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Abstract: The aim of the present study is to understand how the social-psychological method Interactive
Problem Solving (IPS), developed by Herbert C. Kelman, can contribute to the resolution of conflict.
The study looks at the application of the method in dialogue workshops to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Its leading argument holds that identity is not only a possible conflict cause but could also work towards
finding conflict solutions. The study describes processes that form our identity and explores how aspects
of our identity can be discussed and changed. By retracing a set of consecutive workshop discussions held
during the Peace Process between 1990 and 2000, the study reveals instances, where Israeli and Pales-
tinian participants were able to negotiate identity changes. The nature and quality of the traced identity
changes are then evaluated based on 13 interviews, held with former workshop participants. By generat-
ing a good understanding of how identity formation processes can be engaged in conflict resolution, this
study seeks to strengthen the case for methods like IPS, which employ social- psychological concepts to
address identity aspects. Das Ziel dieser Studie ist es, zu verstehen, wie die sozialpsychologische Meth-
ode Interactive Problem Solving (IPS) von Herbert C. Kelman zu Konfliktresolutionen beitragen kann.
Die Studie untersucht die Anwendung der Methode in Dialog-Workshops am Israel-Palästina Konflikt.
Die Leitthese beinhaltet, dass Identität nicht nur eine mögliche Ursache für Konflikte darstellt, sondern
auch zur Lösung von Konflikten beitragen kann. Die Studie beschreibt Prozesse, die unsere Identität
formen und untersucht, wie Identitätsaspekte diskutiert und verändert werden können. Die Studie zeich-
net Diskussionen einer Workshop-Serie nach, welche zwischen 1990 und 2000 abgehalten worden waren.
Dabei zeigt die Studie Momente auf, in welchen Israelische und Palästinensische Teilnehmenden Verän-
derungen in ihren Identitätsaspekten verhandeln konnten. In einem nächsten Schritt werden die Art und
die Qualität der aufgezeigten Identitätsveränderungen evaluiert. Dies geschieht an Hand von 13 Inter-
views, welche die Autorin mit ehemaligen Workshop-Teilnehmenden geführt hat. Die Studie fördert das
Verständnis davon, wie Identitätsprozesse für die Konfliktresolution eingesetzt werden können und stärkt
damit die Position von Methoden wie IPS, welche Identitätsaspekte mit Hilfe von sozialpsychologische
Konzepten bearbeiten.
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fascinated me with its employment of social-psychological processes for the 
purposes of understanding the impetus for conflict behavior, and of making 
conflict resolution tools available.  
My motivation to engage in a study of Interactive Problem Solving has been to 
pin-point the social-psychological processes that are active during the 
application of the method. The study focuses on making hidden processes 
tangible with the aim of showing the efficiency of the method and to 
strengthening the stand of scholars that are taking into consideration the 
indispensable and challenging psychological factor of conflict.  
My gratitude for being able to conduct this study goes to my doctoral tutor 
Professor Kurt R. Spillmann, whom I admire for his courageous contribution to 
the qualitative approach of conflict analysis, and whom I thank for his kind 
encouragement and patience. I especially thank Professor Herbert C. Kelman 
for his trust and for granting me access to principal research material that made 
this study possible, which tries to pay a humble tribute to his invaluable 
contribution to the field of applied social-psychological methods. I thank my 
parents for their unconditional and compassionate support, my husband for his 
loving care, and my colleagues and friends for many fruitful discussions and 
continuing encouragement. Most of all, I thank the former workshop 
participants for their trust and dedication – talking to each one of you in person, 





"All conflicts are identity conflicts" John Paul Lederach 
 
 The aim of the present study is to understand how the social-
psychological method Interactive Problem Solving (IPS), developed by Herbert 
C. Kelman, can contribute to the resolution of conflict. The study looks at the 
application of the method in dialogue workshops to the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. Its leading argument holds that identity is not only a possible conflict 
cause but could also work towards finding conflict solutions. The study 
describes processes that form our identity and explores how aspects of our 
identity can be discussed and changed. By retracing a set of consecutive 
workshop discussions held during the Peace Process between 1990 and 2000, 
the study reveals instances, where Israeli and Palestinian participants were able 
to negotiate identity changes. The nature and quality of the traced identity 
changes are then evaluated based on 13 interviews, held with former workshop 
participants. By generating a good understanding of how identity formation 
processes can be engaged in conflict resolution, this study seeks to strengthen 
the case for methods like IPS, which employ social-psychological concepts to 
address identity aspects. 
 
Introduction  
This study approaches identity not only as a possible conflict cause, but 
also as a tool for constructive conflict resolution. Identity, which is not an 
immutable and stagnant state but an ongoing development, contains processes 
that influence the behavior of conflict parties. Identity has a particular bearing 
on conflict dynamic because it determines whom we perceive as friend or foe, 
and whether we deal with conflict constructively or destructively. The social-
psychological processes of identity formation contain the capacity for empathy 
and enmity and harbor the mechanisms accounting for cooperative as well as 
for obstructive behavior. Exploring the formation of identity structures 
therefore, offers access to a better understanding of conflict behavior and of 
ways to respond to such behavior in a constructive way.  
Understanding identity formation processes is particularly relevant with 
regard to resolving existential protracted conflicts1 as fought between different 
identity groups, such as, for example in Cyprus, Northern Ireland or Sri Lanka. 
  3 
The focus of this study will be on the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. 
In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict the national identity structures of the conflict 
parties have become instrumental to the conflict's dynamic and vice versa. The 
struggle over national identity between Israelis and Palestinians has led them to 
view their conflict in zero-sum terms (Kelman, 1987, 2001). The parties 
perceive not only the disputed territory and resources, but also their national 
identity and existence, which they intrinsically link to their homeland, as finite 
goods. In the view of each conflict party, the other's national existence and 
national identity can only prevail at the demise of their own national existence. 
The threat of destruction and nonexistence has shaped each group's self-
definition. The self-definition or identity of each group in turn, has exacerbated 
the conflict and impeded its resolution.  
To resolve the conflict in terms of reconciling the two parties, Israelis 
and Palestinians would need to remove the negation of the other as a central 
component of their own identity. Removing the negation of the other implies to 
accommodate the existence of the other within one's own collective identity, at 
least in the sense of acknowledging the legitimacy of the other's national 
narrative without necessarily fully agreeing with that narrative. A revision of 
each party's national identity is in principle possible, because identity formation 
is in constant flux. In a conflict situation, however, revising the sense of self 
feels very threatening and is therefore not easily engaged in. An identity 
revision can only occur if it confirms, rather than threatens, a conflict party's 
core sense of self. A situation that allows for an identity revision can be 
induced by geopolitical developments or by being specifically supported 
through official and unofficial conflict resolution efforts.  
Diplomatic efforts that work with identity formation processes as a tool 
for constructively solving conflicts are scarce. One of them is Interactive 
Problem Solving, a method – developed by Herbert C. Kelman – with the aim 
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of offering high-level representatives of conflict parties the possibility to 
engage in analytical discussions of conflict issues in dialogue workshops.  
IPS has been applied to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since the 1970s 
but most continuously during the Peace Process between 1990 and 2000. 
Interactive problem-solving workshops formed part of the Peace Process, 
which in its entirety accelerated changes leading to an accommodation of each 
conflict party’s national existence. The signing of the Oslo Accords mirrored 
the changes in both parties' national identity and seemed to pave the way 
towards a comprehensive resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but so 
far has not led to that end.  
The aim of the present study is to contribute to the research field of 
peace and conflict studies and to strengthen methods like IPS, which employ 
social-psychological concepts to address identity aspects. The study wants to 
explore how working with identity formation processes can contribute to the 
resolution of conflict. For this purpose the study looks behind the scenes of IPS 
to discover how its social-psychological concepts function, both in theory and 
as a practical method. The study retraces how the method evolved conceptually 
to employ identity formation processes for resolving conflict, and to what 
extent identity formation processes have impacted the method’s most 
continuous application during the Peace Process. Thus, the leading research 
question of the study aims at finding out: “how has the identity factor 
influenced the dynamics of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process between 1990 
and 2000?”  
The term identity factor is defined here as the processes that account for 
the ongoing formation of identity as well as for the employment of those 
processes for the purpose of changing identity aspects to enhance the 
development of cooperative and peaceful relations between opponent parties. 
Identity changing mechanisms include systematic employment of identity 
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formation processes as a conflict resolution tool, as well as macro-level 
developments that lead, in an unsystematic way, to identity changes that 
support peaceful relations. The dynamics of the Peace Process refer to official 
and unofficial efforts that contributed to a cooperative political atmosphere 
culminating in the peace agreement of 1993 between the Israelis and 
Palestinians and the ensuing final status negotiations.  
The research of the study follows a qualitative tradition2 and is displayed 
in a narrative form describing two cases of the application of IPS, the 
Continuing Workshop as well as the Joint Working Group to avoid le cas 
pure3. The author conducted active interviews4 with a non-standardized 
questionnaire that allowed for an individual adaptation of questions according 
to the course of the interview and the subjects raised by the interviewees.  
To discuss the research question, the first part of the study, containing 
chapter one to three, establishes theoretical components of IPS, the second part, 
containing chapter four to nine, describes the practical application of IPS, and 
the third part discusses the observed findings.  
Chapter one situates IPS within a newly emerging research field of 
conflict resolution relying on the identity formation processes. Driven by the 
aim of showing how identity formation can account for conflict phenomena, 
the second chapter establishes the process elements of the identity factor by 
explaining how individual and group identities evolve. The third chapter looks 
at how the identity factor can impact on conflict behavior and shows how IPS 
has evolved into an identity management method employing process elements 
of identity formation as a conflict resolution tool.  
Chapter four situates the study within the historical context of the Peace 
Process, before chapter five and six trace processes of negotiating identity 
aspects at the micro-level of IPS workshops and relate them to macro-level 
developments of the Peace Process. Based on observatory notes, taken by third-
Introduction 
 6 
party staff members, the study follows two different forms of applied IPS, the 
Continuing Workshop – a pure discussion format, and the Joint Working Group 
– where participants jointly wrote concept papers that were published.  
The concluding chapters analyse the influence of the identity factor on 
the Peace Process based on interviews with former workshop participants and 
third-party members. Chapter seven, eight and nine evaluate the general impact 
of IPS as a conflict resolution tool, assess what kind of identity changes the 
method was able to produce, what its limitations are, and reflect on the nature 
and quality of the discerned changes.  
                                                
Notes:  
 
1  Edward Azar defines protracted conflicts as hostile interactions between communal 
groups that focus on religious, cultural or ethnic identity, and which persist over 
long periods of time with sporadic outbreaks of violence. See for example in: The 
Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases (Aldershot, UK: 
Dartmouth, 1990), 2.  
 
2  The study’s research design is a non-numerical secondary participant observation, 
relying on the collection of documents from first-hand participant observation and 
individual interviewing, resulting in an informal content analysis. Cf.: Martin W. 
Bauer and George Gaskell, “Quality, Quantity and Knowledge Interests” in 
Qualitative Researching with Text Image and Sound (London, UK: Sage, 2000), 3-
17: 5.  
 
3  Johan Galtung describes the difficulties of finding le cas pur or the ideal case 
knowing that each case will differ somewhat. See for example: Theory and 
Methods of Social Research (London, UK: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., Second 
edition, 1969), 16-17.  
 
4  Active interviews in contrast to traditional interviews take into consideration how 
interview responses are produced in the interaction between interviewer and 
respondent, without losing sight of the meanings produced or the circumstances 
that condition the meaning-making process. The analytic objective is to show how 
what is being said relates to the experience that is being studied. Cf.: James A. 
Holstein and Jaber F. Gubrium, “Active Interviewing”, in Qualitative Research 






1  Identity Management  
 
That the identity factor has a causal relevance for the analysis of 
protracted social conflicts is not new. Several scholars describe identity-based 
conflicts as being caused by frustrated basic needs and rights like participation, 
consistency, security, recognition and distributive justice, which are necessary 
for the development of all people (Burton, 1987, 1990; Azar, 1990; Fisher, 
1997). Jay Rothman characterizes identity-based conflicts as being “[…] 
deeply rooted in the underlying individual human needs and values that 
together constitute people’s social identities, particularly in the context of 
group affiliations, loyalties, and solidarity” (1997: 6).  
New are the implications of the identity factor for the management and 
the resolution of conflict. Only a handful of scholars have so far employed 
identity-forming mechanisms to change identity structures for the resolution of 
conflict, an approach called identity management (Korostelina, 2007: 204). 
Interactive Problem Solving (IPS) – developed and applied by Herbert C. 
Kelman – is one of the few conflict resolution methods of identity 
management. IPS works with the underlying processes of identity formation to 
“negotiate” national identity aspects.  
Identity management refers to conflict resolution efforts, which employ 
communication techniques and conceptual tools to change or redefine identity 
with the aim of mitigating conflict (Korostelina, 2007: 204). Identity 
management evolved within the discipline called conflict resolution, and is to 
be situated within the realm of the diplomatic spectrum that Joseph V. 
Montville named track two diplomacy (Montville and Davidson, 1981).  
Before the term identity management emerged, some conflict resolution 
scholars besides Kelman have already referred to the identity factor as an 
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instrument to solve conflict. Among them are Terrel A. Northrup (1989), Jay 
Rothman (1997) as well as Richard D. Ashmore, Lee Jussim and David Wilder 
(2001). Northrup analyses the dynamic of identity to deduce propositions for 
the transformation of intractable conflicts. Northrup has identified processes of 
identity formation that account for conflict escalation from which he elaborated 
a four-stage conflict escalation model that is further discussed in the third 
chapter of this study. Rothman has developed a framework called ARIA (1997: 
5ff.). The ARIA framework is named after the four phases of its process: 
Antagonism, Resonance, Invention, and Action. The framework focuses on 
transforming identity conflicts relying on a comprehensive analysis that allows 
for the recognition of identity-based conflicts and a constructive response to 
such conflicts. Ashmore and his co-editors of Social Identity, Intergroup 
Conflict and Conflict Reduction, point to the possibility of reducing intergroup 
conflict by employing social-psychological mechanisms (2001: 242ff.). The 
editors plan a future volume dedicated entirely to the approach of conflict 
reduction through social identification processes. 
 
Conflict Resolution and Track Two Diplomacy 
Conflict resolution, as an academic discipline and a school of thought of 
International Relations, analyzes the psychological origins of political conflict 
and "works to discover nonviolent, constructive, and eventually mutually-
satisfactory solutions to […] complex and long-standing ethnic and sectarian 
disputes" (Montville, 1987: 8). By taking psychological factors into 
consideration, conflict resolution complements the analysis of conflict as 
traditionally approached, for example, by the realist tradition of International 
Relations.1 According to the realist tradition, conflicts are caused by clashing 
political interests and claims to power and cannot be fully resolved but only 
settled or suppressed by coercive means. In contrast to approaches that focus on 
Identity Management 
 10 
settling interests through a brokered political agreement, conflict resolution 
aims at resolving underlying conflict causes. Conflict resolution is not only a 
field of study but also a practice-oriented approach that aims at developing 
concrete conflict solutions that will satisfy all conflict parties. For its 
development conflict resolution relies on theoretical concepts as much as it 
draws on practical experience.  
Track two diplomacy can be defined as comprising professional non-
governmental, informal and unofficial activities attempting to analyze, prevent, 
resolve and manage conflicts by non-state actors (Diamond and Mac Donald, 
1993:4). In contrast to official diplomatic efforts, termed track one diplomacy2, 
track two efforts are neither organized by nor do they engage government 
officials, or if they do the latter act as private individuals and not in their 
official capacity. The aim of track two efforts is to change the quality of the 
relationship between conflict parties by addressing and resolving underlying 
conflict causes. The means employed by track two efforts are non-coercive and 
facilitating, in the sense that third parties do not impose and not even propose 
conflict solutions but assist conflict parties to develop their own solutions in an 
interactive process.  
Track two diplomacy also differs from grass-root initiatives, business 
sector contributions, or peace activism, which John W. Mac Donald described 
as ranging from track three to track nine peace-procuring activities (2002: 55). 
In contrast to grass-root activities track two diplomacy is an elite approach as it 
engages highly influential representatives of the respective conflict parties who 
are close to their political leadership and have the possibility to impact the 
public opinion of their polity.  
Track two initiatives can be employed at different stages of a peace 
process. They can operate in the absence of official negotiations, act as a 
preparation for them, or occur parallel to them as well as to other peace 
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procuring initiatives. Second track diplomacy does by no means intend to 
substitute or bypass other peace procuring activities. Its objective is to 
complement governmental as well as grass-root efforts by offering measures 
that other initiatives cannot. 
Although the methodological approach of identity management is 
recent, certain forms of identity “negotiation” have been used as a tool to solve 
conflict between and within states as early as the 1950s. Valérie-Barbara 
Rosoux (2001) observed the phenomenon between France and Germany and 
Daniel L. Byman (1997/98) and Karim Mezran (2001) in Morocco.  
 
Negotiating National Identity 
Rosoux describes the formal negotiations of France and Germany in the 
late 1950 and early 1960s as a case for the emergence of a changed identity 
promoting peaceful coexistence between two nations. The former adversaries 
developed new traits within their national identities through elite negotiations. 
The development was induced by the – at the time – German Chancellor 
Konrad Adenauer and the French President Charles de Gaulle. The negotiations 
they instilled focused on overcoming the conflicting past and accentuating their 
commonalities through a process of mutual re-identification. One of their most 
important steps was to generate understanding and officially recognize the 
suffering of the other nation. The two elite politicians changed aspects of the 
national identity of the two peoples by turning the focus from past enmities 
towards the solidarity between them and by redefining the past wars as 
collective sufferings. The new German national identity included acceptance of 
responsibility for the most difficult episodes of national history. The new 
French national identity encompassed recognition of the French negative 
actions and acknowledgment of Germany as a great nation.  
Identity Management 
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In Morocco consultations between the elite and populist movements led 
to a definition of national identity that became widely shared by the population 
at large; while the lack of such a negotiation process led to an identity crisis 
and an ensuing violent conflict in Algeria. After Morocco gained independence 
in 1956, King Mohammed V acted as a mediator between the Arabist Istiqlal 
and the Berberist Popular Movement and facilitated an agreement around their 
different identity concepts. He developed the conception of Moroccanism as a 
basis for territorial nationalism that encompassed a new identity overarching 
but not suppressing local Arab, or Berber and tribal or urban identities. King 
Mohammed V conducted negotiations on the basis of an issue approach and 
negotiated new identity aspects by discussing single issues. Each party was 
asked to make concessions in exchange for obtaining objectives with regard to 
specific topics. For example, in exchange for the parties’ consent to the 
formation of a democratic National Consultative Assembly, the King offered 
the Istiqlal an agrarian reform and the Berbers recognition of their political 
party (Mezran, 2001: 156).   
Byman draws a different picture of the same period in Morocco. He 
holds that the monarch used a stick and carrot strategy of coercion and co-
optation to preserve ethnic peace and manipulated rather than negotiated 
identities of individual Moroccans (1997/98: 13). Byman especially observed 
manipulation of identities during the reign of Hassan II, who resumed power 
after his father’s death in 1961 and used repressive policies to discourage and 
even crush tribal revolts. Byman’s description of the emergence of a Moroccan 
identity shows that elite politicians can use identity-forming mechanisms to 
coerce a new identity. Bymann stresses that coercively induced identity 
changes only account for ethnic peace as long as the enforcing power structures 




Interactive Problem Solving  
The preceding observations describe changes in identity structures of 
conflict parties that were neither systematically introduced as a conflict 
resolution method nor consciously negotiated by the conflict parties. Kelman, 
conversely, conceptualized his conflict resolution method in a way that aspects 
of national identity can be negotiated in an analytical manner. In contrast to the 
three foregoing examples, in the case of IPS identity negotiation is not imposed 
by elite politicians but is contained in a communication technique applied in 
conflict resolution workshops, in which representatives of conflict parties 
voluntarily participate.  
IPS has been applied mostly to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict under the 
auspices of a research project called Program on International Conflict 
Analysis and Resolution (PICAR) located at the Weatherhead Center for 
International Affairs at Harvard University. PICAR grew out of the efforts, 
starting in the 1970s, undertaken by Kelman and his associates to bring 
together politically influential Israelis and Palestinians in face-to-face dialogue 
groups under the guidance of a third-party panel of social scientists. Kelman 
developed IPS based on the work of John W. Burton (1969, 1979), who applied 
a problem-solving communication technique to tackle conflict issues in 
analytical discussions. Kelman describes the method as an “unofficial, 
academically based third-party approach to the analysis and resolution of 
international and intercommunal conflicts” (1996: 501).  
The fullest application of IPS consists of interactive problem-solving 
workshops (Kelman, 1972: 169). The scope of the workshops is twofold. First, 
they intend to achieve individual changes in the workshop participants at the 
micro level of group discussions and second, at transferring those changes to 
the macro level of the policy-making process of the two communities. The 
workshops offer members of conflicting parties a private and confidential 
Identity Management 
 14 
setting, where they can meet with an impartial third party to engage in direct 
and noncommittal communication. The workshops aim at engendering a 
change of perspective by opening up a possibility for conflict parties to explore 
each other's points of view and see the situation through the eyes of the other. 
Thereby each party gains new insights that may lead to a changed perception of 
themselves and of the other conflict party. Departing from the newly gained 
perspectives, the workshops aim at eventually generating a gradual 
transformation of the conflict parties’ relationship.  
The method guides workshop participants towards analytical discussions 
of conflict issues that contain, or are, elements of national identity. Without 
specifically pointing to it, the discussion format leads participants to negotiate 
aspects of identity elements with the aim of abandoning obstructive and 
integrating constructive parts of their national identity and building a new 
structure that accommodates the national existence of the other. For example in 
the case of the two parties’ relationship to the land, one of the defining 
elements of both Israeli and Palestinian national identity, each party perceives 
that relationship as an exclusive right, rendering claims of the other group as 
illegitimate. According to Kelman, the parties have to “[…] accept the 
possibility that certain elements of identity may be shared with the other, 
acknowledging that the other also has a profound attachment to the land 
anchored in authentic historical ties to it” (2001:193).  
The general workshop format comprises four distinct issues: workshop 
setting, selection of participants, pre-workshop sessions, and the workshop 
structure. The structure of each workshop comprises ground rules concerning 
different communication techniques as well as the role of the third party, and 
an agenda. The communication techniques employed, consist of using a de-
escalatory language that enables parties to engage in an empathic exchange of 
perspectives that engages them in actively listening to each other and 
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formulating their statements in a comprehensible way. The employed language 
assists parties in formulating ideas for mutually reassuring gestures and actions 
that enable them to engage in a creative problem-solving approach that allows 
participants to jointly analyze conflict issues and develop new ideas and 
insights for possible conflict solutions. The procedural agenda structures the 
course of the workshop into five different stages including: information 
exchange, needs analysis, joint thinking about solutions, discussion of 
constraints, and joint thinking about overcoming constraints (Kelman and 
Cohen, 1976: 277).  
 
Identity-Based Training and Identity Reconstruction 
In contrast to Kelman’s methodology that implicitly contains the 
negotiation of identity aspects, Korostelina employs techniques that raise 
awareness of how identity-forming mechanisms act on conflict dynamics or 
even introduce the underlying processes of identity formation as a conceptual 
tool to conflict parties. 
The technique of identity-based training aims at developing 
understanding for the role of identity in increasing and decreasing conflict in 
seven ways (Korostelina, 2007: 213ff.). The technique consists of, first, 
showing the existence of multiple identity systems, second, demonstrating how 
a salient identity can lead to stereotypes and hostile attitudes, third, developing 
a tolerant multi-identity approach, fourth, showing how patterns of identity 
formation and intergroup dynamics can lead to conflict, fifth, building 
analytical skills and recognition of identity-based conflict, sixth, demonstrating 
methods for tolerance building, and seventh, generating conflict resolution 
skills through the knowledge of group dynamics.  
Identity reconstruction workshops are designed to reduce the salience of 
identity by transforming a dominant identity into multiple identities. The 
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technique aims at replacing the structure of narratives, negative attitudes and 
stereotypes that are based on the perception of the “other” as the enemy, with a 
non-oppositional structure rooted in a non-violent self-image (Korostelina, 
2007: 236).  
In a first step the workshop technique kindles an analytic discussion of a 
conflict scenario that is very distinct from the situation of the conflict parties. 
For example, Korostelina introduced the topic of discriminatory practices in the 
Dominican Republic to a workshop discussion of Crimean conflict groups. Her 
aim was to generate understanding of root-causes for violent actions, alleviate 
changes in perceptions, and generate recognition of hostile behavior of 
ingroups among participants. In a second step Korostelina approaches a 
revision of each conflict party’s own identity by emphasizing each group’s 
peaceful, reconciliatory and cooperative features in their self-description. In a 
third step, the technique aims at turning the formed models of peaceful self-
concepts into constructive action, by forming a common overarching identity 
that can de-escalate conflict.  
 
Exploring the Implementation of Identity Management 
As identity management is a new field of expertise within the realm of 
conflict and peace studies, it is the aim of the present study to ascertain the very 
important contribution of identity management as an action-research tool for 
the resolution of conflicts. Psychological processes have long been disregarded 
not only in the scope of understanding the causes of conflicts, but also in terms 
of developing methods that serve as practical tools for solving conflict.  
IPS has captured the idea of learning to understand the identity factor for 
the purpose of employing identity formation processes for the resolution of 
conflicts. It has thereby contributed to the formation of the new research area 
and laid the ground for the development of further methods to tackle complex 
THEORY 
 17 
conflict situations. It is the intent of the present study to contribute to the 
further establishment of identity management by exploring the content of IPS, 
and evaluating the scope of its application to Israeli-Palestinian conflict during 


























                                                
1  
The realist tradition of International Relations founds itself on Machiavellian 
principles and the objectives of power politics. The tradition views nation-states as 
living in an anarchical society amongst which, war is inevitable because each 
follows its own interests and power considerations. Conflicts can only be settled 
through coercive means or the use of force. In Jack Donnelly, Realism and 
International Relations (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000: 7-
11).  
2   
Track one initiatives are organized by states or international organizations and 
thereby occur at an official governmental level. The means employed by track 
one actors comprise the use of their own power to broker or even impose an 
agreement by ways of threats or inducements. The aim of track one efforts is to 
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2  The Identity Factor 
 
In order to analyze how conflict resolution methods like IPS can work 
on and with the identity factor, we need to understand how identity is formed 
and how it acts on our thinking and our behavior. Our identity is not a given, 
but something that we gradually and continuously form. It is through the 
general dynamic of identity formation that we acquire an individual and a 
social identity.  
The identity factor is essential when it comes to understanding our 
actions as it provides the impetus to determine our own life course. At the 
beginning of our lives we are entirely dependent on others to take care of us 
and completely lack control over the course of our lives. We are reliant on 
parenting caretakers to respond to our existential needs of food, shelter, and 
security to stay alive.  
Children react to the lack of control with aggressive impulses. The 
desire to respond to our needs is abidingly strong already from the earliest days 
of our lives. Because we would like to be able to satisfy our needs ourselves we 
start to imitate those who provide for us in order to attain their abilities. By 
doing this we begin to develop our identity. The dynamic that spurs our desire 
of attaining knowledge about our environment and about who we are in relation 
to that environment is the dynamic that spurs the development of our identity. 
Identity development continues during adult life. Our identity 
encompasses a sense that we are safe in the world, physically and 
psychologically, by providing us with knowledge and control. A situation in 
which we are completely unable to exert a certain amount of control over our 
environment, in which we can no longer predict how our behavior affects the 
response of others, and in which we lose sense of who we are, is unbearable for 
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us. The continuing urge to maintain self-determining abilities keeps the 
development of our identity alive.  
 
Individual Identity 
In every day life identity is used to describe a wide range of personal 
attributes like someone's gender, profession, religious orientation and 
nationality. It further includes a person's character and psychological traits such 
as feelings of competence, intellectual interests, and personal tastes (Northrup, 
1989: 65). We refer to our identity to express what we do or do not like, feel 
comfortable with, or equate ourselves to. For example, we say that we can or 
cannot identify ourselves with a given idea, a group of people or a way of 
living. Identity is used here to describe a conscious act of orientating ourselves. 
It provides the answer to the basic questions „who am I?“, „where do I 
belong?“, and „how do I fit in?“ (Oyserman, 2004: 5).  
Our identity has to do with who we are and what we know about 
ourselves. Vamık Volkan describes identity, or the sense of self, as the 
impression we have of how our emotional, intellectual, and physical 
components respond to the world about us and to pressures arising within 
ourselves (1988: 4). Volkan’s description refers to three core elements that 
constitute identity. The three elements consist of: first, that we actually depend 
on a response or interaction to form our identity, second, what we respond to or 
interact with and third, how we respond.  
The identity forming process depends on an interaction between our self 
and our external environment. We cannot develop an identity without 
interacting with those around us. However, we do not only interact with the 
outside world, we also respond to our inner components, as Volkan refers to 
the world about us as well as to the pressures arising within ourselves. In 
addition to the process occurring between internal and external entities, a 
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second process is at work between different internal entities that constitute that 
self, which we are trying to get a sense of. What we respond to consists, thus, 
of our environment as well as of our internal structure.  
Further, the process of forming our identity is determined by how these 
interactions occur. Our physical, emotional, and intellectual components 
respond to other human beings and the experiences we share with them. The 
experiences that were made and the new information stemming from these 
experiences are then processed within our self. The process of dealing with 
new information creates a friction between external and internal elements, 
which Volkan refers to as pressures. The friction or tension between our 
internal structure and new information can be compared to what occurs when 
we engage in a dialogue with others. In a constructive discussion our own 
opinions collide with those of others and, if we allow it, are transformed by 
new inputs. If we can make sense of new information in relation to what we 
know already, we engage in a learning process. In the same manner, our self 
will grow if we accept and integrate new items of information.  
 How we form our identity is, thus, through a learning process: a process 
through which we build the repertory of what we know about ourselves – or 
our self – and through which we make sense of our experiences. The way we 
get to know ourselves is tied to knowing the world in which we live and to 
making sense of ourselves in relation to that world. We are not born with a 
fixed identity but continuously construct it through our social interactions.  
 
 Getting to Know Our “Self” 
George Herbert Mead shows how we construct our identity by 
explaining how the structure of our self is organized in order to engage in the 
process of forming our identity. Mead describes the individual self as the 
mechanism through which society is absorbed by the human mind (1968: 222). 
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The self can be viewed as a miniature society within the individual. We build a 
picture of society within ourselves by internalizing certain societal codes and 
conventions. The elements that constitute the self as Mead views it are the I 
and the Me (1968: 216). The two elements converse with each other, in a way 
analogous to how two people talk to each other. According to Mead, this 
conversational relationship between the I and the Me (which is only possible 





The I and the Me are of a different nature and have accordingly different 
tasks within their conversational relation. At the beginning of our lives only the 
I is active and reacts to occurrences in our environment in an immediate and 
spontaneous way. The impressions that the I gathers through its interaction 
with the outside world are processed and stored in the Me. Thereby the I 
creates the Me.  
 According to Mead, the Me is a picture, a reflection of the outside world 
(1968: 218). The Me processes information collected by the I and assimilates it 
in a way that this new information becomes part of the Me. Among the newly 
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gained information are norms and conventions that govern interactions between 
individuals. The Me develops into an autonomous entity by organizing the 
gathered experiences and societal codes. We thereby integrate the parameters 
of our social environment into our psychological structure. The Me, thus, 
builds our internal psychological structure. This structure consists of the picture 
or concept we have of our selves and others. They are the stock of data that 
originates from our very first contacts with those around us and later in life 
allow us to orientate ourselves when interacting with others. The Me allows us 
to examine and think about our behavior. It is the realm that offers the basis for 
what we experience as being in control of our actions.  
A conversation between the I and the Me starts when we are confronted 
with a situation to which we need to react. Our reactions result from a 
reflective process through which we form a decision that we formulate or act 
out. The reflective process consists of a dialogue between the I and the Me. The 
role of the I in this conversation consists of receiving inputs from the outside 
world. To reach a decision the I consults the conglomerate of structured 
experiences of the Me. Thereby the Me provides an orientation guide to the I. 
While the I depends on the Me to take a decision and form a reaction, the 
decision and reaction are not determined by the Me.  
The interaction between the I and the Me allows us to construct a self-
representation and thereby to build the core of our identity structure, which 
contains our biological and cultural heritage such as our ethnic background, 
capacities and temperamental orientations. While the I perceives what is going 
on around us, the Me is engaged in processing these impacts, in storing our 
experiences, and in internalizing new information in a way that they become 
part of our self. The I can consult the Me about how to react to every new 
impact, which the I receives. Thereby a whole range of self-representations 
emerges, which form different layers in the core of our identity.  
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The different identity layers remain in constant development, as the Me 
does not only allow us to assimilate new information but also to integrate this 
knowledge into the concept we have of our self. The capacity of the Me allows 
us to engage in the learning process through which we form our identity. 
Identity formation evolves by going through an initial emotional and a second 
cognitive development phase.  
 
Emotional Development 
To explain our emotional development, I refer to modern object-
relations theory that originated from Sigmund Freud’s work.2 Object-relations 
theory studies the development of our self in early childhood. As the 
development of our identity depends on relations to others, the theory is named 
object-relations. The theory employs the term object primarily to refer to a 
person other than our self, and more precisely to our inner representation of 
that person. Before turning to the insights of object-relations theory, we will 
look at some of Freud’s elaborations on the development of our identity during 
childhood, on which the theory is built.  
According to William Bloom, Freud used the term identification to refer 
to a three-stage process. First, we develop an emotional tie to someone else. 
Second, we adopt traits of the person, to whom we feel attached, and integrate 
those traits into our own psychological structure (or self). Third, identification 
culminates when we share a valued quality like an ideal, a principle, or an 
emotional attribute with another person (Bloom, 1990; Freud, 1921).3 
Further, two types of dynamics motivate identification, one is emulative 
and one is defensive. Emulative motivation refers to an affectionate bond to a 
parental figure; while defensive motivation refers to a situation, in which a 
child feels threatened by a parent. Emulative motivation is stimulated when 
children experience a satisfaction of their needs like hunger and affection. 
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Defensive motivation is stimulated when children fear that those needs will not 
be satisfied. The lack of need satisfaction is experienced as a threat. 
It needs to be emphasized here, that young children perceive such a 
threat as endangering their lives. Freud understood identification as a dynamic 
that the child develops in order to survive. A child depends on the affection of 
parents, their nourishment and protection, to stay alive. According to Freud, 
children start to imitate and thereby identify themselves with a parent in order 
to gain control over their own life. Emulatively motivated identification occurs 
because children want to become, like the nurturing parent, able to answer their 
needs. Defensively motivated identification occurs because children aim at 
becoming like the threatening parent, in order to neutralize that threat.  
It becomes clear here that the formation of identity is our psychological 
survival guide. In order to understand the origins of enemy images and other 
processes that account for conflict behavior, we need to expand on the content 
of the identity factor a little bit further. 
Object-relations theory elaborates on Freud’s study of infant 
development by exploring our emotional capacity as the initial driving force of 
identity formation. Among the prominent scholars of the theory is Otto 
Kernberg, who explains that our emotional capacity develops in four stages 
(1972: 234ff.).  
In the first weeks of our lives we experience a symbiotic phase, in which 
we perceive parenting figures and ourselves as one. In this phase we do not yet 
have clear representations of object relations. What we absorb (into the Me 
structure) are memory traces of rewarding, or libidinally gratifying 
experiences, like cuddling or feeding. At this stage it is most improbable, that 
we are able to differentiate between our own experiences and the object from 






In the second phase, taking place approximately between the fourth and 
the twelfth week, we develop a first sense of our self, or an undifferentiated 
self-object representation, as Kernberg calls it (1972: 234). Children form a 
good image of themselves when they experience a satisfying feeling, like after 
being fed. This experience builds a memory trace qualified as “only good“. 
Simultaneously, unpleasant and frustrating experiences, like the dissatisfaction 
of a need like hunger, result in an undifferentiated “only bad“ self-object 
representation. These good and bad memory traces are separate. At this 
development stage we are unable to integrate the two images into one person 
and therefore perceive ourselves as having two selves: a pleasant and an 
unpleasant one. The same is true for the parenting person. For example, we 
perceive the „bad“ mother, who did not satisfy our needs, and the „good“ 
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mother, who did satisfy our needs, as two different persons. Consistent with 
our pleasant and unpleasant experiences we form separate reservoirs that 
correspond to the oppositional pairs of good/bad, own/foreign, safe/threatening, 
in which we store information. Everything that we are familiar with is “only 
good” and everything we are unfamiliar with is “only bad”. These mechanisms 
are precisely the presuppositions for the later creation of enemy images.  
During the third phase, occurring approximately between the sixth and 
eighteenth week, we experience a first differentiation between self and other. 
This differentiation occurs first within the “good” self-object representation. 
The differentiation in the “bad” representation realm occurs later, as early 
forms of projection complicate that development. Projection here refers to 
attempts of externalizing “bad” self-object representations.  
According to Kernberg, externalization of bad self-object 
representations is responsible for the so-called stranger anxiety at 
approximately the age of eight months (1972: 235). Stranger anxiety does not 
result from previous negative experiences with the person against whom it is 
directed nor is it a reaction to a real threat. The rejection of the stranger results 
from feelings of dissatisfaction. Dissatisfaction produces anger and aggression, 
which the child seeks to externalize. The child cannot discharge aggressive 
impulses against the parenting person because it fears a possible loss of his or 
her love, on which the child depends. Therefore, the anger is displaced on the 
stranger in whom the child sees the absence of the “good” parent.  
This development accounts for the fact that our identity is also 
determined by whom we are not and constitutes the mechanism creating enemy 
images (Oppenheimer, 2006). We decide who we are by demarcating ourselves 
from those who are different and alien to us. We project self-images that do not 
correspond with our self-view onto the other. The projected self-images are not 
inherently negative but only perceived as such because we cannot integrate 
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them into the existing identity structure and therefore represent a threat to our 
sense of self. The process of projection is at its basis not of malign intention but 
an attempt to neutralize internal threats and to strengthen our sense of self. This 
accounts for the fact that in a conflict situation an enemy image can be 
dissolved, when a threat to our sense of self can be neutralized. The origin of 
assembling or dismantling enemy images is, thus, an outcome of the process of 
self-definition.  
Only between the twelfth and the eighteenth month, the beginning of the 
fourth phase of our emotional development, we start to integrate the previously 
separate aspects of good and bad within one person. We are now able to 
perceive ourselves as well as our parental figure as entities with good and bad 
qualities. The more integrated our self-concept becomes, the more the 
perception we have of our self corresponds to the impact we have on others. At 
the same time the representation we have of others becomes more integrated, 
which means that the image we have of someone else corresponds more closely 
to the real character of that person. In other words, the clearer and more defined 
our internal structure becomes, the more able we become to establish 
relationships with other people in our environment.  
Slowly we arrive at a stage where we are emotionally ready and capable 
to engage in various forms of relationships, also in relationships with people 
who are outside of our own familiar environment or group, and who - in the 
second development stage - fell under the category of alien and bad. This 
development continues until the age of six. It becomes possible because we 
start to identify ourselves with those close to us.  
Identification here refers to a dual process during which we first imitate 
traits of others, which we experience through interaction with our familiar 
environment and then internalize by turning them into our own. Identification 
with others is an unconscious consequence of the conscious act of imitating 
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those around us in order to attain emotional autonomy. Emotional autonomy is 
what we experience when forming a self-concept. We imitate and thereby 
integrate values and norms, which our parents or other attachment figures of 
our familiar group teach us. We then internalize them into the Me, the 
representation of our self and our object-relations, and they become our own 
norms and values.  
A child experiencing this process restructures his or her self-
representation through the incorporation of new norms and character traits. 
Once internalized, these norms and traits will guide our behavior and will serve 
as a repertory, on the basis of which we will interpret new information. Once 
such a repertory is established, we create categories, which help us to make 
sense of our social environment by separating it into comprehensible entities. 
During this process we develop the ability to respond to others.  
 
Social-Cognitive Development 
The development of our cognitive capacity complements our emotional 
capability by adding the possibility to break free from a reflex controlled 
behavior. It allows us to supersede patterns like own/alien (everything familiar 
equals good and everything unfamiliar equals bad) and to develop our ability to 
respond to and empathize with others. Cognition in general refers to mental 
processes like thinking, reasoning, inferring, and conceptualizing through 
which we acquire knowledge and consciousness (Flavell, 1993: 2). Social 
cognition in particular, on which we focus here, refers to cognitive functions 
that are directed at the world of human rather than non-human objects and the 
social-communicative use of language (Flavell, 1993: 3).  
Knowledge about social cognition has been greatly advanced by the 
work of Jean Piaget. According to Piaget, we learn by adapting ourselves to a 
complex environment (1991). This adaptation, however, is of an extremely 
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active nature. We do not just passively copy information as it presents itself to 
our senses, but actively select and interpret information from which we 
construct our own knowledge. We learn by taking the structure of our 
surrounding environment into account and by reconstructing it to fit in with our 
own existing mental framework.   
Adaptation, in this sense, consists of two simultaneous and 
complementary processes, which Piaget called assimilation and 
accommodation (1991: 52). He defined assimilation as a repetition of a 
behavior or concept that we have experienced and as the application of those 
experiences to new situations. In other words, we interpret objects in terms of 
our available ways of thinking. For example, a child, who pretends that a chip 
of wood is a boat, assimilates the wood chip to his or her mental concept of a 
boat. The child would, however, never see a boat in the wood chip if it could 
not float and were not vaguely boat shaped. Accommodation, therefore, refers 
to the converse and complementary process of adapting our mental structure to 
the structure of external stimuli.  
Our social-cognitive development starts approximately at the age of six, 
after we have experienced all stages of the emotional development. Kati and 
Kurt Spillmann explain that social cognitive development runs through five 
levels (1989: 21-23).4  
During the first development stage, we still perceive the world 
predominantly from our own perspective, which means that our viewpoint 
equals reality. At this stage we are hardly able to accept a reality different from 
our own. 
At the second level of development, it becomes possible for us to 
differentiate between various points of view, but we are not yet able to apply 
the different perspectives to our social interactions. In other words, we are 
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unable to take thoughts and emotions of others into account with regard to our 




It is only at the third level that we develop the capability to perceive our 
own behavior from the perspective of someone else. We recognize and accept 
that there are many possible perspectives and that people may think and feel 
differently about the same situation. We are able to see that we have to deal 
with conflicting motives, which determine whether we do things that are 
favorable for ourselves, but might not be for others; or choose to act in a way 
that is favorable for others, but not necessarily advantageous to us. Thereby we 
THEORY 
 33 
develop the capacity to bear emotional as well as cognitive contradictions and 
come to understand that we and others sometimes do things, which we do not 
really want to do and don’t do things, which we actually want.  
During the fourth level of development, we discover that we can adopt 
viewpoints of others and that other people can perceive things from our 
perspective as well. The ability for a reciprocal change of perspective contains 
the capacity to develop empathy, mutual trust, and respect and thereby enables 
us to engage in friendships.  
Finally, at the fifth level of development, we start to recognize how the 
whole construct of our society functions and begin to understand the 
foundations of social coherences. Piaget explains that through continuing 
interaction with our environment, we actively construct pictures of what we 
experience, from which we derive structures, patterns and a set of beliefs 
(1991). By organizing and coordinating new information within the created 
structures we acquire knowledge. The structures give us a sense of inner 
stability and allow us to function in the world without being totally 
overwhelmed by the many stimuli that confront us at every moment.  
Erik Erikson describes adult identity as a conglomerate of all single 
identifications with our surrounding, which we have experienced during 
childhood (1973: 107). Our adult identity consists of different identity layers, 
which provide us with points of orientation that we can refer to in order to deal 
with new information. The sense that we have of our self as adults forms a core 
construct within the total system of identity layers of which we dispose to 
navigate in the world. Erikson explains that we need to adapt our identity to 
socio-cultural circumstances in order to function in society. Thus, our identity 
does not remain fixed, once we have reached adulthood, but continues to 
develop by constantly adapting itself to societal demands.  
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The way we react to those demands and how capable we are in coping 
with them depends on the state of our identity. Kelman describes three 
normative identity dimensions that account for our ability of coping with 
societal demands: stability, integration, and authenticity (1998). In this 
perspective, the more stable, integrated, and authentic the structure of our 
identity is, the better equipped we are to handle contradictions and constraints 
inherent in social interaction.  
A stable identity is maintained over time and across situations (Kelman, 
1998: 5-6). While stability is necessary for an identity to exist at all, the degree 
of stability can vary considerably due to an individual's nature or to 
destabilizing experiences. If our identity is stable, it does not mean that it is 
fixed in the sense of being rigid, but strong enough to maintain a continuous 
sense of self while responding to new experiences. Our identity is stable if it is 
open for constant development by accommodating new information within the 
existing structure and relating new identity elements to old ones.  
Our identity is integrated if its constituent elements are in 
communication with each other (Kelman, 1998: 6). Our identity contains 
various elements that are at times contradictory. If our identity is integrated, we 
are able to uphold a creative tension between contrasting elements and accept 
certain inconsistencies of our personality. If the contrasting parts of our identity 
remain in communication, we are able to think and act in a differentiated way 
taking into consideration all parts that define us. If our identity becomes 
disintegrated, we would think in a compartmentalized way and act in an 
undifferentiated manner.  
Our identity is authentic if we take our own development into account, 
reflect our development, and are aware of who we are (Kelman, 1998: 6-7). 
Authenticity in this sense also implies that we keep track of how new elements 
relate to the core of our identity and make sure that newly accommodated 
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identity elements are congruent with that core. This does not mean that we 
cannot overcome limiting biological or social limitations, or reject experiences 
that have become incongruent with our evolving identity; as long as we do not 
deny or repress such unwanted elements. Our identity is authentic if we 
recognize what part a rejected identity element has played in shaping who we 
are. Furthermore, the elements of our identity must be our own in order to be 
authentic. Only if we relate and adapt socially derived identity elements to our 
own orientations and experiences and again integrate them into our emerging 
identity structure, do they become authentic. 
 
 Social Identity and Group Membership 
 Our identity varies according to social, cultural and political realities 
with which we identify and which we integrate into the structure of our self. As 
the features of collectives within which we live are significant for the 
constitution of our personal identity, we can say that the adult personal identity 
expands to encompass in addition a social identity.  
The social dimension of an individual identity is influenced by societal 
roles (Côté and Levine, 2002: 8) and memberships in formal and informal 
groups. Such a collective can be determined by gender as well as by religious, 
ethnic or national belonging. Although these allegiances are the most 
prominent, an individual may also have strong attachments to a province, a 
city, a parish, a clan, a company, a political party or an interest group. Each 
group membership contains some evaluative emotional charge and a 
considerable significance for the individual member's conception of self 
(Northrup, 1989: 65). If social elements are of great importance to an 
individual, they become part of the core construct of the self. In other words, a 
person's individual identity is in part determined by his or her social identity, 
while social identity is primarily determined by group membership. 
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Social identification necessitates a conscious determination and direct 
communicative relationships with those forming a relevant group. Henry Tajfel 
defines social identity as "that part of an individual's self-concept, which 
derives from his or her knowledge of the membership in a social group (or 
groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that 
membership" (1978: 63). An individual needs to truly correspond to a group's 
traditions and practices, its orientations and goals and act according to them in 
order to build his or her social identity on the basis of that group. Only if 
collectively shared experiences, expectations, and orientations are accepted to 
form the past, present, and future, a socially integrative identity can be 
constructed.  
Our identification with a group is again not fixed but depends on the 
active renewal of that identification with the constituents of the group. An 
individual can incorporate many collectives and can acquire or abandon his or 
her belonging to a given group according to changing experiences, 
expectations, values, and rules that determine the nature of that group. 
 Social identity can also be understood as the image that members of a 
collective construct of themselves, and with which they identify. The identity 
of a group, however, exists only if its members profess it. Group identity is not 
something that can be enforced from the outside (Assman, 1992: 132). The 
identity of a group is a construct that designates a commonality of those 
forming the group. This communality needs to be specified in each group 
member's relationship to him or herself and to the world. Collective identities 
are formed, when individuals agree on qualitative descriptions of their selves 
and the world. They are communicative constructs that rest on the active 
personal identification process of the individuals that constitute the group 
(Straub, 2002: 72).  
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Adopting a specific collective identity is not motivated by individual 
goals, or used to achieve personal aims. It serves as a reference point for 
evaluating means and strategies for collective action. A collective identity can 
be seen as a language consisting of symbolic codes through which individuals 
communicate (Eder et al., 2002: 19-20). Codes of collective identities are 
inclusive and exclusive at the same time, in the same way as a language limits 
the range of the meaningful by excluding the meaningless. Collective identity 
codes exclude certain members in order to set boundaries that demarcate the 
existence of the collective.  
Codes of collective identity are not invented from scratch but are based 
on self-evident symbols embedded in a social group, which can either not be 
changed at all or only over very long periods of time. The reason for this 
becomes apparent if we remind ourselves that the principle of identity 
formation, be it on an individual or on a collective basis, relies on the 
differentiation between "self" and "other" or "us" and "them". Collective 
identities link this distinction to unchangeable entities like gender, generation, 
kinship, ethnicity and nationality, or to longstanding traditions, implicit rules of 
conduct and social routines. Still, codes of collective identities do not prescribe 
a boundary of a given group in a mechanical way. Its employment requires 
interpretation and voluntary decision. Collective identities, like ethnic groups, 
are neither naturally given nor logically defined, but are socially constructed.  
The process of interpretation and construction of collective identity can 
give way to dissent and conflict. It can, however, also open opportunities for 
strategic use of the codes of identity. Political actors can use the commitment to 
values of a collective to mobilize a constituency. The symbolic codes, by 
reference to which a collective identity constructs itself, provide the range 
within which issues can be politicized without contesting the overall integration 
of an identity group. Codes of collective identity although subject to 
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interpretation are not completely malleable. They set limits within which 
political strategies can be formulated. The argument that an ethnic conflict can 
be staged by strategically acting politicians is thus not entirely true. A 
community can only be mobilized on ethnic grounds if its collective code 
provides the potential for such action.  
Gender, class, regional, national or ethnic collective identities are 
prerequisites of collective action. The formation of collective identities is an 
expression of individual actors attempting to solve societal problems. National 
or ethnic groups are a particular version of that attempt. The national group that 
we live in is one of the most important social collectives that act on our identity 
formation, as it provides us with an identity layer that is often core to our sense 
of self. Nationality or ethnicity can be seen as a specific manifestation of the 
more general category of collective identity, and as an inevitable, necessary 
aspect of any collective action.  
 
National Identity 
Each individual member of a national group carries national identity. 
Thereby national identity becomes a property of that group and as such also a 
collective phenomenon. This impacts on conflict behavior, as those forming a 
nation are ready to pursue the interests of the national group and to engage in 
costly and self-sacrificial actions around that perception (Kelman, 1978: 169).  
National identity is often perceived as a given, but is like any other 
collective identity socially constructed. A group forms a nation not because of 
sovereign state borders or outside designation but because it perceives itself as 
such. According to Kelman, a group has acquired a sense of national identity if 
its members "[…] have come to see themselves as constituting a unique, 
identifiable entity, with a claim to continuity over time, to unity across 
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geographical distance, and to the right to various forms of self-expression […] 
(1997: 171).  
The formation of national identity draws on a variety of authentic 
elements held in common within a group, like a common origin, relation to a 
homeland, language, or religion; it also draws on common customs, cultural 
expressions, experiences, values, grievances and aspirations. These elements 
are captured in a nation's narrative, the story (or history) a nation tells of itself. 
A narrative provides a group with an explanation of their positive sense of self 
and of belongingness, as well as of their distinctiveness with regard to other 
groups. National narratives justify a group's claims to ownership of the land 
they inhabit or perceive as their homeland, as well as the right to exert control 
over that land’s resources.  
 In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as in other protracted ethno-national 
conflicts, the clashing narratives of the two peoples nurture hostilities. The 
distinct Palestinian national identity as well as the distinct Israeli identity began 
to form at approximately the same time. The two communities lived the same 
events and yet experienced them in a completely different way (PRIME, 
2003/2006).5 As conflict between the two communities began to escalate at the 
same time as their national narratives were formed, they were built on a 
reservoir of reference to the parties' conflicting identities.  
 
Israeli National Identity 
 Israeli national identity began to form as an answer to the rising of 
hostilities and persecutions against European and Russian Jews during the last 
two decades of the nineteenth century. After the painful experience of the 
violent Russian progroms between 1881 and 1882 and the Dreyfus affair in 
1894, the conviction within Jewish communities in different parts of the world 
grew, that Jewish national identity could only be expressed in a separate 
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homeland. Such convictions fueled support for emigration to Palestine. Most of 
the early settlers, who joined a small existing Jewish community called the 
Yishuv, had few political ambitions (Gerner, 1991: 12-13).  
 Distinct political Jewish nationalism, known as Zionism, grew from the 
efforts of Theodor Herzl. His book "The Jewish State" published in 1896 in 
Vienna, Austria, became a manifesto for the new movement. Herzl stated that 
Jews are one people entitled to a separate state. The First Zionist Congress held 
in 1897 in Basel, Switzerland, was a landmark event for the establishment of 
modern Jewish nationalism. The majority of the 200 delegates, mainly 
Russians and Eastern Europeans, voted in favor of Palestine as the most 
appropriate site for a Jewish state. Simultaneously, the World Zionist 
Organization was established in order to facilitate the spread of Zionist ideas 
and the migration of Jews to Palestine (Tessler, 1994: 53ff.). 
 The idea to establish a Jewish home in Palestine responded to the Jewish 
narrative encapsulating a strong religious and spiritual tie to Jerusalem and its 
surrounding areas. The concept of the Jewish return to the Promised Land had 
been embedded in religious liturgy and traditions ever since the destruction of 
the Jewish temple in Jerusalem in 70 C.E. and the expulsion of the Jews from 
Jerusalem in the second century C.E.  
 The first wave of immigrants after the First Zionist Congress, called the 
first aliyah, was rather small. The new settlers integrated well into the 
indigenous Palestinian community without causing any difficulties, except 
among the Palestinian peasants, who lost their traditional right to sharecrop 
land owned by Zionist immigrants. The ethic of egalitarianism led to the 
insistence that only Jewish labor could be employed on lands owned by Jews. 
Only the immigrants from the second and third aliyah, who arrived in Palestine 
between 1904 and 1923, were explicitly interested in establishing a Jewish 
state, rather than coexisting with Arab communities. They eventually formed 
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the backbone of the Jewish peasant and working class in Palestine and served 
as the foundation of the Jewish Labor movement.  
 The Balfour Declaration, a letter that Lord Balfour, the British Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, sent to Lord Rothschild, a leader of the Jewish community 
in Great Britain, represented support for the establishment of a Jewish national 
home in the area.  
 With fascism rising in Central Europe, immigration increased and 
dramatically peaked between 1931 and 1935. This massive influx was one of 
the main factors that triggered the Palestinian Revolt lasting from 1936 to 
1939. By 1939, the Jewish population in Palestine had risen to 31 percent, a 
dramatic increase from 17 percent in 1931 (Timm, 1998: 348). The new 
immigrants fleeing economic collapse were hostile to the egalitarian socialism 
of the early colonial settlers, which caused considerable friction between 
Jewish communities.  
 Many new immigrants brought financial resources to invest in industries 
and shops. Also, the Zionist movement mobilized financial and moral support 
through, for example, the Jewish National Fund to purchase land, the Jewish 
Foundation Fund to finance agricultural activities, and the Jewish Agency to 
manage the governance of the Jewish community in Palestine, encourage 
immigration, and raise money for settlements.  
 Jewish populations grew around Jaffa, Jerusalem, Haifa and Ramlah. 
The settlers in these areas spoke modern Hebrew and established separate 
Jewish schools and universities as well as hospitals, banks, civil courts, the 
General federation of Labor and a defense force. Supported by British officials, 
state building activities took form. Representatives from the various Jewish 
groups formed the Assembly of the Elected, who established the National 
Council designed to exercise decision-making within the Jewish community in 
Palestine.  
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 After the Second World War and the atrocity of the Holocaust, the quest 
for a Jewish state gained momentum. Britain refused the establishment of a 
Jewish state in Palestine and turned the matter over to the United Nations. On 
November 29, 1947, the UN General Assembly approved Resolution 181 
calling for the establishment of two independent states in Palestine.  
 The Jewish community was overjoyed by this opportunity to express 
their national identity through the formation of a state. Their joy was crushed 
by a civil war that broke out shortly afterward. During the war the Haganah, the 
military organization of the Yishuv that had been established during the 1920s 
and had grown to a unit of 20'000 soldiers, began to deport Palestinians. There 
was no orchestrated plan or high-level political order to do so, but military 
commanders were given freedom to act as they saw fit. In the Israeli view, 
Palestinians fled because they were generally scared and feared possible 
deportation (PRIME, 2006: 25) 
 Israelis call the war in 1948, the war of independence because the 
Jewish community attained independence, when in May 1948 David Ben 
Gurion announced the establishment of the state of Israel. The newly founded 
state was immediately invaded by the neighboring Arab states. By January 
1949 the Israeli Defense Force had defeated its Arab neighbors and held its 
first elections for their parliament, the Knesset.  
 
Palestinian National Identity 
 Palestinian identity originated with the general movement of Arab 
nationalism, which mostly took hold in the Levant (the eastern Mediterranean 
region) at the same time that ideas of a Zionist state emerged. Arab nationalism 
built on a shared language, culture and history as well as on inhabiting their 
homelands for hundreds of years. The influence of western nationalist ideas as 
well as the desire to replace Turkish Ottoman rule with local Arab political 
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control led the general sense of shared Arab identity to be expressed in more 
explicit nationalistic form. By 1880, a movement emerged that was based in 
Damascus and Beirut, which demanded the independence of the Levantine 
Arabs from the Turks. The movement's political agenda included achieving 
independence for Syria in union with Lebanon, the recognition of Arabic as an 
official language, the removal of the censorship and restrictions on the freedom 
of expression and the diffusion of knowledge, as well as the employment of 
locally recruited units on local military service only (Gerner, 1991).  
 When the Ottoman Empire crumbled and the Levant was divided into 
areas of French and British control, Arab hopes of a Greater Syria were 
quashed and a separate Palestinian national identity began to flourish. Distinct 
Palestinian nationalism was surely shaped by the Zionist challenge, anti-Zionist 
sentiments were more widely expressed and linked with Arab and Palestinian 
nationalism. Palestinian national identity did, however, by no means result 
mainly as a response to Zionism, but just as much from the rebellion against 
British authority and the realization that Syria and Iraq would neglect the 
protection of Palestinian national rights over their own interests, as from 
resistance to Zionism (Khalidi, 1997: 20).  
 At the beginning of the 20th century, the Palestinians found themselves 
in the midst of colonial rivalry. By 1907, Britain had formed a committee of 
seven European countries to oversee matters in the region. They submitted a 
report stating that the Arab countries and the Muslim-Arab people living in the 
Ottoman Empire represented a real threat to European countries and 
recommended to promote disintegration and fight any kind of unity among the 
region's inhabitants. The report further called for the establishment of a buffer 
state in Palestine. A state populated by people hostile to their neighbors and 
friendly to European countries.  
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The British played a double game. While exchanging letters with Sharif 
Hussein of Mecca about recognizing independence of the region, Britain 
secretly signed the Sykes-Picot Agreement with France to divide the Arab East. 
When the Balfour Declaration summed up British efforts a year later, for 
Palestinians it represented a convergence of British colonial interests and 
Zionist aspirations, as a Jewish state in Palestine offered Great Britain an 
opportunity to protect their strategic and economic interests in the Middle East 
(PRIME, 2006: 1ff.).  
 In December 1920, the Third Palestinian Arab Congress formulated a 
statement containing their aspiration to achieve independence from British 
control. The British refused to recognize the statement as well as any 
subsequent documents delivered by the Palestinians. The Third Congress also 
created the Arab Executive, an elected body consisting of nine Christian and 
Muslim members, with the purpose of conducting political activities on behalf 
of the Congress between its meetings. The Arab executive was headed by a 
member of the influential Husseini family, who also had a dominant role in the 
Arab Congress and the newly formed Supreme Muslim Council throughout the 
first half of the 1920s.  
 The Husseini family met political opposition in the Nashashibi family, 
who launched the Palestinian Arab National party in November 1923. The 
Nashashibi faction included landowners and wealthy businesspeople. During 
the 1920s and 1930s, they called for a British friendly policy aiming at 
cooperation without full independence. The Nashashibi movement increased its 
political influence over time and managed to insert their representatives into 
the Arab Executive and the Congress. This coalition held for several years and 
allowed the Palestinians as a unified body to contract with the British rulers 
(Krämer, 2002: 254ff.).  
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 In 1928, the Seventh Congress convened to institute a number of 
permanent committees and pass a resolution calling for the establishment of 
parliamentary government and a representative council to govern Palestine. 
While Palestinian political expression gained momentum, Jewish immigration 
to Palestine constantly increased and the Zionist movement grew stronger. 
Palestinians feared that Zionism would be detrimental to their nascent 
Palestinian nationalist aspirations.  
 Due to a high level of distrust and fear between its constituents, Zionism 
and Palestinian nationalism were on a collision course, resulting in several 
confrontations precipitated alternately by Zionists and Palestinians alike. 
Among them were the Wailing Wall riots in August 1929, triggered by the 
issue of access to the Western Wall in the Old City of Jerusalem. For Muslims, 
the wall forms part of the Hara-al Sharif, the third holiest site in Islam, and the 
location of the Dome of the Rock and al-Asqa mosque. For Jews, it is an 
equally sacred place being part of the ancient wall surrounding the area on 
which Solomon and Herod built their temples.  
 Rebellion against Zionist manifestation accelerated the process of 
Palestinian political and national development. By 1935, there were six 
political parties vying for support. These included the National Defense party 
of the Nashashibis; the Palestine Arab party of the Husseini family; the Youth 
Congress, organized by Muslim Palestinians in 1932; Istiqlal, a branch of the 
pan-Arab Independence party that was supported primarily by young 
professional elites and called for the independence of all Arab countries; as 
well as two locally based Reform party and the National Bloc of Abdal-Latif 
Saleh. The Reform party headed by Hussein Khalidi was allied with the 
Palestine Arab party, while the National Bloc was a rival of the Husseini 
family.  
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 The Palestinian community, particularly the peasants, suffered difficult 
years during the 1930s and exerted tremendous pressure on the political parties. 
As a result of economic hardship, large numbers of Palestinians were forced to 
sell their land. Due to the policy of exclusive Hebrew labor, Palestinian 
peasants were not hired to farm and forced to move to urban areas where it was 
not easy to find work either. The Palestinian economy in urban centers further 
declined because Jewish immigrants would not buy from Palestinian shops, use 
their seaport, or hire them as workers. This contributed to the fragmentation of 
traditional Palestinian society and increased hostility towards the Zionists, who 
were portrayed as the cause of these problems.  
 In 1936 the longest sustained protest against Jewish national aspirations 
– prior to the establishment of the Israeli state – started with the Palestinian 
Revolt and lasted until 1939. The upheaval was not politically orchestrated; it 
constituted a response by the population to continued Jewish immigration. The 
first stage of the revolt consisted mainly of a six-month period of strikes, 
nonpayment of taxes, and other forms of civil disobedience vis-à-vis Britain. It 
was terminated at the request of Arab leaders who encouraged Palestinians to 
wait for the outcome of the British Peel Commission's investigation of the 
situation.  
 The resulting report proposed in 1937 to partition Palestine into two 
states, answering to the competing claims of the two national groups. This 
sparked the second stage of the revolt resulting in complete turmoil in the 
region with Zionist, Palestinian and British forces fighting for control. In many 
areas the British civil authorities lost all ability to manage the day-to-day 
affairs of the population, as the Palestinians had established many elements of 
an autonomous government. In order to restore their control, the British sent in 
over 20'000 troops, imposed emergency regulations, expelled or imprisoned all 
significant Palestinian leaders and demolished homes of suspected activists. By 
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spring of 1939 the revolt had been crushed after killing 101 British soldiers, 
463 Jews and probably up to 5000 Palestinians (Gerner, 1991: 26-28).  
 After the core of the Palestinian national movement had been 
eliminated, the Arab Higher Committee was reconstituted in 1945. Again, the 
Husseini family dominated the Committee and was unable to gain the support 
of other political parties, which resented the Husseinis' control. The lack of a 
unified political organization greatly hindered the manifestation of Palestinian 
nationalism and the fulfillment of their desire for self-determination.  
 For the Palestinians the UN partition plan gave way to the "An-
Nakbeh", the catastrophe, which dispersed Palestinians throughout the world, 
reduced the remaining population by half and has continued to cause their 
national suffering until today. According to Palestinians, the catastrophe was 
the result of continual subjugation, killing, executions, arrests, exile, and 
conspiracy – international and Arab – against their nation (PRIME, 2006: 25). 
Within the borders of the land defined as the Palestinian state by the UN 
partition plan, 418 Palestinian villages were destroyed and many of its 
inhabitants killed in brutal massacres. The terror forced many families to flee. 
After the war Palestinians had nowhere to go, as Israeli villages had been built 
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1 The distinction between I and Me was introduced by William James in Principles of 
Psychology (New York: Dover Publications, 1950), 371ff. James called the I the 
thought that contemplates the Me, which is a collection of memories and an 
empirical aggregate of things that we objectively know.  
 
2  For an overview of the development of object-relations theory see Rubin Blanck 
and Gertrude Blanck in Jenseits der Ich-Psychologie (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1998), 
15-39.  
 
3  Freud cited by William Bloom in Personal Identity, National Identity and 
International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 28. 
 
4 Here I draw on the excellent elaboration of Piaget’s social-cognitive development 
stages by Kurt R. Spillmann and Kati Spillmann in „Feindbilder: Entstehung, 
Funktion und Möglichkeiten ihres Abbaus,“ Zürcher Beiträge zur Sicherheitspolitik 
und Konfliktforschung 12 (1989), 21-23. See also Dieter Geulen (ed.), 
Perspektivenübernahme und soziales Handeln (Frankfurt am Main, D: Suhrkamp, 
1982), 230-237.  
 
5 PRIME stands for Peace Research Institute in the Middle East, initiated and headed 
by the Palestinian Professor Sami Adwan and the Israeli Professor Dan Bar-On. 
PRIME launched a curriculum development project in 2002 with the aim to produce 
a joint history booklet for Israeli and Palestinian schools. Teams of Palestinian and 
Israeli teachers and historians have developed parallel historical narratives of their 
communities and tested their use in both communities' classrooms. Unlike other 
projects that focus on revising existing texts, the project is designed to produce new 
accounts and expose students in each community to the other's historical narrative of 
the same events. Thereby students can not only learn what has shaped their own 
community's understanding of historical events, but also get to know the historical 
perspective and the context that has influenced the other community's sense of 
reality. The project's goal is not to produce a single historical narrative that is shared 
by both, but to develop multiple narratives of events that reflect how, even within 
each community, people have different views of their region's history. Thereby the 
project hopes to break down stereotypes and build a more nuanced understanding of 
what has led to the deeply entrenched and polarized attitudes on both sides of the 
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3  The Identity Factor and Conflict Resolution 
 
Identity has a decisive relevance with regard to conflict resolution. 
Identity impacts directly on how individuals and groups behave in conflict 
situations as it encompasses a sense of psychological, social and also physical 
security. Terrell Northrup defines the dynamic of identity as "the tendency of 
human beings, individually and in groups, to establish, maintain, and protect a 
sense of self-meaning, predictability, and purpose" (1989: 63). As identity 
equals a sense of self in relation to the world, it provides us with the ability to 
predict how our behavior will affect others and their reactions towards us.  
A threat to that sense of navigation causes immense existential fear and 
a general breakdown of our ability to function. A threat to identity can occur in 
the form of denied political participation, denied enactment of customs, 
language and religion, as well as forced prioritization of one identity allegiance 
or an annihilation of one identity layer.  
If not challenged, different identity layers, which may at times be 
contradictory, coexist without causing difficulties within an individual. In a 
conflict the pressure to prioritize one of our allegiances over all others or to 
give up on one of them is experienced as a loss of other or even all vital 
attachments. Amin Maalouf explains that, although our identity is multi-
layered, it is also singular in the sense that we experience it as a complete 
whole. If one constituent element of our identity is threatened, we feel that our 
whole existence is endangered (2000: 22).  
If our identity is threatened, psychic or even physical annihilation can 
seem to be imminent. Annihilation here is to be understood not only in the 
sense of “causing a person to cease to exist” but also as “reducing a person to 
nothing” and as “destroying the substance or force of a person" (Northrup, 
1989: 65). In this sense an injury to our identity can be experienced as a fear of 
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continued but meaningless and powerless existence, which is a torturing 
psychological state that is at least as important to our sanity as a physical 
threat.  
In response to a threat of identity loss we react by mobilizing resources 
to protect our sense of self. Identity protecting mechanisms follow a reverse 
order of our emotional and social-cognitive development. Our identity structure 
is no longer open to refinement and expansion. The capacity to take in new 
information gradually diminishes. Existing beliefs about the self, others and the 
world become frozen and extremely resistant to change. The frozen beliefs act 
as a stabilizing mechanism that moves us from a felt experience of 
disintegration to one where we are psychologically integrated and balanced 
again. As a consequence, the ability to communicate, to hear what an opponent 
is saying, or to adopt a different perspective becomes exceedingly limited.  
The same is true for group or social identity. A threat to group identity, 
just like a threat to personal identity, can take the form of a loss or the fear of a 
loss of something that constitutes group identity. Group members may react 
individually or collectively to threatening socio-political changes. Members of 
an identity group may synthesize a new identification or bolster the old one. 
How a group reacts to a shared identity threat depends on how the group as a 
whole perceives and defines the nature of the crisis. If a group identity factor, 
such as ethnicity, is core to the sense of self of a group of individuals, the 
process of mobilizing resources to protect that sense of self can occur as a 
group phenomenon.  
The methodology of IPS employs insight about the impact of the 
identity factor on conflict behavior. As a threat to identity impairs identity 
formation mechanisms that account for cooperative behavior, the methodology 
aims at restoring the workability of identity formation mechanisms. The 
method gradually evolved from social-psychological concepts over a problem-
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solving approach towards adopting process-elements of the identity factor to 
form a methodology of identity negotiation.  
 
Impact of the Identity Factor on Conflict Escalation 
For the purpose of comprehending and in a next step evaluating how IPS 
can restore identity formation mechanisms and account for a process of 
negotiating identity aspects, it is necessary to understand how elements of the 
identity forming process can spiral conflict escalation. Terrell Northrup 
describes four psychological processes inherent to the identity factor that 
escalate conflict behavior. They include threat of invalidation, distortion, 








First, the dynamic of identity formation can cause conflict if an event 
occurs in the course of a relationship between individuals or groups that is 
perceived as invalidating the core sense of identity of one or of several parties 
involved. The invalidation of a party’s core construct is experienced as 
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threatening because it destroys the meaning of who they are as well as the 
ability to predict events. In this conflict phase we fall back into the second 
stage of our cognitive development in which we are unable to take the 
viewpoints of others into account with regard to our own behavior. 
The intensity of a conflict will be particularly high in the case where 
identities of two groups invalidate each other, as it is the case in the conflict 
between Israelis and Palestinians. Many members of both parties believe that 
their own existence is threatened by the mere existence of the other. This is 
especially clear in relation to territorial claims. Both groups associate their 
sense of identity with the same land. Each side affirms that in order for them to 
maintain their identity they must live on and cultivate the same piece of land, 
which represents their meaning as a national group and their religious ties. Loss 
of that land, or the threat of its loss or of not obtaining it, means more than the 
fact of the loss of territory. It implies the loss of self and psychic annihilation. 
Davidson and Montville state that: "each side perceives the fulfillment of the 
other’s national identity as equivalent to the destruction of its own identity" 
(1981/82: 153). Thus, each is reluctant to accept the other’s right to a state 
expressing national identity. To do so would be to participate in a process 
imperiling one’s own national existence. Therefore, unless each side is assured 
that its own national existence is secure, neither can be expected to make a 
move to accept the other.  
Second, the dynamic of identity can cause conflict if parties react to a 
threat of invalidation with distortion (Northrup, 1989: 69). This implies that 
incoming information is misperceived and distorted in order to maintain the 
core sense of identity. Distorting incoming information means that the one 
receiving a piece of information perceives it in a way that is inconsistent with 
reality and transforms this information into something that suits his, or her, 
own perception of things. This psychological response can be qualified as 
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aggressive because an individual or group of individuals seeks to force a 
meaning onto the invalidating event, for the purpose of making it seem 
validating. Our reaction pattern here corresponds to the first level of our 
cognitive development, in which our own perspective – and only our own 
perspective – equals reality.  
 Third, the dynamic of identity formation exacerbates conflict, as 
distorted views of events accumulate and form increasingly impermeable 
constructs. That is to say, parties engaged in conflict develop increasingly rigid 
interpretations of the world; this is why Northrup calls this process 
rigidification (1989: 70ff.). The psychological process that is at work here is 
directed at putting a distance between the self and the threat by separating the 
„invalidated“ party from the „invalidating“ one. As this process continues, 
more and more characteristics about the other party that have been perceived as 
„like self“ become threatening and are re-construed as being different from the 
self. This leads to a clear-cut perception of the self and the other.  
The perceived threat of core identity invalidation, leads to rigidification 
of the clear-cut pictures of self and other, because the fear of losing our identity 
leads us to shut down our learning channels. In other words, new information 
that could make the in-group discover that the out-group has „like-self“ 
characteristics, is aggressively distorted, or simply not heard and seen (because 
they fall out of the „reality“ constructs of the self or the in-group, as in the late 
stages of our emotional development).  
 A further important aspect of rigidly construed conflict perception is that 
not only behavior and demands of the opponent party are perceived as 
threatening, but also beliefs and characteristics not related to the original threat. 
This aggravates conflicts and makes their resolution very difficult.  
Parallel to the process of rigidification, the process of projection occurs, 
the mechanism that accounts for the creation of the enemy image. In a stage of 
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conflict where we feel that the integrity of our self is threatened and a certain 
hardening of conflict perception has taken place, we start to project parts of our 
self that we dislike onto the other and construe them as non-self qualities. The 
other, or the relationship to the other, serves to bring out some of the negative 
elements of our own identity, which we want to overcome or deny.  
In a protracted conflict two types of negative identity elements are often 
brought to the fore by the relationship to the other: the view of one's own self 
as weak and vulnerable, and the view of one's self as violent and unjust 
(Kelman, 1999: 593). In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict such negative identity 
elements consist of the view of the self as victim and victimizer. At the level of 
political rhetoric each party claims the status of victim and each denies the role 
of victimizer. At the level of self-esteem, however, both of these elements are 
negative and ego-alien and, therefore, difficult to accept. This presents an 
obstacle to conflict resolution efforts, as it is necessary to accept one’s own 
weakness and error for the purpose of developing cooperative relations with an 
opponent. For example, to acknowledge the other's rights, may necessitate 
admitting unjust behavior towards the other.  
As a consequence of rigidification and projection, differences between 
conflict parties are exaggerated while differences within each party are 
minimized. During this conflict phase we find ourselves thrown back to the 
third stage of our emotional development and react again like the infant who 
builds separate categories of experiences of good/bad, own/foreign, 
safe/threatening. Everything that we are familiar with is rated as being entirely 
good, of our own, and safe; while everything we do not know, is rated as being 
entirely bad, foreign, and threatening.  
In the case of further aggravation of rigidified conflict perception, a 
process of deligitimization and even dehumanization develops, which portrays 
the other as being less valuable than the self-group. Deligitimization can install 
The Identity Factor and Conflict Resolution 
 56 
a blatant domination-submission relationship between two conflict parties if 
one of them is unquestionably more powerful than the other. The dominating 
group portrays itself as representing the norm of what is valuable and 
sometimes even of what is human; while it portrays the other group as being 
different from that norm and therefore as being less valuable. Being excluded 
from the identity norm creates an unbearable situation for the dominated group 
as it pushes them into great uncertainty about their identity ( Bar-Tal, 2000: 
121-124).  
Deligitimization and dehumanization increase violence, as it is easier to 
harm someone construed as non-self or even inhuman. Things that we would 
never do to those who are like us are possible to be done to someone, who has 
nothing to do with us and is no longer seen as human but as an object, a target, 
and a threat. 
In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict the most extreme examples of 
delegitimizing the other have consisted of equating Zionism with racism, and 
Palestinian nationalism, as represented by the PLO, with terrorism. Since 
racism and terrorism are morally unacceptable in human society, these 
designations not only deligitimize the other's national movement but even 
border on dehumanizing it by placing the other outside of the human 
community. Deligitimization announces that these national movements, and 
implicitly the national groups forming them, have no right to exist (Kelman, 
1999: 590).  
Fourth, as conflict dynamics further exacerbate, a collusion process 
takes hold (Northrup, 1989: 75). At this stage the behavior of conflict parties 
towards each other consists exclusively of hostile acts that can easily burst into 
violence. These acts serve to validate established distortions that actually 
created hostile behavior in the first place. The effect of distorting the image of 
the other is that they will indeed act according to that image. This leads to a 
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totally absurd phenomenon. Making the other group behave in a way that is 
consistent with the distortion provides security to the sense of identification, 
even though this behavior may include violent acts (and a physical threat to the 
existence of either group). The reason for this is that distortion is a response to 
the threat of invalidation of identity. The affirmation of distortion, therefore, 
proves that the threat to identity was successfully averted and the sense of 
identity is reassured. That way, the conditions of conflict become part of each 
conflict party’s identity.  
As elements of the conflict begin to define the identity of the parties, the 
latter start to behave in ways that are consistent with maintaining the conflict. 
Northrup calls this process one of collusion because conflict parties adopt a 
kind of cooperation in prolonging the conflict relationship (1989: 75). 
Collusion may manifest itself in various forms, which mostly serve the purpose 
of sanctifying the struggle and honoring the efforts of the respective groups. 
Collusion provides affirmation of self-worth and secures the sense of self or 
self-group. As a consequence, the initially unintended collusion may over time 
be manifested in formal social, political, and economic structures within and 
between parties. In this case we speak of an institutionalization of conflict. At 
this stage, elements of the conflict have become formally established parts of 
the identity of those in conflict. Therefore, the prospect of ending the conflict 
represents a threat to the sense of self of conflict parties or an invalidation of 
their identity. Thereby the vicious circle of conflict escalation reaches its 
starting point.  
In order to de-escalate the conflict spiral, a conflict resolution method 
needs to restore, in a long step-by-step process, natural identity formation that 
allow a cooperative relationship. Conflict resolution must first account for a 
confrontation between the opponents in order to break up the negative 
cooperation of collusion that constantly fuels conflict. If the parties can quarrel 
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with each other there is contact.  Exchange between the parties can bring about 
the possibility of giving the other a human face again and a more differentiated 
image. The rigid enemy images can gradually soften and the opponent can 
eventually be heard and understood again, while Identity threats can be 
deterred and the conflict spiral de-escalated.  
 
Developing a Method to De-escalate Conflict  
IPS builds on the de-escalatory effect of restored identity forming 
processes. It aims at negotiating identity aspects in a way that strengthens the 
conflict parties’ sense of self and disperses identity threats. The development of 
IPS towards an identity management method has spanned over four decades. 
The method evolved from a social-psychological understanding of conflict 
theory, over adopting a problem-solving technique, towards integrating 
process-elements of identity formation.  
With regard to both its conceptual foundation and its practical 
application IPS was predominantly influenced by the work of John W. Burton, 
a former diplomat from Australia. Burton started to develop an alternative 
conflict resolution approach in the early 1960s. Together with other social 
scientists he founded the Center for the Analysis of Conflict (CAC) at the 
University College in London (Fisher, 1997). The foundation of the center 
ensued from the positive experiences Burton and his colleagues had made 
during problem-solving discussions with representatives from Malaysia, 
Indonesia and Singapore with regard to the conflict over Malaysia’s 
independence (Mitchell, 2001). The pioneering endeavor showed that 
analytical discussions allowing parties to freely talk about conflict issues 
without being pressured to produce an agreement could lead to productive 
results. Kelman was introduced to the application of Burton's method in 1966, 
when he joined the panel of social scientists at the CAC to facilitate a 
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discussion between Greek and Turkish Cypriots about the future status of the 
Republic of Cyprus (Kelman, 1999: 2).  
 
Controlled Communication  
The aspects of Burton's method that predominantly influenced the 
development of IPS were the system level of its analysis and its problem-
solving technique. Dissatisfied with the options official diplomacy offered to 
reconcile conflict parties, Burton aimed at applying social theory to intractable 
violent conflicts and creating new means for conflict parties to analyze their 
problems and develop options for solutions. Burton approached conflict 
analysis in a problem-solving mode, which he defined as "questioning implied 
assumptions, attitudes and theories, putting forward alternative hypotheses and 
examining these in light of events" (1979: 6). Problem solving as a method, 
thus, entails approaching a problem, or a given conflict, through an analysis 
based on new parameters that are free of existing assumptions.  
 In this vein, Burton and his colleagues developed a theory of practice, 
which consisted of a methodology that was continuously informed by actual 
experiences. Burton called the practical application of the methodology 
“controlled communication” (1969). Later on, the term was used to describe 
the methods first phase of communication. In total the method contained three 
phases, in each phase the third party had distinct facilitating tasks. Controlled 
communication as a methodological term did not mean that the facilitators 
intended to control the participants. It referred to the intent to keep the nature 
of the discussions on an analytic level that would allow conflict parties to stand 
back from adversarial positions and see their conflict as a problem to be solved.  
Calling the first phase of Burton's method, controlled communication 
referred to the effort of the third party to grant each participant the possibility 
to describe his or her perception of the conflict.  




Keeping a discussion between conflict parties on an analytic, non-
polemic level proved to be quite difficult at times. For example, at the occasion 
of the meeting with Greek and Turkish Cypriots, the third-party members 
agreed to initiate the meeting by asking each side to present their view of the 
conflict. The aim behind a mutual presentation of perceptions was that the 
participants would thereby become ready to listen to each other. Contrary to 
these hopes, the parties got caught up in a fierce debate. To bring talks back to 
an analytical discussion mode the panel introduced an abstract concept: a spiral 
model of conflict escalation (Fisher, 1997: 25). Supported by an abstract 
metaphor the delegates were able to engage in a conflict analysis exercise by 
relating the conceptual tool to their specific situation. This led the participants 
to discover that the image each side had of the other was distorted by 
misperceptions. More so, they were able to retrieve some essential deep-rooted 
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sentiments like the need to enact their ethnic identity in a safe and autonomous 
way.  
Burton fed these insights back into his evolving theory of practice. 
Consequently, the second phase of his methodology included the introduction 
of abstract models of conflict dynamics that would stimulate the analysis of 
conflict issues. This enabled participants to adopt the role of an analyst that 
gave them a new outlook and an alternative identity layer. During the second 
phase, the facilitation of the third party consisted of seeking clarification by 
questioning misperceptions and promoting insight by explaining processes of 
interactions. The role of the third-party panel also consisted of offering possible 
explanations of conflict causes by introducing knowledge of conflict theory 
into the discussion. Participants were free to choose whether or not to adopt a 
proposed theoretical explanation and to decide about the usefulness of 
conceptual tools. 
 In a third phase, the panel assisted conflict parties to consolidate their 
understandings and explore possible solutions in a problem-solving way. 
Burton recommended tackling conflict resolution by replacing existing 
assumptions with newly developed hypotheses that could be tested in light of 
ongoing events. Three features inhere in the problem-solving mode Burton 
envisioned (1979: 6). First, problem solving requires to form a new synthesis of 
knowledge or techniques and to adopt a changed theoretical structure. Second, 
it does not portray a solution to a conflict as a final product but as a forward 
leading process entailing further problem sets. Third, problem solving occurs in 
an open system. In an open system different factors have a reciprocal effect on 
each other. The environment in which a problem is solved has an effect on that 
problem, while solutions that were developed to solve the problem have an 
impact on the environment.  
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The Fermeda Workshop 
A second source of inspiration for IPS stemmed from a conflict 
resolution effort organized by Leonard W. Doob and two of his colleagues 
from Yale University, which focused on border disputes in the Horn of Africa 
between Somalia and its two neighbors, Ethiopia and Kenya (Kelman, 1972: 
172). Through a research project Doob became familiar with the lot of Somali 
people who were victim of a conflict that had emerged after the Republic of 
Somalia gained independence in 1960. The new state manifested claims over 
areas of Ethiopia and Kenya, which had been populated by ethnic Somali 
majorities and had historically belonged to Somali territory. After the 
Organization of African Unity and the United Nations had undertaken various 
unsuccessful efforts to mediate a settlement, Doob set out to build a new 
method to approach a resolution of the conflict.  
Doob drew on findings stemming from behavioral science to develop a 
new methodology. The method's rationale was to overcome barriers of 
communication between conflict parties. For this purpose, Doob and his 
colleagues invited Kenyan, Ethiopian and Somali representatives to participate 
in a series of unstructured discussions that would be facilitated by a third party 
panel and held in a realm far removed from the conflict scenario. The 
participants would be split up into small groups in which they would be able to 
share how they perceive themselves and their relations to others with regard to 
the conflict. The method built on providing experiential learning directed 
toward building increased self-awareness, interpersonal effectiveness, and 
understanding of group processes (Doob, 1972: 683). After learning from their 
interaction, participants would eventually be able to apply their new insight to 
the development of innovative solutions to their conflict.  
Doob and his associates had been engaged over a period of three years 
in gaining approval from all three governments to recruit six participants of 
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each country. The invitees were to have an academic background, an 
understanding of the situation, and an openness to change. Although they had 
been chosen according to their potential ability to influence the policymaking 
process of their countries and had received consent of their governments, 
participants came as private individuals and did not act as official 
representatives. Together with two of his colleagues and four trainers for the 
small-group exercises, Doob was finally able to convene a two-week meeting 
in a remote area in the mountains of south Tyrol in 1969. The endeavor was 
called “Fermeda Workshop” after the name of the hotel that hosted the meeting 
(Doob et al., 1969).  
The meeting started with unstructured discussions held in small groups 
containing three representatives of each country, two third-party members, who 
would act as communication trainers, and one or two members of the 
organizing team. For the first few days, workshop activities focused on training 
sensitivity for self-awareness and open communication among the participants. 
Panel members observed and helped to interpret group processes. Process 
observation is used to illustrate how interactions between workshop 
participants reflect conflict dynamics of their national groups that point to 
underlying conflict causes. The fact that the third party only engaged in process 
observation but did not intervene in any other way, led to initial insecurity, 
anger and frustration about the lack of structure. Eventually the exchange 
crystallized into fruitful discussions. Conversations concentrated solely on 
individual and group development and did not touch on concrete conflict 
issues, though.  
After the initial phase, the small groups started to convene in plenary 
sessions where the trainers introduced them to leadership styles of cooperative 
and competitive strategies. To illustrate the concepts, the participants were 
asked to take part in simulation exercises. Plenary session activities helped to 
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improve the working process of the small groups and provided tools for 
tackling conflict issues at a later stage.  
 
 
 In a second phase, the workshop finally addressed the border disputes. 
Each national group was asked to make a list of how it perceived its own 
grievances and those of the other two parties. The lists were then presented in a 
plenary session. The process proved to be strenuous as some participants found 
it difficult to identify grievances of the other conflict parties. The third party 
decided to reconvene in the original small groups and develop proposals to 
which all team members were able to agree, regardless of their nationality. 
When the small groups presented their results in plenary sessions, however, a 
joint decision could not be achieved. Confronted with their fellow nationals, 
participants felt constrained by their national loyalties and saw previously 
agreed upon solutions as being detrimental to their national cause.  
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 The aim of the Fermeda Workshop to develop a joint proposal supported 
by all participants could not be met. Nonetheless, participants found that they 
had been able to engage in fruitful discussions with their opponents and 
develop a certain amount of trust towards them within the framework of the 
small training groups.  
 
The Evolution of Interactive Problem Solving  
 In a thorough analysis Kelman compared the two approaches with the 
objective to further develop conflict resolution tools for dialogue workshops 
(1972: 175ff.). As both approaches represented exploratory exercises, their 
methods were open to change and recombination. Therefore, the features of the 
two approaches could very well be combined in a new way.  
The two approaches proved to have common characteristics with regard 
to offering a private and even isolated setting, academic sponsorship, non-
political roles of participants, an informal atmosphere, an analytic discussion 
format and an impartial third party.  
Central to both workshops was that their applied methodology offered 
participants the possibility to directly communicate their perceptions, hopes 
and fears. Thereby they were able to develop their own new ideas without 
being constrained by a rigid agenda or coercive mediation. In both exercises 
the third party guided the discussions only by providing a range of conceptual 
tools, from which participants were free to choose and which enabled 
participants to tackle conflict issues like problems, to which creative solutions 
could be sought.  
 While the methods differed in their conception and specific tasks of the 
exercises, they had both been designed to enhance the probability that changed 
conflict perspectives and new ideas for solutions, which had been generated 
during the discussions, would be fed into the policy process. Features like 
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selection of politically influential participants and coordination with their 
governments had been geared to achieve this end. 
 Together with Stephen P. Cohen, Kelman applied the experience gained 
from Burton's and Doob's efforts to an exploratory workshop with the aim to 
evolve and evaluate intergroup techniques for conflict resolution in the 
workshop setting (Cohen et al. 1977: 166). They combined some of the 
elements, which Burton and Doob used for their communication technique. The 
exploratory workshop was conducted in 1971 as part of a seminar on social-
psychological approaches to international relations and was not a full-scale 




Kelman and Cohen integrated not only the problem-solving approach to 
analyzing and discussing conflict issues. They also applied Burton's technique 
of introducing conceptual tools in the form of theoretical concepts to allow 
participants to move from the role of a combative representative to that of a 
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conflict analyst (Cohen et al. 1977: 169). This process generated an alternative 
identity layer. In addition to their national and ethnic identity, participants were 
able to develop an identity as conflict analysts. The third party chose material 
on issues of nationalism and national identity to provide a framework for the 
discussions. They introduced additional theoretical ideas to change the level of 
discussion or provide a different perspective when conversations reached an 
impasse.  
Kelman and his team used small-group techniques like Doob and his 
colleagues had employed to generate some level of trust between conflict 
representatives and to provoke changes in individual behavior. Instead of 
focusing on interpersonal changes, the Israeli-Palestinian pilot workshop 
applied group intervention techniques to explore intergroup relations.  
In addition to theoretical inputs and process observation, Kelman and 
Cohen applied content observation as an additional type of third-party 
intervention (1976: 86). Content observation interprets the content of what is 
being said by the participants to increase the understanding of both parties 
about assumptions and sensitivities that are contained in their statements and 
that point to their hidden needs and fears.  
Although the pilot workshop was a limited academic exercise, it offered 
its organizers valuable insights that enhanced the evolution of IPS. The third 
party learnt a lot about impacts of the different intervention techniques. In 
particular, process observation interventions proved to be useful in terms of 
generating new insights about conflict realities to the participants.  
 For example, when Israelis offered advice, assistance and cooperation to 
Palestinians, the latter reacted with hostility and rejection of such support 
(Cohen et al. 1977: 184). This dynamic reflected the unequal distribution of 
power between the two parties and showed that the image each had of the other 
differed widely from the image each party had of itself. The offer of help from 
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a more powerful Israel reminded the Palestinians of their inferior status. The 
Israeli participants seemed to underestimate the intensity of the Palestinian 
animosity toward them. They failed to see that their offer of help would come 
across as an affirmation of their own superiority and as an assertion that Israel 
would control the future of the Palestinians. 
 Another situation that lent itself to process observation occurred, when a 
Palestinian participant drew a symbol on the blackboard during a break. The 
symbol consisted of a cross, a crescent, and a Star of David. The Palestinian 
participant saw the symbol as representing his vision of a future Palestine in 
which Christians, Moslems, and Jews would live together in peace. The Israeli 
reaction to the symbol came as a complete surprise to the Palestinians. 
According to them the symbol represented Israel encircled by the Arab world, 
with a dagger piercing its heart (Cohen et al. 1977: 185).  
 The interactions around the described symbol demonstrated the 
differences in perception of the conflict parties. The firsthand experience of 
these divergent views showed participants what kind of effect their 
expectations had on their conflict perception. Moreover, it demonstrated that 
the intentions behind an act or a statement are not as obvious to the receiver as 
they are to the one emitting them. Such insight can be a necessary first step for 
the development of conflict solutions.  
 
Structural Elements of Interactive Problem Solving 
The valuable insights from the first interactive problem-solving 
workshop have been adapted to succeeding workshops. Each practical 
application of the method ensued in theoretical refinement of employed 
techniques. Most importantly, the action-research of Kelman and his team led 
to the realization that the workshop discussions needed to employ process-
elements of identity formation to enable the negotiation of identity changes. 
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The present section displays the structural elements of IPS before the next 
section explores the conceptual elements of identity negotiation. The structural 
elements of IPS consist of ground rules that govern the norms of 
communication as well as the role of the third party, and a set agenda or 




The ground rules of IPS are active throughout the workshop discussions. 
They govern the five issues that are essential to achieve effective 
communication. These are: privacy and confidentiality, nature of interaction, 
no expectation of agreement, equality in setting, and role of the third party 
(Kelman, 1999: 8/2000: 275).  
IPS grants privacy and confidentiality. The identity of workshop 
participants is not made public without their consent, nor is any item of 
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information displayed during a workshop disclosed to the public without the 
consent of the participants.  
 The nature of interactions among participants is based on committing to 
a first discussion phase that focuses only on the present people without thinking 
about their respective constituencies. The participants' needs and fears, their 
priorities and constraints can best be discussed in an analytical rather than 
polemic way. Further, the second rule stipulates agreement among workshop 
participants to adopt a problem-solving approach for the analysis of conflict 
issues.  
 Participants are not expected to produce an agreement regarding 
definitive conflict solutions. The workshop discussions are designed to increase 
the participants' understanding of their diverse conflict perceptions and to 
develop new ideas that would ideally inspire and support an eventual resolution 
of the conflict without being pressured to produce a blueprint for a peace treaty.  
 The fourth rule grants participants equality of treatment. Each 
participant has an equal right to speak and to be listened to and statements of 
each group member will be treated with equal consideration.  
Third-party activity is confined to the facilitative guidance of the 
workshop discussions by focusing on its content, process and theoretical 
formulation. The third party regularly summarized the accounts of participants, 
asking for clarifications, or highlighting shared views. The third party only 
stops the discussions if they become polemic, contributes if discussions reach a 
deadlock, or channels confrontations between participants. The third party 
exercises great caution about the timing and relevance of their intervention. A 
third-part intervention can only be successful if the participants are ready for it. 
The rule further entails that the third party abstains from exerting pressure of 
any kind to produce consensus, from offering advice, and from making 
proposals regarding possible conflict solutions. The third party does not take 
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sides or arbitrate between different interpretations of historical facts or 
international law.  
Once the third party has communicated the ground rules during pre-
workshop sessions – held with each party separately – and/or in the process of 
recruiting participants, workshop discussions start with both parties present. 
Workshop discussions are structured into five stages. (Kelman, 2000: 277) 
During the first discussion stage, each conflict party is asked to 
separately describe conflict issues as perceived within their communities while 
the other party only listens or asks for clarifications.  
 
Five Discussion Stages of Interactive Problem Solving
description of own story and active listening 
underlying conflict causes, needs and fears become transparent 
develop new perspectives and ideas for solutions
address constraints/obstacles to solution
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At the second stage each side is asked to discuss their central concerns 
with regard to the conflict, to elaborate what they think are existential fears and 
fundamental needs of their community members that need to be met. Only after 
each group has demonstrated that they significantly understand the concerns 
and requirements voiced by their opponent the discussion moves on to the next 
stage.  
 During the third discussion phase new conflict perceptions can be 
developed and ideas elaborated for working out possible approaches to resolve 
the conflict that meet both parties' needs. For this purpose participants are 
asked to engage in an interactive process of joint thinking through which each 
party can share propositions of how to meet not only their own needs but also 
those of the other side.  
 If common ground can be reached during the third phase, the discussion 
can move on to the fourth level at which political and psychological constraints 
can be identified. Such constraints may consist of objections occurring within 
the respective communities toward proposed steps for changing the status quo.  
 At the fifth and final stage the parties should jointly develop ways to 
overcome the identified obstacles to proposed solutions and develop concrete 
measures, which their societies and they themselves could undertake to 
overcome barriers to negotiating mutually satisfactory solutions.  
  
Conceptual Elements of Interactive Problem Solving  
I ascribe the conceptual development of IPS to descriptions of social-
psychological processes found in early publications of Kelman (1958, 1965), 
where he examines how social-psychological developments account for the 
occurrence as well as for the sustainability of change in social communities and 
illustrates the relevance of social psychology for the study of conflict.  
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The understanding that identity aspects have a negotiable quality can be 
linked to two assumptions: that identity is to a large part socially constructed 
and to Burton’s understanding that psychological needs, like identity, security, 
or recognition are not inherently zero-sum (1988). Kelman has expanded on 
Burton’s notion that one party need not gain its identity or sense of security at 
the expense of the other, by formulating that the sense of identity is not only 
left intact by the mutual acknowledgement of each other’s national existence, 
but that the expression of certain changed identity elements reinforce, rather 
than threaten the core of the parties’ identities (Kelman, 1987: 358).  
Kelman first referred to the method’s conceptual content as “the 
negotiation of identity”, ascribing the term to his colleague Stephen Cohen 
(Kelman, 1979: 104). IPS proposes that certain psychological conditions are 
necessarily required for participants to engage in a dialogue that entails a 
discussion and really a negotiation of aspects of their national identity 
(Kelman, 1978: 162-186).  
The first requirement entails that both sides make the effort to explain 
their view in a way that the other can understand, and actively listen to what the 
other tries to say. Thereby the parties develop responsiveness to the opponents 
concerns. Such responsiveness needs to be reinforced by mutual gestures of 
reassurance. Each party must be willing not only to offer gestures to the other, 
but also to communicate what gestures from the other would be meaningful to 
them. Thereby the second prerequisite is met and each side can acquire insight 
into the perspective of the other.  
At this level, both sides can learn what gave rise to the other's positions, 
interests, needs and concerns. By understanding the motivations of the other, 
each party will be able to make sense of the other’s reluctance to accept one's 
own point of view and will discover that there is someone to talk to and 
something to talk about.  




In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict it has generally been assumed that 
there is no one to talk to on the other side. The reason for this, besides the lack 
of trust, is that those on the adversary side, who showed readiness to participate 
in talks, are dismissed as non-representative. Generally, those willing to listen 
and even make suggestions for changing the status quo are not seen as being 
able to implement the suggested changes because they lack the necessary 
political influence. Further, Israeli and Palestinians have presumed that even if 
there would be someone to talk to, there would be nothing to talk about, 
because the demands of the two sides have been viewed as being mutually 
exclusive. Also, each side is used to thinking that the opponent’s goal in an 
eventual negotiation would be to discuss their own surrender.  
Acceptance of the idea that a dialogue about substantial issues is 
possible requires a differentiated view of the other side, which entails the 
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fourth prerequisite of distinguishing between ideological dreams and 
operational programs.  
Ideological dreams refer to old ritualized myths. These dreams are 
important in terms of maintaining a community's cohesion and ideological 
elements may be reiterated as rhetorical instruments in frustrating conflict 
situations. Ideological remnants of each group's historical narrative have, 
however, in most cases been abandoned and are not likely to become part of 
the two political communities' operational programs, that is their political 
agenda that each party intends to follow. Old beliefs may remain in the 
collective conscience of a group but do no longer determine the actions of that 
group. For mutual acceptance to occur, it is vital that both sides learn to 
distinguish between the elements of the opponent's ideology that are mere 
components of political rhetoric and those that actually form part of the 
political agenda determining current decision making.  
For Israelis and Palestinians new convictions have become operational 
over time. However, both sides still need to be convinced that this is the case. 
The difficulty that needs to be overcome is that both sides know that one set of 
ideological beliefs is not just replaced with another and that myths and dreams 
associated with their historical narrative are not easily abandoned. However, 
both sides also experienced how new beliefs evolved that made old myths 
irrelevant in terms of political goals. If both sides share the experience that new 
and sometimes even contradictory ideological principles can exist alongside of 
old ones, the distinction between ideological dreams and operational programs 
becomes easier to draw. 
The acceptance of the opponent's new political agenda implies a move 
towards the other and leads to the fifth prerequisite that each side must be 
persuaded that mutual concessions will create a new situation, setting a process 
of change into motion. Parties in conflict tend to underestimate the prospect for 
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change in the future. They anticipate that the other side aims at keeping the 
status quo and will replicate its past actions in the future. Doing so, they 
disregard any new element that might enter the equation including their own 
respective actions. This obstructs readiness to concede to the demands of the 
other.  
In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict both sides have a fixed and outdated 
perception of each other and their respective position with regard to the 
conflict. Over time, positions on each side changed considerably. Palestinians 
and Israelis both perceive their own changes as drastic, while they perceive the 
changes of the other side as either non-existent or as being unauthentic.  
It is very difficult for each side to imagine how their own enormous 
catharsis could pass as unperceived or as negligibly small by the other side. 
The reason for this asymmetry of perception is that both evaluate the changes 
that occurred on the other side in terms of the extent to which they did or did 
not bring them closer to their own preferred positions and not in terms of the 
difficulties that had to be overcome to achieve the changes. Only if each side 
comes to understand how important the achieved changes are to the other side, 
and how strenuous it was for the members of their community to achieve those 
changes, both can gain trust to believe these changes to be real and link 
necessary concessions on their part to the implementation of those changes.  
To formally make a concession to the other side, the sixth prerequisite 
needs to me met. The changes, which each polity underwent, need to be 
expressed in structural changes of the leadership of the other side. Acceptance 
of change occurring in the opponent's leadership is a central element to build 
mutual trust between the conflict parties because the other party's leadership 
will account for future change to happen or not. It determines each party's 
assessment of what they may realistically expect from the other side and the 
probable consequences their own moves will have in the future. As with the 
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attitude towards believing in future change of the conflict scenario in general, 
the same tendency prevails with regard to the leadership of the other side. 
There is a general tendency to perceive it as being static and assume that apart 
from minor adjustments in personnel and tactics it is not likely to change. 
Again, evidence of structural change in the other side's leadership is essential 
for each side to risk a change in its own political direction. 
It is vital to outline future scenarios in detail so that both sides can 
evaluate their probable consequences, which should make them able to commit 
to concessions that will lead to an altered situation. For example, Israelis are 
only likely to agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state, if Palestinians 
are ready to commit to a detailed process of moving towards constituting a 
state that will reassure Israelis that they need not fear for their security. On the 
other hand, Israelis will need to present Palestinians with concrete steps, which 
they are willing to take to assure the establishment of a Palestinian state. Only 
if Israelis dispel the Palestinian fear of not being able to form their own state, 
will the Palestinians be ready, to concede to Israeli demands. 
In addition to the psychological prerequisites there is a further condition 
that needs to be met for the purpose of identity negotiation. Kelman stresses 
that the core construct of the conflict parties’ national identity needs to stay 
intact and must be confirmed to account for a strong sense of self, which in turn 
is necessary to discuss changeable identity aspects. Kelman counts six elements 
that are core to Palestinian and Israeli national identity (1987: 349ff.).  
The first core identity element concerns nationhood. For their identity to 
stay intact, each party needs to receive recognition of their nationhood by the 
other party. The second unalterable part of national identity refers to territorial 
ownership. A national community needs to be able to express its political 
identity through the sense of ownership of a territory. 
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Third, Palestinians as well as Israelis need others to recognize that they 
see themselves as members of a larger people, part of which lives in its 
ancestral homeland and part of it in the diaspora. It is important for both 
peoples that the other recognizes that those living in the diaspora form part of 
their nation. Fourth, Palestinians and Israelis need to be able to organize 
themselves politically and assemble a legitimate leadership. Each party's 
leadership needs to be acknowledged and respected by the other as their 
legitimate political representative. Fifth, both need a sense of political 
participation that can be accounted for through legitimately representative 
politicians. Finally, both groups need assurance of their right to continued 
national existence.  
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The communication techniques employed by IPS ensure that the core 
elements are respected and confirmed during the discussions. In this 
environment identity threats are soothed and the parties’ sense of self 
strengthened. Such an atmosphere enables participants to negotiate their 
perception and ways of expressing some more peripheral elements of their 
national identities.  
 
Negotiable Elements of Israeli and Palestinian National Identity 
 Changes in identity elements are a legitimate subject for negotiation 
because the identity of one group has significant implications for the identity of 
the other. Whenever one group translates the self-definition of its nationhood 
into action, the other is inevitably affected. Also, conflict parties perceived 
changes to less central identity elements as protecting the core of their 
identities. For example, the majority of Israelis and Palestinians came to accept 
territorial compromise for the purpose of maintaining their national identity.  
Kelman distinguishes six identity elements that can be negotiated, he 
explains how they can be changed and which aspects may be omitted or 
altered. (Kelman, 2001: 201ff.).  
The first negotiable element is a monolithic perception of national 
identity. A monolithic view of national identity implies that all its dimensions 
like ethnic and political boundaries as well as boundaries of sentimental 
attachment are seen as being highly correlated. This leads to a completely 
separated perception of self and other along these lines. Negotiating a 
monolithic view consists of realizing that the different boundaries to group 
identity do not necessarily coincide. The boundaries of sentimental attachment 
to the land must not necessarily be congruent with the political boundaries of a 
state. It is possible to keep one’s attachment to a homeland without “owning” 
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the entire territory of that homeland in the form of establishing a sovereign 




Recognizing different demarcations of identity expressions opens the 
way to the development of a transcendent identity that is bigger then the 
particularistic identity of each conflict party. A transcendent identity layer can 
include several particular identity layers. If conflict parties can engage in a 
transcendent view of their national identity they become able to recognize that 
one of their identity layers consists of their need to have ownership over a 
given territory while another identity layer consists of their attachment to the 
homeland. If both of theses identity perceptions can coexist and accommodated 
in the national identity of both conflict parties, it becomes possible for both of 
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them to maintain a common attachment to their entire homeland and “own” 
only part of that land as their political state (Kelman, 2001: 201-202).  
 The second negotiable element consists of the exclusive perception of 
national identity. An exclusive identity perception implies a zero-sum view in 
which meeting the other's claims equals having to give up one's own, rendering 
the other's claims invalid. Negotiating exclusive identity implies discovering 
shared identity elements and that the claims of the two sides are not necessarily 
exclusive. An inclusive identity allows for the recognition that accepting the 
other’s claims as valid does not necessitate invalidating one’s own claims. 
Thereby they can discover that they share certain claims, concerns and needs. 
Israelis and Palestinians share many claims and concerns, like their claim to the 
same land, but also the concern about and for secure living conditions. 
Recognizing shared elements opens the way to political solutions based on 
sharing resources and territory.  
A third realm of negotiation consists of outdated elements of group 
identity. These can comprise ideological dreams of glorified images that have 
no more current political relevance. For Palestinians this would imply to move 
away from their reference to the armed struggle as the way to eliminate the 
Zionist entity towards establishing a strong political representation. For Israelis 
it meant to move away from their reference to the Zionist project of making the 
desert bloom towards fostering prosperity of their constituency. By omitting 
exaggerated images from their rhetoric, both parties can discard many items 
that cause humiliation and fear to the other side, without giving away core 
elements of their national identity.  
 A fourth negotiable identity aspect is the prioritization of its constituting 
elements. For example, territorial ambitions that were pursued as a top of the 
list issue may be relegated to a lower priority, because parties recognize that its 
pursuit had become too costly. Palestinians, for instance, have over time 
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qualified recovering the lost land in its entirety as less important than ending 
the occupation and establishing a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, 
while Israelis began to give priority to maintaining the Jewish character of 
Israel over controlling the whole land of Greater Israel. Elements that have 
been relegated to a lower priority become available for negotiated compromise. 
 The fifth negotiable element touches on national narratives. National 
narratives can be changed if each party ceases to exclude the narrative of the 
other. Such acceptance starts by learning to accept the other’s story as it is 
without necessarily agreeing with it. Thereby each party can accommodate 
parts of the other’s view of history within their own narrative. For example, 
each side may become ready to acknowledge their role in the course of the 
conflict and accept a share of the responsibility for the causes of the conflict.  
If conflict parties are able to make room for the history of their opponent 
within their own understanding of their national identity they get very close to 
alter the identity element that is most important to maintaining the conflict. 
That identity element consists of the negation of the other’s identity as an 
integral part of one’s own identity. The negation of the other as a part of each 
group’s national identity has been socially constructed by the experiences both 
parties made during the development of the conflict. It can, therefore, be 
deconstructed. To achieve this, each party needs to move from their perception 
that portrays the other’s demise as a condition for their own survival, to a 
perception that allows for the recognition and acceptance of the other’s 
existence as a people.  
In the course of interactive problem-solving workshops, Israeli and 
Palestinian participants have negotiated aspects of the monolithic images they 
held of each other. They discovered that there is a distinction between the 
other’s ideological dreams and operational programs, and that the other has 
positive goals beyond destruction of their group. Each party was able to enter 
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into the other’s perspective and recognize the historical sources of the other’s 
claims and grievances, the depth of the other’s fears and the authenticity of the 
other’s sense of people hood.  
Some of the achieved changes have, however, not been fully resistant to 
setbacks of further conflict dynamics. As the present study aims at finding out, 
how negotiated identity changes have contributed to the Peace Process, it is 
relevant to look at the nature and quality of the negotiated identity elements 
and to find out under which conditions identity changes are sustainable.  
 
The sustainability of negotiated identity changes  
The sustainability of identity changes or the nature of the impact of the 
identity factor on the dynamics of the Peace Process depends on the stability, 
integrity, and authenticity of the negotiated identity changes. In chapter two, 
we discussed the three identity dimensions that Kelman describes to account 
for the capacity of identity elements to cope with the challenges of social 
interaction and resist to variations in social context.  
Taking the perspective of a conflict resolution practitioner, we would 
like to find out, how stable, integrated and authentic identity changes can be 
negotiated. Kelman has looked at how social influences can impact on identity 
formation by discussing a model of social influence. The model of social 
influence had been developed in the framework of explaining the processes of 
attitude and opinion change (see Kelman 1958, 1961 and Jahoda, 1956).  
Social influence is defined in this context, as a change in a person’s 
behavior as a result of induction by another person or a group. Induction refers 
to an action that points to a new direction for the person and makes a new 
behavioral possibility available to her or him (Kelman, 1998: 7).  
According to Kelman, three processes of social influence may contribute 
to the acquisition of elements of personal identity (Kelman, 1998: 12). The 
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three processes of social influence that may contribute to the formation and 
adoption of identity elements are called: compliance, identification, and 
internalization (Kelman, 1958: 53).  
The basic assumption of the model is that each of the three processes is 
determined by a qualitatively distinct set of antecedent conditions and yields a 
qualitatively different type of change. If change is induced by compliance it has 
been motivated by the aim to achieve some kind of reward and approval, or in 
order to avoid punishment or disapproval. If change originates from 
identification it has been motivated by the aim of maintaining a desired 
relationship and the self-definition anchored in that relationship. If change 
comes about through internalization, it derives from the motivation to maintain 
the congruence of one's own value system (Kelman, 1958: 53).  
Behavior resulting from a compliance-induced change addresses 
interests and depends on a system of enforceable rules, which individuals or 
groups of individuals are expected to comply with. Behavior resulting from an 
identification-induced change centers on the relationship between individuals 
and groups and depends on a system of shared roles, which individuals and 
groups identify with. Behavior resulting from an internalization-induced 
change centers on the core of individual identities and is governed by a 
person’s own value system (Kelman, 1961: 67ff.).  
With regard to identity formation, a stable and authentic identity change 
is likely to emerge from internalization. Internalization involves the acceptance 
of social influence because the induced behavior is congruent with the person’s 
own value system. Adopting the new behavior involves some modification of 
the behavior to fit it into each individual’s preexisting identity structure as well 
as some modification of the existing identity structure to accommodate the new 
element. The new identity element is stable because it is integrated into the 
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individual’s value system and bears the individual’s personal stamp (Kelman, 
1998: 13).  
The process of identification also contributes to identity formation but 
does not lead to authentic identity elements but only to vicarious identity 
elements (Kelman, 1998: 12). Identification of individuals and groups of 
individuals with another group often occurs to compensate for a characteristic 
that those individuals lack. Thereby each group takes on a role that is defined 
by the system of the relationship between the two groups. The identification 
with the new identity aspect means that it is adopted as it is without adapting it 
to an individual’s capacities and without integrating it into the personal value 
system. Vicarious identity elements only remain intact as long as the 
relationship from which they derive persists. If the social context changes in a 
way that the adopted role is no longer salient, the vicarious identity element 
will be changed or abandoned.  
The process of compliance can lead to the adoption of certain patterns of 
self-presentation to gain the approval of or conform to the expectations of 
another group for the purpose of smooth interaction with that group in a 
particular set of situations. According to Kelman, one can only speak of 
identity elements based on compliance if such self-presentations become part 
of an individual’s self-definition – in the sense that they define themselves in 
terms of the characteristics favored by the other or the categories imposed by 
the other (1998: 13). Such conferred identity elements are highly dependent on 
the situation and the characteristics of the group with whom an individual 
interacts (Kelman, 1998:14). Such elements of identity are thus low in 
authenticity, stability and integration.  
Kelman points out that the contributions of the three processes of 
influence to identity formation are not sharply separate and that identity 
formation is never simply a matter of either internalization or identification or 
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compliance (1998:14). The three processes can interact with each other in the 
development of personal identity and the activation of conferred and vicarious 
elements may help to strengthen authentic identity elements or facilitate their 
expression.  
The impact of the identity factor on conflict resolution is, of course, 
more substantial if authentic identity changes can be negotiated. The second 
part of the study will observe how and to what extent identity aspects have 
been negotiated in problem-solving workshops held in the 1990s. As the 
discussions of the workshop participants contain many references to actualities 
of the time, the following chapter four, gives an overview of the contemporary 
historic context and describes events and developments that have influenced 
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4  Historical Context of the Peace Process 
 
The development of identity changes is a long and complex process 
caused by different motivators and occurs at different levels. The way Israelis 
and Palestinians define their national identity has to some extent, changed dur-
ing the Peace Process in the 1990s. The transformation of their identity has 
occurred at an individual level of the members of each national collective and 
has possibly been initiated at the micro-level of Track Two efforts like interac-
tive problem-solving workshops. The manifestation of the identity changes, on 
the other hand, took place at the collective level in the context of macro-level 
conditions that enabled the changed realities to take hold. Moreover, while 
changes achieved at a micro-level can have an impact on macro-level events, 
the latter influence and stimulate micro-level developments.  
With the intent of making this interactive effect between micro-level and 
macro-level events transparent, Part II follows the continuous application of 
IPS during different phases of the Peace Process in the 1990s, set. Chapter four 
explores some of the developments that created an optimal opportunity for Is-
raelis and Palestinians to negotiate the Oslo Accords and situates the workshop 
meetings in the historical context of the Peace Process. The fifth chapter fol-
lows the micro-level workshop discussions, held during the pre-negotiation 
stage. The sixth chapter then follows workshop discussions that occurred 
alongside of official negotiations of the Peace Process.  
The historical context of the Peace Process, in which the continuing ap-
plication of IPS workshops takes place, spans from developments that laid the 
groundwork for the Peace Process, encompasses the first multilateral Middle-
East peace negotiations that were followed by the Oslo Accords with its five 





Ariel Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount and the start of the Second Intifada 
(Rothstein, 2002.)  
Developments that created momentum for the Peace Process contained 
the Intifada, the Palestinian Declaration of Independence, the systematic dip-
lomatic strategy of the US, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the Gulf Cri-
sis. These developments added to the personal motivation of at the time Israel’s 
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rhabin and PLO Chairman Arafat to sign the papers 
that had been drafted in private meetings in Norway.  
 
Intifada  
The Intifada – 'the shaking off' – erupted on December 8th, in 1987. A 
tank transport vehicle of the Israeli Army crashed into a line of Palestinian cars 
traveling back to Gaza after a day of work in Israel. Funerals held for some of 
the victims turned into massive demonstrations. In the course of the following 
weeks, a large-scale uprising followed this triggering event that would last in 
varying intensity throughout the course of the following years. Demonstrations 
in the refugee camps spread to major towns in Gaza, to villages in the West 
Bank, and for the first time also to East Jerusalem (Tessler, 1994).  
The Intifada mobilized all age groups and social classes but particularly 
expressed the assertiveness of the generation born after 1967, who had lived 
their whole lives under occupation. They transformed their frustration and an-
ger about humiliating living conditions into a decisive and extremely well 
structured upheaval. Young neighborhood committees lined up with the exist-
ing PLO structures and organized themselves in the “Unified National Leader-
ship of the Intifada” (UNLI) and eventually called themselves the Unified Na-
tional Leadership of the PLO.   
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Thereby the Intifada strengthened the position of the PLO and recon-
firmed its acceptance not only by the Palestinian population living within the 
Occupied Territories but also by those living in the diaspora as the only legiti-
mate representative of the Palestinian people. This position of the PLO proved 
to be a crucial element in the ensuing Peace Process.  
The impact of the Intifada on Israel was less immediate but had a pro-
found long-term effect. It has rendered the occupation decisively more difficult 
and costly. Existing forms of social control were no longer effective confront-
ing Israel with increased expenses to maintain order. Fewer Palestinians 
worked in Israel, Israeli consumer goods were boycotted, and a partially suc-
cessful campaign against the payment of taxes in the territories was launched 
(Shehadeh, 1988).  
Politically, the Intifada added to the polarization between the proponents 
of territorial compromise and those in favor of a maximalist “Greater Israel” 
position. This effected added to the collapse of Israel’s national unity govern-
ment in 1990. Further, the Intifada accentuated the minority status of Israeli 
Arabs, who showed a surge in expressing sympathy and solidarity for Palestin-
ians living under occupation (Rouhana, 1990). Over all, the Intifada spurred the 
emergence of greater political realism towards the Palestinian issue among im-
portant segments of both the Labor and Likud parties (Tessler, 1991).  
On an international level the Intifada contributed to a shift in perspec-
tive. It moved the struggle between Palestinians and Israelis to the center of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict and highlighted significantly, the identity and security 
needs of Palestinians and Israelis. This contributed to the possibility for negoti-






Palestinian Declaration of Independence  
On July 28th in 1988, King Hussein of Jordan announced the termination 
of a $1.3 billion development program for the West Bank. He described the 
blatant move as measure allowing the PLO to take over more responsibility for 
the area. Two days later, he formally dissolved Parliament, ending West Bank 
representation in the legislature (Nevo, 2006).  
In his address to the nation On July 31st, King Hussein proclaimed that 
Jordan would formally cede sovereignty over the occupied West Bank – with 
the exception of guardianship over the Muslim Holy Sites of Jerusalem. He 
thereby transferred all control over territory, administrative and legal matters to 
the PLO. This move strengthened the legitimacy of the PLO’s as the repre-
sentative of the Palestinians and fostered their political leverage (Kurtzer and 
Lasensky, 2008)  
On November 15th of the same year, the Palestinian National Council, 
the legislative body of the PLO adopted the Declaration of Independence and 
the Political Program. The Declaration proclaimed the establishment of the 
independent state of Palestine; while the Political Program elaborated on the 
objectives of the declaration. The Declaration was of historical significance for 
Israeli-Palestinian relations as it called for a two-state solution and for peaceful 
coexistence of the two neighboring states and the two peoples. The Palestinians 
thereby accepted the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and 
the Gaza Strip as an ultimate objective and implicitly accepted not only UN 
Resolution 242 and 338, but most of all recognized Israel’s right to exist. The 
Declaration of Independence gave impetus to the further development of Israe-
li-Palestinian relations, by leading to a diplomatic dialogue with the US, and by 
further contributing to the acceptance of the PLO as the legitimate representa-
tion of the Palestinian people (Rabie, 1995).  
Historical Context of the Peace Process 
 92 
US Diplomatic Relations with the PLO and Israel  
In December 1988, following the adoption of the Palestinian Declaration 
of Independence, the US started a dialogue with the PLO in Tunis. The Decla-
ration together with the stated Political Program seemed to respond to US poli-
cy demands formulated by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in 1975, implic-
itly recognizing Israel's right to exist and accepting Security Council Resolu-
tion 242 and 338. By calling for a two-state solution and for peaceful coexist-
ence of the two neighboring states and the two peoples, the Palestinians accept-
ed the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 
as an ultimate objective. As the documents remained unclear about the ac-
ceptance of the UN Resolutions and renouncement on terrorism, and did not 
explicitly recognize the existence of Israel, the US asked the PLO for further 
clarification. When Arafat addressed the UN General Assembly in Geneva, on 
December 13th 1988, he remained vague about the acceptance of the UN Reso-
lutions and the acceptance of Israel. A day later, Arafat called a press confer-
ence and specifically stated that Palestine, Israel and their neighbors had a right 
to exist and clearly renounced from terrorism. The public pledge of the PLO's 
policy change was sufficient to remove existing ambiguities and led the US to 
engage in a dialogue with the PLO (Barrari, 2004).  
The US administration under President George H. W. Bush followed a 
clear and sustained strategy to bring about a peaceful solution to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. Even though the negotiating environment was unfavorable 
in 1989, the Bush team sought to create opportunities and develop new ideas. 
Also, the Bush administration exerted increased pressure on the Israeli gov-
ernment to end the occupation and to recognize the political rights of the Pales-
tinian people. Shamir responded to that pressure by presenting the Four Point 





ton. The Plan contained four basic points: Firstly, strengthening the peace with 
Egypt as a regional cornerstone, second, promoting full peaceful relations with 
the Arab states, third improving refugee conditions through international ef-
forts, and finally Palestinian elections and interim self-rule for a five year peri-
od leading to a "permanent solution" (Lukacs, 1992: 236-237). These proposi-
tions did not contain new ideas but borrowed from the Camp David Accords. It 
was mostly a pretense of seemingly playing along with US demands.  
In response, the US Secretary of State, James Baker, submitted a Five 
Point Plan to Israel and Egypt on November 1st, 1989. The plan was an effort to 
support foregoing attempts of Israel and Egypt to deal with the Israeli-
Palestinian dispute and to solve some of its obstructions. Israel had been reluc-
tant to follow propositions for engaging in a negotiation process because it 
feared that Egypt would introduce the PLO through the back door.  
First, Baker's Plan agreed that: "[...] an Israeli delegation should conduct 
a dialogue with a Palestinian delegation [put together with Egyptian help] in 
Cairo"; second, "the United States understands that Egypt cannot substitute 
itself for the Palestinians and that Egypt will consult with Palestinians on all 
aspects of the dialogue. Egypt will also consult with Israel and the United 
states". Third, the Plan assures that: "the United States understands that Israel 
will attend the dialogue only after a satisfactory list of Palestinians has been 
worked out". Fourth, the Plan reads that: "the United States understands that 
the government of Israel will come to the dialogue on the basis of the Israeli 
government's May 14th [1989] initiative. The United States further understands 
that Palestinians will come to the dialogue prepared to discuss elections and the 
negotiation process in accordance with Israel's initiative. The fifth and final 
point of the Plan states that: "in order to facilitate this process, the US proposes 
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that the foreign ministers of Israel, Egypt and the US meet in Washington with-
in two weeks" (Lukacs, 1992: 133). 
The purpose of the proposed dialogue was to discuss elections in the 
Occupied Territories and to negotiate a political settlement to the Palestinian-
Israeli dispute. Israel said to agree with Baker's plan if the PLO would in no 
way participate in the discussions (not even through the naming of Palestinian 
delegates) and if the discussions would be strictly limited to preparations for 
Palestinian elections. In a vote of no confidence precipitated by disagreement 
over the response to the Baker initiative, the National Unity government (with a 
strong left wing Labor party) fell in March 1990. Prime Minister Shamir 
formed a new government (dominated by the right wing Likud party) in June 
1990 and rejected the Baker Plan (Bentsur, 2001). 
  On May 30st 1990, the Palestine Liberation Front (a small faction 
backed by Iraq) led by Abu al-Abbas embarked on an operation launching six 
boats with armed personnel off Israel's coast. Israeli forces captured the group, 
after the latter had landed on Israeli shores but before it had carried out its mis-
sion. The US considered the attempt a terrorist attack and demanded the PLO 
to condemn it and expel Abu al-Abbas from the PLO's executive committee. 
As the PLO refused to answer any of these demands, President Bush ordered 
the suspension of the US-PLO dialogue (Rabie, 1995).  
 
The End of the Cold War  
The end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the USSR had a deep 
impact on the entire Middle Eastern region by causing a remarkable revision of 
fortune and collapse of long-held premises. The Arab world was forced to revise 
their most cherished ideas of Pan-Arab nationalism, of soviet-modeled economy 





The new strategic setting brought about by the developments leading to 
the end of the Cold War made it much more difficult to paint over domestic 
problems for Middle Eastern rulers. Popular frustration with the failure of politi-
cians to grapple with poverty, injustice, lack of respect for human rights, corrup-
tion, and violence, was widely expressed throughout the region. Israel’s neigh-
boring states had realized that they were not able to destroy Israel, that the at-
tempt to do so had been exceptionally costly and had actually strengthened 
Israel’s stand. Yet ideology, rivalries between states, and the insecurity of gov-
ernments made it difficult to end the conflict – from which a deadlock situation 
resulted. The Arab-Israeli conflict, which had been portrayed as a regional-
policy priority was actually used by Syria, Egypt and Jordan to camouflage 
internal problems. The Arab-Israeli conflict was not a cause but a visible mani-
festation of internal Arab struggles over identity, economic development and 
military power (Rubin, 1991: 136).  
With the end of the Cold War, Israel lost strategic relevance for the 
United States in the Middle East.  This became apparent during the Gulf Crisis, 
when Israel was forced to completely rely on US military support. Further, the 
rapid deterioration of economic conditions in the Soviet Union, coupled with the 
American decision to limit the acceptance of Soviet refugees, brought about a 
dramatic influx of Soviet Jewish immigrants. In 1990 a total of nearly 200,000 
Soviet Jews were flocking to Israel (Quandt, 1990/91: 57).  
For the Palestinians the end of the Cold War meant a sever loss of finan-
cial and moral support. The Soviet immigration stimulated fears that possibilities 
to form a sovereign state in the shrinking territories of the West Bank and the 
small area of the Gaza strip were deteriorating. This scenario was one of the 
reasons why Saddam Hussein’s bid for power in the Gulf Crisis seemed to offer 
a means of checking Israeli expansion that appealed to the Palestinians.   
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The Gulf Crisis  
 On August 2nd in 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait, and caused unlimited in-
ternational attention as well as serious diplomatic effort, headed by the US 
government, to deter further aggression and restore Kuwaiti sovereignty.  The 
Gulf Crisis had developed into the Second Gulf War on January 17th in 1991, 
when hostilities of the Operation Desert Storm began. A coalition of 34 coun-
tries under US lead had deployed troops in Saudi Arabia. They started to use 
force after diplomatic efforts had failed to bring Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. 
The war ended on March 1st, 1991with the liberation of Kuwait (Tessler, 1994).  
For the Palestinians, the Gulf Crisis had a weakening effect on their po-
litical stand. The PLO leadership opposed military action by the US and its 
allies. This position was perceived by Israelis as well as by the international 
community as supporting Saddam Hussein. As a consequence the US and other 
Western Powers but also the Gulf States distanced themselves from the PLO 
and withdrew their political and financial support, further deteriorating the eco-
nomic situation in the Occupied Territories, which had already suffered from 
the Intifada and the end of the Cold War. 
For Israel, the Gulf Crisis had both negative and positive consequences. 
A strengthening effect derived form a renewal in Israel's military predominance 
in the region. The destruction of Iraq's military potential eliminated Israel’s 
most threatening regional opponent. No other neighboring Arab state would be 
able to endanger Israel's existence as a state.  
Nevertheless, the Gulf War also had a destabilizing effect on Israel with 
regard to national politics and the national moral. During the Gulf War Israel 
had to face its loss of strategic importance for the US in the Middle East. Not 
only was Israel asked by the US to exclude itself from the military alliance it 





US for its own defense. When in January 1991, Israel was attacked form Iraq 
with a missile launch, the United States asked Israel not to respond. Israel's 
military passivity produced a feeling of traumatic humiliation among large 
parts of the Israeli public (Schiff, 1991: 19). The paradoxical feeling of having 
achieved strategic gain without any real military effort lowered the Israeli mo-
rale and the departure of their historic military self-sufficiency heightened Isra-
el’s sense of vulnerability and dependence on the US.  
The Gulf crisis created circumstances that made both the PLO and Israel 
highly susceptible to pressures from the US, which the latter was keen to apply 
in order to consolidate the dominant position it held at that time. Moreover, the 
Gulf War had led to a security policy situation in the area that put further pres-
sure on the two parties. A maintenance of the status quo or a refusal of tackling 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would give the surrounding Arab states the pos-
sibility to develop or obtain mass destructive weapons (Alpher, 1994: 233). 
Pressure to engage in negotiations also grew from the Israeli public. Polls had 
shown that 60% of the Israelis were in favor of negotiations on the basis of 
"Land for Peace" (Hadar, 1992: 87). Reluctance from the Likud government to 
engage in a negotiation process consequently threatened a re-election of Sha-
mir.  
 
The Madrid Conference  
Even before the Gulf War ended, the US distanced itself from the peace-
conducive atmosphere and stopped insisting on further peace initiatives. Under 
the lead of Secretary of State James Baker the US tried to bring Israel and its 
opponents to the negotiating table. In preparation of the Madrid Conference, 
Baker visited the Middle East eight times (Bentsur, 2001). 
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By June1990, the Israeli government showed itself ready again to accept 
the American invitation to a peace conference, provided certain conditions on 
Palestinian representation would be met. Those conditions contained that the 
Palestinian delegation would form part of the Jordanian delegation, that it 
would not include PLO representatives, nor people living in East Jerusalem or 
outside the occupied territories. The Israeli government expected the US to 
negotiate such conditions with the Arab side and bring them to commit to these 
conditions in a Memorandum of Understanding that the Israeli and the Palestin-
ian delegation would sign (Cowell, 1991).  
The US on their part did not speak of a memorandum but of letters of 
assurance that would be sent to all parties eventually agreeing to attend the 
peace conference (including Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Israel) in order 
to broker outstanding reservations about their participation. Israeli officials just 
interpreted the US offer as leading to a Memorandum of Understanding that 
would carry more weight (Cowell, 1991). When the Israeli government realized 
that the US brokered letters of assurance would not have the binding character 
as their envisioned Memorandum, they stalled their move towards entering 
peace talks. 
By mid 1991, the US was able to gain Syria, who had lost Soviet politi-
cal and military support, as a partner in achieving peace with Israel. On July 
14th 1991, Syria's President Assad confirmed in a letter to US President Bush 
his willingness to take part in direct negotiations with Israel on the basis of a 
land-for-peace principle. Following this diplomatic move, Israel was put on the 
spot. The US augmented the pressure on Israel by withholding a guarantee for a 
$10 billion loan. In order to avoid confrontation with the US and preventing a 
loss of their awaited loan for settling Soviet-Jewish immigrants, Israeli Prime 





peace conference on August 1st, under the condition of having control over the 
list of Palestinian negotiators (Frankel, 1995). 
The vulnerable position of both the PLO, being politically isolated and 
financially cut off, and Israel being highly dependent on the US, provided Pres-
ident Bush and Secretary of State Baker with the leverage to push the parties to 
take part in the Madrid Conference that opened on October 30th in 1991 as well 
as the bilateral talks in Washington and the ensuing multilateral talks, although 
they clearly lacked commitment for the negotiations. PLO Chairmen Arafat had 
to accept an indirect role for the PLO, which he did not agree with, while Israe-
li Prime Minister Shamir had to enter negotiations he did not consent to a pri-
ori. That lack of commitment accounted for the failure of the Washington talks, 
with limited substantial outcomes that led to a standstill in the peace process.  
 
The Norway Channel  
 While the bilateral talks between the Jordanian-Palestinian and the Israe-
li delegation continued without producing results, members of the PLO and 
Israeli officials started to engage in secret negotiations in Norway in January 
1993. Norway's involvement in the matter stemmed from its close ties to both 
Israel and the PLO. Norway was sympathetic to the suffering of the Jewish 
people during the Second World War, and supported the founding of Israel. 
Although strained by the outcome of the 1967 war, the ties to Israel never com-
pletely disappeared and were renewed with the new generation of Israeli doves 
emerging within the Israeli Labor party. Norwegian Labor governments built 
relations with the PLO, since the 1970’s and supported the cause of the Pales-
tinian people. After the Gulf War, the PLO turned to Norway to facilitate con-
tacts with Israel (Corbin, 1994).  
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 A number of factors accounted for the fact that the papers drafted in 
Norway resulted in a signed peace agreement. Among them was the election of 
Yitzhak Rabin as Israel’s Prime Minister in June 1992. He headed a Labor-led 
government that was genuinely interested in seriously committing to fruitful 
negotiations. Also, Rabin came to realize – although he had opposed the idea 
throughout his political career – that the PLO was a necessary negotiation part-
ner for reaching a peaceful agreement with the Palestinians. Another factor was 
Arafat’s realization that an agreement had to be reached with Rabin or loose the 
chance to a later right-wing Likud government under Benjamin Netanyahu 
(Kelman, 1997: 188). Failure to reach an agreement now, would not only have 
jeopardized the ultimate goal for Rabin to achieve Israeli security and for Ara-
fat to achieve ultimate Palestinian statehood, but would also have imperiled 
their political survival. This personal motivation of both Rabin and Arafat was 
the catalyst for the positive reception of the papers that had been drafted in the 
privacy of the Oslo Channel by unofficial representatives of the two parties.   
The US, however, ignored and failed to shape the secret contacts be-
tween Israel and the PLO. Responsible for this unfortunate strategy was in part 
the decision of the Clinton administration to turn their focus away from the 
achievement of the Palestinians and instead focus on the Israel-Syria track of 
the official negotiation process. Not withstanding its focus on Syria, the Clinton 
team did not develop that track’s full potential. In summer 1993, Rabin secretly 
told Secretary of State Warren Christopher and envoy Dennis Ross, that Israel 
was willing to negotiate a full withdrawal from the Golan Heights in exchange 
for full peace agreed security arrangements with Syria (Kurtzer and Lasensky, 
2008: 18). Instead of pursuing that opening in a streamlined shuttle diplomacy 






The Oslo Accords 
The first document of the Oslo Accords, the Declaration of Principles 
on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (DoP), was finalized in Oslo on 
August 20th and signed on September 13th in 1993 in Washington. The Declara-
tion was accompanied by an exchange of Letters of Mutual Recognition be-
tween PLO leader Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin 
granting mutual acknowledgement of the two peoples’ national existence 
(Beilin, 1999)  
In addition to the text of the Declaration itself, the DoP comprises four 
annexes dealing with elections, withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho 
Area, economic and regional-level cooperation, as well as a series of agreed 
and separately signed minutes that amplify various articles of the Declaration. 
These documents set out a framework for an interim period of five years during 
which agreements on final status arrangements should be negotiated (Buchan-
an, 2000: 162ff.). 
In 1994 three follow-up agreements of the Oslo Accords were signed. In 
May, the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area was completed, 
implementing the first phase of the Declaration of Principles. It contained the 
withdrawal of Israeli forces from these areas and the transfer of responsibilities 
for public order and internal security to the Palestinian police force. The 
agreement further held that Israel would retain authority over the rest of the 
West Bank until redeployment.  
In August, the Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Re-
sponsibilities was reached between Israel and the Palestinians. The latter put 
the transfer of authority in the sphere of education and culture, health, social 
welfare, tourism and taxation into effect.  
Historical Context of the Peace Process 
 102 
In October, the Treaty of Pace between the State of Israel and the Hash-
emite Kingdom of Jordan was concluded between Israel and Jordan. The for-
mal peace treaty defined the border between the two countries and normalized 
relations between the two peoples.  
In May 1995, the Gaza-Jericho Agreement was signed between Israel 
and the PLO in Cairo. It established the Palestinian Authority (PA) and laid out 
its jurisdictional power. The agreement represented the famous “land for 
peace” bargain and entailed obligations for both sides. Israel committed to turn 
territory over to the PA, while the PA committed to combat terror and prevent 
violence (Egeland, 1999).  
In September the Protocol on further Transfer of Powers and Responsi-
bilities transferred further power to the Palestinian Authority; while the Interim 
Agreement incorporated and superseded the earlier Oslo Accords and is there-
fore also known as Oslo II. Israel withdrew from six more West Bank towns 
handing over jurisdiction of areas that contained most of the Palestinian popu-
lation to their own authority. The process was completed in January 1997 with 
the Hebron Agreement.  
In October 1998, Israelis and Palestinians agreed to the Wye River 
Memorandum containing further Israeli withdrawals from the West Bank and a 
commitment form the Palestinian Authority to combat terrorism (Ross, 2004). 
Implementation of the memorandum was cancelled due to clashes between 
Israeli and Palestinian troops later that year. These incidents were indicative of 
the beginning of a deterioration of the Peace Process that unfolded in 2000 
when the Camp David negotiations failed and Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Tem-
ple Mount triggered the Second Intifada.  
The subsequent chapter five describes discussions of the Continuing 





and situates them in the context of the events and developments of their con-































5  Interactive Problem Solving during Pre-negotiation  
The study of IPS workshops during the pre-negotiation phase of the 
Peace Process is based on the primary sources of anonymous notes, which 
members of the third-party staff took during workshop sessions. The notes are 
anonymous in the sense that the names of the participants have not been 
revealed. To distinguish between different speakers, the participants' nationality 
is indicated with code. Thereby, nothing that had been said during the meetings 
can be attributed to a particular person. During a research stay at Harvard 
University, the author was allowed to read the workshop transcripts and take 
notes. The following description of applied IPS, documents some of the 
discussions' central argumentations. As workshop participants point to past and 
contemporary events in no chronological order during the discussion sessions, 
footnotes provide historical background information and a timeline guides 
through the dense web of events. 
 
 The Continuing Workshop 
The Continuing Workshop distinguished itself from previously held 
workshops by consisting of a series of meetings with the same participants. 
Herbert C. Kelman, at the time Richard Clarke Cabot Professor of Social Ethics 
at the Department of Psychology at Harvard University and from 1993 onwards 
directing the Program on International Conflict Analysis and Resolution 
(PICAR) at the Weatherhead Center; and his colleague Nadim Rouhana, at the 
time Associate Professor at the Graduate Program in Dispute Resolution at the 
University of Massachusetts-Boston, were able to engage six Israeli and six 





Palestinian participants to take part in three meetings between 1990 and 1991. 
At the end of the third meeting, the participants wished to engage in further 
workshops and started, together with the third party, organizing new meetings, 
when in October 1991 official negotiations began in Madrid and introduced 
new parameters for the workshop format. After a number of meetings and two 
additional workshops with the continuing group, some of the former 
participants established together with Kelman and Rouhana the Joint Working 
Group on Israeli Palestinian Relations in 1994. The Joint Working Group 
published three concept papers that were also printed as journal articles.  
Up to twenty people were involved in the Continuing Workshop. The 
third party team counted four members: Herbert C. Kelman; Nadim Rouhana, 
Harold Saunders – director of International Relations at the Kettering 
Foundation and former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South 
Asian Affairs – and Christopher Mitchell – director of the Institute for Conflict 
Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University. The third-party staff 
consisted of four to five members, who were responsible for note taking and 
organizational tasks. The Israeli and the Palestinian teams were supposed to 
contain six members each, but not all of the participants were able to attend 
each meeting.  
 
First Meeting of the Continuing Workshop in November 1990 
When the continuing group first convened, the meetings were started 






the Palestinian and two times with the Israeli team respectively. The purpose of 
the pre-workshop sessions was to allow participants to familiarize themselves 
with the third party, workshop procedures and ground rules, before they were 
confronted with the adversary team. Also, they allowed the third party to learn 
how each party had experienced recent political developments and to work out 
an agenda for the subsequent meetings according to that information.  
The third party started the pre-workshop sessions by explaining why 
three Palestinian participants were not able to attend the first sequels of 
meetings that took place in the United States. Two had been held back because 
they did not receive their travel permits from the Israeli government, while one 
had been unable to travel due to health problems. The third party decided not to 
replace the three missing Palestinian participants because they found the most 
important thing was to maintain the integrity of the team. They saw the team as 
being intact and thought it possible to go ahead with the workshop with only 
half of the team members present, as meetings were consecutive and offered 
possibilities for the groups to engage in interim activities between the meetings.  
 
Pre-workshop Sessions with Palestinian Participants 
According to the Palestinian team members, the fact that Israelis failed 
to issue the necessary traveling permits, although there was no security pretext 
involved, was an indication of some of the daily problems the conflict entailed 
for them. The absence of two Palestinian team members reflected the political 
reality of occupation: Palestinians depended on Israeli government policy even 
with regard to their free movement. Further, the Palestinian participants hoped 





to be able to talk to the other side in an open way, despite the fact that they 
were not in a symmetrical position.  
In a next step, the third party asked the Palestinian team how they 
viewed recent political developments with regard to the conflict and their own 
situation.  
The Palestinians described the situation as having changed from being 
one in which they felt they could achieve something in cooperation with others 
to one in which they started to feel having less and less impact on the process. 
They said that during the IntifadaH1 a lot of dialogue groups had been active 
and Palestinians participated in these groups because they felt, that they could 
contribute something to a future solution. They described the current political 
atmosphere as being very hostile and as leaving them with the impression that 
their participation in the workshops would not become part of a wider dialogue.  
The third party then asked them what they thought to bee the turning 
points that provoked that change in the political atmosphere.  
The Palestinian participants named the Gulf CrisisH2, the election of the 
Likud party as the dominant force in the Israeli government, and the 
consequent defeat of the Labor party's pro-peace policy after the Gulf Crisis as 
such turning points. Also, they explained that they were shocked about the 
                                                
H1 The Intifada or 'the shaking off' of ongoing occupation erupted on December 8th, 
1987 (Tessler, 1994). 
 
H2 On August 2nd 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait, and caused unlimited international 
attention as well as serious diplomatic effort, headed by the US government, to deter 






Israeli reaction as well as about the reaction of governments supporting the 
peace process, like the US, towards the Gulf Crisis and more particularly 
towards the Palestinian stand on the Gulf Crisis. They felt that the Israelis as 
well as other countries completely misunderstood the Palestinian position.  
The third party then asked the Palestinian group members to explain in 
what way they felt misunderstood by the Israelis.  
The Palestinian participants responded that Israeli judgments of 
Palestinian position seemed to be based on media pictures of demonstrations in 
Amman, Galilee and the West Bank and not on PLO publications. They 
explained that Arafat had actually tried to intervene in the conflict by using his 
good offices to help restore the sovereignty of Kuwait. The misperception of 
the Palestinian stand on the issue started to form during the Arab Summit held 
in Cairo before the Kuwaiti annexation, when no consensus could be reached 
among the countries present about their reaction to the situation. There were 
several voting procedures during which the PLO voted against the deployment 
of forces in Saudi Arabia. Conversely, Egyptian media portrayed the behavior 
of the PLO as demonstrating support for the annexation. What was 
misunderstood was that the PLO was opposed to a military solution not 
because they supported Saddam Hussein but because they hoped to achieve a 
negotiated solution.  
Further, Palestinian participants explained that the demonstrations in the 
Occupied Territories were portrayed as an expression of support for the 
invasion of Kuwait. In reality, however, they were an expression of frustration, 
triggered by a number of events. For instance, Palestinians were disappointed 
by the behavior of the US administration after the failure of James Baker's Five 





Point PlanH3. Palestinians were frustrated about the fact that the US failed to 
bring Israel to the negotiation table. Further Palestinians in the Occupied 
Territories were very upset about the lack of UN measures in response to the 
events on Temple MountH4, during which several people were killed. The PLO 
asked the UN Mission in the Occupied Territories to find a way to secure the 
safety of Palestinians. The Resolutions of the Security Council on that behalf 
were vetoed by the US seven times and for the last time just two days before 
the Arab Summit was held.  
Palestinian group members held, that the reaction of their constituency 
towards the Gulf Crisis had to be seen as an expression of their deep frustration 
about the US negligence of the situation in the Occupied Territories vis-à-vis 
their immediate reaction against the occupation of Kuwait. They elucidated that 
the Palestinian stand towards the Gulf Crisis was not one of support for 
Saddam Hussein but one of protest against the US. Further, Palestinians were 
looking for Arab help after three years of Intifada, Iraq was just one possibility 
                                                
H3 The US Secretary of State, James Baker, submitted a Five Point Plan to Israel and 
Egypt on November 1st, 1989. The plan was an attempt to support foregoing attempts 
of Israel and Egypt to deal with the Israeli-Palestinian dispute and to solve some of 
its obstructions. (Lukacs, 1992: 133). The newly formed government by Shamir in 
June 1990 rejected the Baker Plan.  
H4 On October 8 1990, a serious incident occurred on Temple Mount in Jerusalem. 
Jewish worshippers at the Western Wall were attacked by stones and pieces of iron 
hurled by Arabs from Temple Mount. Police reinforcements were charged by Arab 
youths and fired at the attackers. In the course of the rioting 20 Arabs were killed and 
53 injured. The entire Moslem world reacted sharply to these events and demanded 
that the Secretary General of the UN send a mission to Jerusalem to investigate the 
events. Security Council Resolution 672 condemned Israel, referred to Jerusalem as 






for obtaining that. Also, Palestinians saw the US action against Iraq as an 
attempt to destroy a military power that had been posing a threat to Israel. The 
US behavior was therefore seen as an act of support towards Israel and hence 
against the Palestinians. Combined with the loss of influence of the Labor 
party, in whom the Palestinians saw an ally for their cause, the situation led the 
Palestinians to lean towards Iraq as being a last possibility for gaining support 
for their cause.  
The third party then asked the Palestinian participants about their 
concerns and wishes with regard to the future of the peace process. 
The Palestinian participants voiced their whish to develop concrete 
measures to end the occupation. They said they were not looking for unrealistic 
commitments but for positions that could be represented by the Israelis 
workshop participants. Further, they talked about the Israeli oblivion of the 
living conditions the occupation forced upon a great number of Palestinians. 
They wanted to hear how Israelis felt about Palestinians not being able to get 
exit visas. Also, they were eager to find possibilities for bringing the reality of 
the occupation on the international political agenda with regard to the Geneva 
Conventions of which Israel was a signatory.  
 
Pre-workshop Sessions with Israeli Participants 
On the Israeli side, the first reaction to the travel difficulties of the two 
Palestinian participants consisted of comments about general bureaucratic 
delays. Later on in the discussion, however, the Israeli party showed signs of 
concern about the situation of the Palestinian group. They realized that it was 





questionable whether the Palestinian group would be complete at the occasion 
of the next meeting. The participants wondered how Palestinians might feel 
about the fact that they are a team of three facing an Israeli team of six. The 
Israeli party then discussed that they should try to find ways of enabling 
missing Palestinians to participate in the next meeting.  
The Third party then asked the Israeli team to talk about how recent 
events had influenced their situation.  
The Israeli participants identified the following four political 
developments as being of major importance: (1) the Gulf Crisis; (2) the Abu al-
Abbas raid and the end to the US-PLO dialogueH5;  
                                                
H5 The US-PLO dialogue had started in December 1988 following the adoption of two 
major documents by the Palestinian National Council (the legislative body of the 
PLO) on November 15th, 1988. The documents comprised a Palestinian Declaration 
of Independence proclaiming the establishment of the independent state of Palestine 
and a Political Program elaborating on the objectives of the declaration. The 
documents seemed to content the US policy formulated by Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger in 1975, which refused to recognize or negotiate with the PLO until they 
would recognize Israel's right to exist and accept Security Council Resolution 242 
and 338. More so, the Declaration represented a historical compromise of great 
significance. By calling for a two-state solution and for peaceful coexistence of the 
two neighboring states and the two peoples, the Palestinians accepted the 
establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as an 
ultimate objective. However, the documents remained unclear about the acceptance of 
the UN Resolutions and renouncement on terrorism, and did not explicitly recognize 
the existence of Israel. The US asked the PLO for further clarification. One month 
later, at a press conference that followed a still vague address to the UN General 
Assembly in Geneva, Yasser Arafat clearly stated what the Declaration had only 
implied. The public pledge of the PLO's policy change was sufficient to remove 
existing ambiguities and led the US to engage in a dialogue with the PLO.  
 The dialogue process was only of a short duration. On May 30 1990, the 






(3) the events on Temple Mount, and (4) the assassination of Rabbi 
Meir KahaneH6.  
Some Israeli team members rated the Gulf war as playing a positive role 
and having a sobering effect because it supposedly eliminated unrealistic hopes 
among those associated with the left wing. Others opposed that and voiced that 
they were shocked about the Palestinian reaction to the invasion of Kuwait and 
Saddam Hussein's threats. Some Israeli participants felt that it was detrimental 
for the Palestinians to join the Iraqi camp and speak against Kuwait who had 
been supporting the Palestinians for a long time. In fact they saw this move 
towards Baghdad as having happened even earlier than the actual invasion. 
They rated the Gulf Crisis and the Palestinian reaction to it as being very 
detrimental for the peace process.  
The Temple Mount incident and the Kahane affair were described as 
having aggravated the conflict and as being very dangerous in the sense that 
                                                                                                                                       
embarked on an operation launching six boats with armed personnel off Israel's 
coast. Israeli forces captured the group, after the latter had landed on Israeli shores 
but before it had carried out its mission. The US considered the attempt a terrorist 
attack and demanded the PLO to condemn it and expel Abu al-Abbas from the PLO's 
executive committee. As the PLO refused to answer any of these demands, President 
Bush ordered the suspension of the US-PLO dialogue (Rabie, 1995).  
 
H6 Meir David Kahane was an American Orthodox Rabbi with strong nationalist and 
religious views proclaiming that the Jewish people was intended by God's will to 
annex the Palestinian territories a land inhabited by disparate Arab clans with no 
distinct ethnic identity. He founded the Jewish Defense League, a political movement 
in the US engaged in militant activities and Kach a political party in Israel. In 1984, 
Kach gained one seat in the Knesset and Rabbi Kahane served for a short while as a 
member of the Knesset. In 1986, Kach was declared a racist party by the Israeli 
government and banned from the Knesset. In 1994, the Kach movement was outlawed 





they introduced a religious element into a political conflict. Responsibility for 
what had happened at the Temple Mount was attributed to the Israeli 
government for not being sensitive enough to develop awareness about how 
critical the issues associated with the Temple Mount are and how little it takes 
to cause a serious escalation.  
The Kahane affair unleashed fanatic emotions of a small but dangerous 
group. It created a lot of hatred against the Arabs. Some Israeli participants 
feared that the conflict was moving into a new phase in which the Green LineH7 
would be closed and free movement for the Palestinians between the Occupied 
Territories and Israel would be prohibited or only allowed with special permits.  
The third party asked the participants about their most prominent 
concerns and their wishes for the future.  
                                                                                                                                       
completely. On November 5 1990, Kahane was assassinated by El Sayyid Nosair after 
concluding a speech in a hotel in New York (the Jewish Virtual Library). 
H7 The term Green Line originally referred to the 1949 Armistice lines established 
between Israel, Syria, Jordan and Egypt at the end of the 1948-1949 Arab-Israeli 
War. After the 1967 War, during which Israel captured and occupied territories 
outside the Armistice lines where over a million Palestinians including refugees from 
the 1948 War lived, the Green Line became the administrative border between the 
Occupied Territories and the Israeli side.  
There are a number of exceptions to this, like Jerusalem, the Golan Heights 
and Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Territories. In 1967, East Jerusalem – ruled 
by Jordan until then – was annexed into Israel and considered to be sovereign Israeli 
territory, a conception that was reinforced by the Basic Jerusalem Law of 1980. Arab 
inhabitants of East Jerusalem were given permanent residency status. The Golan 
Heights have been informally annexed with the Golan Heights Law in 1981 extending 
Israeli jurisdiction to the territory. Also Israeli Settlements are treated as being 
subject to Israeli state law rather than to its military or laws of the Palestinian 






The Israeli participants voiced their deep disappointment and even 
despair about the situation at hand. Some of them had a feeling that real change 
had taken place between the negotiations in Geneva and Stockholm – not just a 
change of heart, but also a change of policy. There used to be a general 
assumption among the Israeli political left that a Palestinian state would set an 
end to the conflict. Now, there was a feeling that the Palestinians living in East 
Jerusalem followed the same course as the ones in the West Bank, who had 
been advocating the Intifada. Israeli participants lamented that they did not feel 
safe in any part of the city anymore, not even in West Jerusalem. The incidents 
began to involve Israelis on a personal level. The Israeli participants went on to 
say that this experiences put the Israelis in the same situation in which the 
Palestinians found themselves, namely to live in a constant state of fear.  
 
Reflections 
During the pre-workshop sessions, each party was able to present their 
positions and get some of their grievances and concerns off their chests. It 
further enabled participants to get to know the other members of their own 
group and to develop a certain degree of group cohesion. Both are favourable 
for the proceeding of a workshop and enable participants to engage in a joint 
exploration of new ideas.  
For the third party, the pre-workshop sessions were important for the 
purpose of observing reflections of political realities in the statements of 
participants, like leadership structures, range of opinions and tolerance for 
internal dissent. The observations enable the third party to understand processes 
that might become active between the conflict groups during the joint 





discussion sessions and helped them to choose appropriate topics for theoretical 
presentations at the start of plenary discussions.  
   
 Joint Workshop Sessions 
The first workshop session, in which both parties took part, was opened by 
short introductions of all participants. Then, the third party proposed to explore 
the deterioration of trust that had occurred during the past months and to 
attempt to rebuild it by applying a three-step procedure. In a first step, the 
Palestinians were asked to tell their Israeli counterparts how they experienced 
recent events, how they perceived Israeli reactions to those events, and explain 
what discouraged or threatened them about Israeli reactions. During this phase 
Israelis were asked to listen only and not to interrupt the Palestinian 
participants except for necessary explications. The third party explained that it 
was vital for both groups to attain complete comprehension of the other's 
viewpoints. In a second step, it would be up to the Israelis to talk about how 
they perceived the situation, the Palestinian reaction to it, and what upset or 
disappointed them about their actions. The Palestinians were, of course, also 
told to just listen and only ask for clarifications in order to make sure that they 
fully understood the others' points. In a third step, there would be room for both 
sides to engage in an open discussion of the issues that had been mentioned by 
both groups.  
At first there were some objections to the procedure, especially from the 
Palestinian side. Participants felt they would be cast in opposing groups if one 






They suggested that participants on each side should alternate with giving their 
view of the situation. The third party then explained that this would result in 
asking each other questions, which would lead into a chaotic discussion and 
that it was therefore better to listen to each party's point of view separately.  
The Palestinians started to give their view of the conflict situation by 
portraying the Palestinian reaction to the Gulf Crisis as the main point that had 
caused renewed rupture between the two parties. They felt that the broadcast of 
Arafat embracing Saddam Hussein caused an extreme reaction among Israelis 
in general. Palestinian participants thought that Israelis took on the view that 
Palestinians could no longer be a dialogue-partner for them because they took 
sides with Iraq. They explained that this view of the Israelis was distorted. And 
that it was not the case that Palestinians were in favor of the Kuwait invasion. 
What was true, was that they felt strongly against the West and felt closer to 
Saddam Hussein, who symbolized an Arab partner whom they were looking 
for. Further, they felt that Israelis portrayed the Palestinians as being in favor of 
Iraq because they were seeking for an excuse to back out from the peace 
process.  
Conversely, the Palestinian participants said that the PLO had to take 
part of the blame that Israelis had a distorted perception of the Palestinians. 
They described that there were Palestinians who had continuously urged the 
PLO to adopt an unambiguous language and define in clear terms of how they 
viewed their relationship with Israel and its right to exist. They named the 
Declaration of Independence of 1988 as representing a decisive instance in this 
effort. The Declaration expressed the Palestinian struggle of trying to give up 
on the aim of correcting the past and taking on the objective of building a better 





future instead. Nonetheless, they described the PLO as having failed to 
crystallize the Declaration into specific actions. The PLO did not manage to 
commit to a particular political position that would direct the Palestinian fate in 
the right direction; all they did was to react to given situations but never 
managed to act on behalf of their constituency. The inadequate representation 
of their political leadership and the stagnation of their struggle greatly 
frustrated Palestinians.  
The Palestinian participants explained that the reaction to the Gulf Crisis 
had to bee seen in light of the general situation of the Palestinian people. Being 
inadequately represented by their own political leadership, having lost the 
support of the Labor party as their partner in the Israeli government, after the 
National Unity coalition fell, and being extremely disappointed of US 
reactions, they felt that they had no ally left to support their cause. The 
Palestinian reaction had to be understood as being an objection to the US 
sending troops to Kuwait and not as an approval of the Invasion of Kuwait or a 
veneration of Saddam Hussein.  
According to the Palestinian participants, the misreading of Palestinian 
actions and the abrupt Israeli backsliding led to a mutual monolithic view 
amongst the members of each side. The Palestinians started to see the Israelis 
as one block and felt that all of them reverted to the view that Palestinians did 
not form a distinct group, but built a homogenous block with all Arab nations. 
This represented enormous regression from previously attained developments 
and led Palestinians to doubt whether Israelis had ever been serious about what 






In addition to that, Palestinian participants felt that past developments 
had added a religious component to the conflict, developments that culminated 
in the assassination of Kahane. This caused further erosion of trust and 
communication between the two sides. Palestinian participants described the 
October massacre on Temple Mount as expressing, once more, Palestinian 
frustration. Palestinians were of the view that if the US wanted to be taken 
seriously again in terms of having a real interest in helping the region, it would 
have to come up with a concrete way of how to engender a process that would 
lead to Palestinian self-determination. Otherwise, the region would remain 
stuck in a situation of intercommunal conflict in which one massacre would 
lead to another.  
Israeli participants then asked the Palestinians to say more about the 
impact the Intifada had on the Palestinian situation.  
The Palestinians explained that the Intifada had improved their situation, 
because it made Israelis realize that the Palestinians were indeed a people. This 
was a true shift in perception. In response to that, the PLO agreed to talk to 
Israelis who believed in a two-state solution. Palestinians felt extremely 
disappointed that no concrete actions resulted form that dialogue. Unlike the 
Palestinians, the Israelis were unable to transfer their shift in perception to 
political grounds. The Palestinian participants explained that this 
disappointment decisively caused the PLO position during the Gulf Crisis.   
The Israeli group then asked for further clarification about what they 
expected from the Israelis in concrete terms.  





Palestinian team members gave the example of Ezer Weitzman who had 
agreed to meet with the PLO but who was not able to publicly admit that he 
engaged in talks for the advancement of an Israeli-Palestinian peace. Instead he 
had to apologize for it and justify what he had done. This showed the 
incapacity of translating progress that had been made on a grass-root level into 
acts of the political elite.  
The Palestinian participants admitted that they faced similar problems 
within their political community and compared an Israeli with a Palestinian 
situation. In both cases, a political group from the fringe was able to sabotage 
peace initiatives. They took the view that Kahane's group dragged Israel into a 
position it did not choose. For the Palestinians the BeitaH8 incident triggered a 
snowball reaction in the West Bank and managed to hijack PLO initiatives.  
Israeli participants asked the Palestinian team what their stand was on 
the fall of the National Unity coalition and the loss of the pro-peace parties' in 
the Israeli government. 
                                                
H8 On April 6 1988, a group of adolescent Israeli settlers went on a hike in the hills 
through Palestinian villages following a call of their settler community to assert their 
fearlessness of the Intifada and their right to the land. The rout of the group took them 
past the village of Beita where villagers gathered on a hillside to watch. After a while 
gunshots were directed at the crowd and killed one 15-year old Israeli girl, two 
Palestinians and wounded several people. The Israeli army believed that the girl had 
been killed by one of the Palestinians and entered the village to demolish 14 homes.  
 On April 11, three residents of Beita, who were involved in the incident, were 
deported to Lebanon.Weeks later, Israeli ballistics tests revealed that all three victims 
had been killed by the Israeli guard of the group, a young man with a history of 
mental illness and violence, who had opened fire. The Israeli was never brought to 






The Palestinian participants responded that they still wanted political 
recognition of the PLO as the representative of the entire Palestinian people 
and not just of the population living in the Occupied Territories.  
The third party then suggested moving on to the second phase in which 
Israelis were asked to give their view of the situation.  
The Israeli analysis of the situation at hand contained two major points 
with regard to their own stand as well as two points about how they viewed the 
Palestinian position. For one, some of the Israeli participants said they felt that 
the Peace Process was not weaken because of the Gulf Crisis but because their 
government did not accept the Baker plea. Some of them said that the Israeli 
government reached an impasse because they did not have a solution for the 
Palestinian Diaspora. Secondly, they voiced their very real and deep-rooted 
fear of losing their existence, which built up as a characteristic of their history. 
They confirmed that this concern was the reason why Israel has aimed at 
appearing invulnerable. It was a way to assuage their great fear.  
With regard to how they viewed the Palestinian role, the Israeli 
participants articulated their feeling that Palestinians had done little to alleviate 
this fear. Some of the Israeli participants stated that they were aware of 
Palestinians proclaiming to wipe Israel off the map.  
Other Israeli participants, however, reminded the group that this was not 
the case for the majority of the Palestinians. Still, Israelis felt that even the 
Palestinians who were pro-peace did not sufficiently respond to their fear.  
The Israeli participants explained that the fear of losing their existence 
was aggravated by the Temple Mount incident. Israelis felt that the atmosphere 





both in their own as well as in the Palestinian community had taken on an 
explosive character and had deteriorated to the extent that just about anything 
could cause a riot. The turmoil surrounding the incident led to a lot of rumors 
about the intentions on either side and ultimately aggravated the distortion of 
how each side portrayed the other. Even more so, it added a fanatic religious 
component to the conflict.  
Another occurrence that aggravated Israeli fear consisted in the 
perceived Palestinian support of Iraq in response to the Gulf Crisis. The Israeli 
participants made it clear that they understood to a certain degree that 
Palestinian support for the Iraqi leader stemmed from the fact that Saddam 
Hussein represented a psychological remedy for the Palestinian situation. 
Israelis acknowledged that the demonstrated support did not come from the 
political leadership, who in a first instance condemned the invasion, but from 
the people on the street. What scared Israelis was that the leadership did not 
seem to control the masses but quite the other way around, just as it was the 
case with regard to the Mount Temple incident. Israeli participants, hence, 
feared that extremists were taking over the situation and marginalized previous 
efforts.  
Secondly, many Israeli participants felt that Palestinians presented 
themselves in a disjointed way. They found PLO statements, which had been 
published since the 1988 Declaration, to be too complicated and legalistic. 
Israelis did not feel addressed by the PLO statements but viewed the statements 








The initial phase of mutual presentations took off well, considering the 
disturbing events that preceded the beginning of the Continuing Workshop. Not 
only did both parties listen to each other, they also started to respond towards 
their counterpart's statements in a cautiously empathic way. This surfaced, 
when Israeli participants included the voiced Palestinian concerns in their 
political situation report. They expressed understanding of the Palestinian 
support for Iraq in terms of constituting a psychological sustenance and 
demonstrated their awareness about the Palestinian leadership's initial 
condemnation of the invasion of Kuwait.  
The discussion about the concrete facts of the Gulf Crisis, although they 
had a bearing on the conflict situation, did not directly touch on long held 
interests or grievances that were at the heart of the conflict. This allowed 
participants to test the readiness to listen to each other and to find out whether 
the other side was able to understand their own situation and the underlying 
motivations of their own convictions.  
The fact that both parties were able to engage in a process of open 
communication and active listening so swiftly, can be seen as testifying to the 
impact IPS and other dialogue methods had on developing cadres of individuals 
across conflict lines. Such cadres developed through individuals, who became 
convinced of the necessity of talking to the other side, and who developed 
enough working-trust to communicate their view of things to each other.  
More so, each side was able to see itself in a differentiated way by 
acknowledging some of their shortcomings and taking some blame for the 





difficulties they were presented with. Palestinian participants readily 
acknowledged that part of the distorted perceptions derived from the 
ambiguous language employed by their leadership and their lack of committing 
to an explicit position.  
 The Israeli participants on their part put partial blame for the impasse of 
the peace process on their government, who had failed to positively respond to 
the Baker initiative. By saying that the Temple Mount incident aggravated their 
fear of losing their existence touched on the very heart of their identity needs, 
at a very early stage of the workshop discussions.  
 Further, the parties discovered that they shared the concern that the 
conflict took on a new religious dimension. The latter had forced a dynamic 
onto the conflict that neither community wanted to be faced with and had 
caused a lot of fear about violent outbreaks on each side. It was important for 
the representatives of each conflict party to see that they had a shared concern. 
The open display of how their communities had experienced recent events also 
triggered aggressiveness resulting from each party’s long held frustrations 
about not being heard by the other side, which further unfolded in consecutive 
sessions.  
 
When in a subsequent session, the group started a quarrel about 
asymmetries between the conflict parties. Israeli participants stated that 
Palestinians were always asking Israelis for concessions for the purpose of 
attaining independence, while Israelis wanted nothing from the Palestinians. 






Palestinians did have something to offer which Israel needed, namely 
legitimacy in the Arab world.  
The third party intervened by asking all participants to consider the fact 
that Palestinians and Israelis were not two completely separate entities without 
any contact, but that there was a relationship between them. No matter whether 
their relationship was good or bad, constructive or destructive, it was 
characterized by a dynamic of interactions of various kinds. Failure to view the 
existence of that relationship would result in the loss of a number of 
opportunities to change the nature of it. The third party asked the participants to 
keep that point in mind and return to a discussion about concrete issues that 
represented obstacles to a possible peace process.  
The participants then approached the question of the linkage between 
the Gulf Crisis and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. While discussing a number 
of issues concerning the Gulf Crisis, each party managed to explain their view 
of things and gain understanding from the other one. Both sides felt that the 
Gulf Crisis put an obstacle to the peace process, which they needed to 
overcome in a joint way. An Israeli participant even voiced that common 
understanding and pointed out that each time one side was able to communicate 
their view of a given issue in a way the other side could understand and vice 
versa, both parties made progress.  
The main issue they were trying to tackle was the fact that Palestinian 
behavior on the street convinced the public in Israel and also in the US and 
Europe that Palestinians were siding with Saddam Hussein. Even if the Israeli 
workshop participants now understood why and how this perception came 
about and that it was not what it seemed to be, the issue still remained a major 





obstacle to the peace process. An Israeli participant explained that Israelis 
could not be convinced of making concessions to Palestinians sitting in a boat 
with Saddam Hussein because Iraq was perceived as posing a major threat to 
Israel. Further, they reminded everybody about statements made by Arafat that 
Iraq would attack Israel militarily.  
Palestinian group members replied that it was Israeli behavior that led 
them to a seemingly pro Iraqi position. Palestinians felt that Israelis had 
promised them to make concessions if they accepted UN Resolutions 242 and 
338H9. However, Palestinian acceptance of the Resolutions did not change 
anything nor did it bring about a clear statement from the Labor Party.  
 
Israeli participants conveyed their complete understanding of the 
Palestinian perception of that matter. In their view the Palestinian acceptance of 
                                                
H9 The UN Security Council Resolution 242 was adopted on 22 November 1967 after 
the war in June when Israel had attacked Syria, Egypt and Jordan and occupied 
Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem. The Resolution condemned the acquisition 
of Territory by war. Further, it required withdrawal of Israel's armed forces from the 
Occupied Territories, the termination of all belligerent claims, and acknowledgement 
of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the 
area.  
The UN Security Council Resolution 338 was adopted on 22 October 1973 
shortly before the war ended that had been initiated by joint Syrian and Egyptian 
attacks on Israel on Yom Kippur, the day of Atonement, being the most important 
holiday in the Jewish calendar. The Resolution demanded all parties to the fighting to 
cease military activity, to implement Resolution 242 and to engage in negotiations 
concurrently with the cease-fire (United Nations, 1967 and 1973). The Declaration of 
Independence and its accompanying Political Program explicitly mentioned 
acceptance of Resolution 242 and thereby implicitly acknowledged the pre-1967 state 






the Resolutions did change a lot. It allowed Israelis to substantially think about 
negotiations with Palestinians. Still, the Israelis made it clear that Palestinians 
and their political leadership needed to publicly distance themselves from 
Saddam Hussein in order to move on with the peace process.  
Palestinians then explained that the Israelis misunderstood Arafat's 
statements about the attacks against Israel. It was not Arafat who supported a 
military attack of Israel; he only acted as a postman delivering the Iraqi 
message to the Israelis.  
The third party picked up on the two points and asked the Palestinians 
whether they felt that their reaction to the Gulf Crisis would have been different 
if the Labor Party had committed itself more openly to the Palestinian peace 
initiative. They explained to them that the Palestinian portrayal of things had 
made it difficult for Israelis to accept that Arafat only acted as a postman 
delivering an Iraqi message.  
The Palestinian group members showed understanding for that. The 
Israeli party replied that not all weight should be put on the support of the 
Labor party. They were of the view that in order to reach stability, Labor and 
parts of Likud needed to be in support of the peace initiative. It should 
therefore be the aim of Palestinians and Israelis to achieve a more balanced 
support for peace.  
The third party then raised the question of how to influence public 
opinion and asked the participants to discuss this topic in a bifocal way.  
The Palestinian team voiced problems with their leadership. Although 
they felt that the PLO did not fully represent them, the organization still 





controlled everything. They continued to explain that the PLO and its head 
Arafat were not able to deliver what many Palestinians would want to be 
implemented.  
Israeli participants showed understanding of that situation. They drew 
attention to the fact that the Palestinian participants were better placed than the 
Israeli participants in terms of influencing their community and leadership, as 
some of them were linked to the PLO. Some of the Israeli participants said they 
felt that none of them were directly representing their government. Other Israeli 
participants countered that they could all be seen as political actors, as they 
were all potentially able to influence their community. In response to that there 
emerged agreement within the Israeli group that they could try to achieve 
something by publishing written items as well as through activities in their 
academic or socio-political environment.  
 
Reflections 
The third party intervention, that stopped the polemic debate about 
which party had more to offer to the other, brought the conversation back to the 
level of a real dialogue. The third party reminded the two groups that their 
actions were interconnected and that they were bound to each other by a 
relationship no matter how conflicting it may be. By recognizing the existence 
of their relationship, the parties could seize a chance to change the nature of 
that relationship. The third party used that input to redirect the discussion 
towards concrete points that had influenced the situation of their conflict (and 






reality, the two parties were able to approach underlying issues that had caused 
their current situation.  
The intervention of the third party alluded to a central component of the 
identity formation process by pointing out that the actions of one party 
influence the actions of the other party. The intervention was successful and led 
the group to make real progress in analyzing how their actions of the past two 
years had influenced their relationship. Palestinian participants pointed to a 
major change in the identity of their people by referring to the content of the 
1988 documents and to their implicit acceptance of the state of Israel within the 
Green Line. The implicit acceptance of the Israeli state represented not only a 
decisive identity change but also a major concession of the Palestinian polity, a 
concession they did not feel to be reciprocated by the Israelis.  
The Israeli reply showed a lot of empathy by acknowledging the 
immense change of perspective of the Palestinians and by confirming that this 
concession did have an impact on Israeli public opinion, as it made the public 
receptive for the objective of engaging in a peace process, even though this 
change was not always reflected in political statements.  
The statement of the Israeli group members, that their perception of the 
Palestinian reaction toward the Gulf Crisis had changed through the workshop 
discussions, shows that the method had fulfilled its aim of opening up learning 
channels to enable the parties to gain insight into the perspective of the other 
and to integrate new information about the other within their own value system.  
 
In the following session the third party asked participants to jointly think 
about possibilities of how Palestinians would be able to detach themselves from 





their perceived linkage with Saddam Hussein; as well as about possibilities of 
how Israel could send a signal of their renewed commitment to the peace 
process.  
Israeli participants illustrated a misunderstanding between Israelis and 
Palestinians about their mutual readiness to engage in negotiations. Palestinians 
seemed to need certain concessions from the Israeli side before they would feel 
comfortable to engage in negotiations and seemed to be thinking that Israelis 
were not ready to make these concessions and were thus not willing to 
negotiate. Israelis, on the other hand, felt that they could not commit to a given 
concession before they did not know its consequences. What the Israelis 
needed was to engage in an open-ended negotiation. Open-ended did not refer 
to uncertainty of whether the Israelis would commit at all, but to how they 
would commit to a given concession.  
Israeli participants confirmed that they understood an open-ended 
discussion to be a theoretical exercise in which models for solutions – that 
would entail concessions – were discussed. This would provide them with 
insight into the plausibility of future scenarios and give them the necessary 
confidence to commit to actual negotiations and make concessions to the 
Palestinians. The Israeli participants explained, that to think Israelis would a 
priori be unready to make concessions would be to misunderstand the Israeli 
point of view; all they needed was a gradual process to create an atmosphere in 
which things that seemed to be impossible would become possible.  
Some Israeli participants then commented on the quarrel with 






of their relationship. The Israeli participants apologized for the previous 
remarks about Palestinians having nothing to offer to the Israelis. They 
affirmed that the truth was that they both needed each other. The only thing that 
was different for each of them was their motivations and the obstacles they 
faced. Israeli participants suggested that the Palestinians should improve their 
situation by organizing elections of a representative body that the international 
community would recognize and that they should not hesitate to ask for Israeli 
help to achieve that.  
Other Israeli participants supported the apology and raised attention to 
the fact that both parties needed to be sensitive towards their respective 
traumata and fears. They showed understanding of the Palestinian fear that 
parameters of an interim solution would become permanent. Israeli group 
members voiced deep concern about recent violent incidence and that they 
needed confirmation from the Palestinians to take control of extremists' attacks. 
Israeli participants admitted that they would want to know in advance what the 
consequences of discussing a given issue would be. Nevertheless, they 
maintained their view that negotiations needed to be a step-by-step process 
which would have to lead to an agreement that, very importantly, would have 
to satisfy both parties and that would be based on realistic mechanisms that 
would keep the process upright. In any case, the Israeli group members were 
very clear about the fact that negotiations of solutions would have to lead to 
Palestinian sovereignty and that this needed to be officially declared to the 
Palestinian public.  
Palestinian participants greeted that statement with decisive approval.  





Some of the Israeli participants then said that it would not be possible 
for the Israeli government to give assurance for the future establishment of a 
Palestinian state but that only the US would be able to give such an assertion. 
They further stated that issues like the Palestinian refugee problem and the 
question about whether or not to divide Jerusalem would be non-starters for 
future negotiations.  
The third party drew attention to the shared need of both parties for the 
assurance that some parts of a future negotiation process would be known in 
advance. They raised the questions of what such assertions would entail and 
what was needed on each side to take the chance of committing themselves to 
negotiations. They asked participants whether they had ideas of how to 
formulate what Palestinians asked for without touching on an issue that was a 
non-starter for Israelis in terms of engaging in negotiations.  
In reaction, Palestinian participants stated that the fewer concessions 
they received towards building a state, the less assurance they would be able to 
give to the Israelis. They continued to explain that if there were reasonable 
expectations of building a Palestinian state, it would be easier to engage in 
negotiations and give Israelis their needed assurance than if the only expectable 
option would be to hold municipal elections.  
Some Israeli participants replied that they saw difficulties on their part 
to initiate negotiations that would lead in that direction, they feared it would 
cause a civil war in Israel, as the public was not ready for a Palestinian state. 
Others refused that idea and drew parallels to the Egyptian peace process, in 






The Palestinian group then said that the PLO would never negotiate for 
anything less than a flag, and that the PLO had the commitment of the 
Palestinian people, as it was the only legitimate body representing them. They 
continued to explain, that the fact that the Israeli public did not accept the 
Palestinian need for a state, as was expressed in the disappointing results of 
Camp DavidH10, was as much a problem for the Palestinians as for the Israelis 
and that the Intifada resulted from that lack of acceptance. They further pointed 
out that if the Israeli participants saw no possibility of convincing the Israeli 
                                                
H10 The Camp David summit meeting was held from September 5th until 17th, 1978. It 
resulted from diplomatic efforts of the US, Egypt and Israel, which had been spurred 
by Anwar Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in November 1977. The summit resulted in two 
documents: the Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Israel and 
Egypt (signed March, 26, 1979), containing complete Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, 
and the Framework for Peace in the Middle East, containing new parameters for 
Palestinian rights and the future of The West Bank and Gaza. The latter document did 
not contain a commitment of withdrawal from the West Bank or Gaza, but the 
procedures that would guideline negotiations about a final status of the territories 
based on UN Resolution 242. It envisioned a maximum five-year transitional period 
to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza, during which its inhabitants 
were to have "full autonomy" until an administrative authority could be freely elected 
and the Israeli Military and its Civilian Administration withdrawn. Delegations from 
Israel, Egypt and Jordan, including Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza, 
would negotiate how to establish and structure the Palestinian Self-Governing 
Authority. The views of the negotiating committees differed widely. Egyptian 
representatives counted the Arab population of East Jerusalem as an integral part of 
the West Bank and as such entitled to elect the Self-Governing Authority, while Israel 
saw them as participating in Israeli municipal elections. Further, Egypt wanted a 
Palestinian legislature and the Authority to levy taxes, regulate land and control 
water rights, while Israeli representatives called for the creation of an administrative 
council, with limited executive authority and no possibility for legislative powers. 
Palestinians interpreted Israel's policy as using their agreement to an autonomy 
status as a cover to legitimize occupation and to prevent the establishment of a 
Palestinian state (Quandt, 1993). 





public of that reality, they could not expect the Palestinian participants to 
convince their public to accept open-ended negotiations.  
The Israeli group then asked whether Palestinians did not believe in 
constructive ambiguity that had worked before.  
Palestinian participants answered that they could not compare 
negotiations with Egypt to negotiations with Palestinians. Egypt was a state 
while Palestinians lived under occupation or as refugees, which made them feel 
as second or third class citizens who had to come along under or beside Israel. 
They explained to the Israeli group that for Palestinians not just larger or 
narrower borders were at stake but the disappearance of a whole people. 
Therefore, the only solution was to form a nation state. They illustrated, that 
after 43 years of struggling, the PLO needed to report back to the Palestinian 
people that they were able to achieve a solution, not just a process of stages; 
otherwise violent outbreaks would be the result.  
Palestinian participants said that failure to achieve statehood through 
negotiations would destroy the one thing they had gained, the legitimate 
institution that they had built after 43 years. If they engaged in an open-ended 
negotiation process, severe violence could lead to a loss of their leadership. 
They feared that if Yassir Arafat were to be assassinated there would be no one 












The full impact of the third party intervention regarding the 
interconnectedness of the two parties became visible when Israeli participants 
apologized for the remark that Palestinians were only requesting concessions 
without being able to reciprocate something, and acknowledged that they had 
indeed something to offer and that they both needed each other.  
This instance of the Continuing Workshop showed a true alteration in 
the Israeli identity perception. The participants' initial remark that Palestinians 
were not able to reciprocate Israeli concessions reflected the status quo conflict 
perception that one party could only lose by answering demands of the other 
side. The participants' apology and acknowledgement of the two sides' 
interdependence showed that they were able to include the other as a 
cooperative partner who had something to offer.  
 
In the first session of the last day, the third party concluded that many 
issues that had been set out in the preliminary meetings had been discussed. 
One item on the list that both parties deemed necessary to pick up in the 
consecutive discussions was the Intifada and how far it contributed to 
Palestinian goals as well as to the advancement of a peace process. The third 
party asked the participants to discuss the topic with regard to advancing the 
development of practical ideas.  
The Palestinian group saw several points in which the Intifada 
succeeded to achieve progress in the peace process and several in which it 
failed to do so. First of all, the Intifada managed to change Israeli public 
opinion in a major way. The Intifada made the Israelis see, who Palestinians 





really were and that there was a person behind the mask of the monster, which 
Israeli myths had put on the Palestinians. The PLO achieved that, by 
crystallizing their political goals in the 1988 Declaration. The Intifada made 
Israelis realize that what they were confronted with in the first place was the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and not the Israeli-Arab conflict.  
This progress raised Palestinian hopes for achieving a political solution 
that would give them independence. In this respect the Intifada failed, as it did 
not manage to attain its stated goal of bringing independence to the Palestinian 
people. Another point, in which the Intifada failed in the eyes of the Palestinian 
participants, was that it did not manage to make Israel feel responsible for the 
occupation. The Palestinian group illustrated how extremely difficult it was to 
live under conditions of occupation. To be confronted with these difficulties 
every day made it all the more difficult for Palestinians to see that Israelis in 
general refused to take responsibility. 
Some Israeli participants readily accepted that and confirmed that they, 
being part of the Israeli community, acknowledge their responsibility for and 
the ugliness of the occupation. Other group members did not feel so easy about 
the issue and asked the Palestinians to explain what they meant with "taking 
responsibility" and what they expected the Israelis to do concretely, in order for 
them to see that they were taking responsibility for the occupation.  
Palestinian team members replied that they would need Israeli 
statements that schools should be reopened; or that Israeli soldiers should start 
to wear identification tags that would allow Palestinians to report to the Israeli 






Talking about the difficult reality of every day life under occupation 
caused considerable emotional turbulence and anger among the Palestinian 
participants. They said that it was impossible for them to sit at a table with 
Israelis and forget about the horrors of the occupation. Israeli participants 
represented the occupier and as such the Palestinian enemy, therefore, it cost 
Palestinian participants an enormous effort to be able to sit and talk to them. 
The Palestinian group further illustrated that participating in joint talks was 
almost a psychological absurdity, due to the Israeli law forbidding contact 
between the two parties. The Palestinian team recognized that they had to live 
with that reality and that this forced them to be more creative. They said they 
felt that they were the ones who always had to reach out to the Israelis, while 
Israelis did not reach out for them. They felt that although they saw Israel as a 
democratic society within the Green Line borders – and a Palestinian 
participant even voiced admiration of the ability to establish an Israeli society 
out of a population coming from all over the world – they resented the fact that 
Israel claimed all the rights of a democratic society without assuming any of its 
duties.  
Palestinian group members continued to explain that in order for Israelis 
to understand the cause of Palestinian violence they needed to see that the 
Palestinians felt that an enormous injustice had been inflicted on them, a 
feeling that had been reinforced under occupation. What Palestinians suffered 
most from under occupation was economic hardship. With the closure of the 
Green Line it had become impossible for about 10'000 workers to move from 
their home to their workplace. The occupation made economic development 
impossible, as not even Arab entrepreneurs in the Gulf wanted to invest in a 





Palestinian economy under occupation. An Israeli participant chipped in by 
confirming to know about the severe economic situation from first-hand 
experience and that it was necessary to make that reality known to the Israeli 
public at large.  
The Israeli group gave their analysis of the impact of the Intifada on the 
conflict. They discerned six achievements. First, they were of the view that the 
Intifada managed to involve local Palestinians, especially people living in the 
Occupied Territories. Henceforth, local Palestinians began to identify with the 
PLO and its objectives, which previously almost only had viability in the 
Palestinian Diaspora. Second, this led to a strengthening of the PLO and led 
them, pushed by local Palestinians, to formulate the Declaration of 
Independence. Third, this caused the disengagement of the Palestinian question 
from Jordan. Fourth, the PLO attained US recognition as being the political 
body representing the Palestinian people and brought them to engage in a 
dialogue, which although suspended, was rated as being able to be picked up 
again on a later stage. Fifth, the Intifada re-established the Green Line. Sixth, 
the Intifada caused the Israeli government and public to realize that not only 
Arab states but most of all the Palestinians were the prevalent negotiation 
partners for establishing peace in the region.   
The downsides of the Intifada, according to Israeli participants, included 
its contribution to an enlargement of the conflict as it began to involve Israeli 
Arabs (or Palestinians living in Jerusalem and in cities inside the Green Line). 
Further the Intifada had strengthened the Hamas and led to more violence – 






Israeli group members, the Intifada failed to crystallize that its aim contained 
two layers: the outward riots and the internal endeavor to establish a political 
administration as well as a social and economic infrastructure. The second 
layer had never been sufficiently communicated to the Israeli public. Finally, 
the Intifada was seen as having achieved the 1988 Declaration but as having 
failed to put it into practice one year later by not accepting the Israeli 
concession made to them at that time.  
The Palestinian team responded to the Israeli analysis that the shift from 
throwing stones to using knives was not intended but a result of spontaneous 
individual acts. The horrors of occupation, like living under curfew for three 
weeks in a row, brought about the knifing, not PLO or Hamas orders. 
Palestinian participants made it clear that they never wanted their struggle to 
become militarized and that the PLO was battling against the Hamas in order to 
prevent Palestine from becoming a religious state.  
Both parties engaged in a discussion of their mutual fear of violence and 
raised attention to the need for both of them to acknowledge their share of 
responsibility for it. They both admitted that their leaderships were not able to 
control street violence as much as they wanted them to. Further, both parties 
were able to talk about their anger towards the other caused by the violence and 
the misunderstandings. Israeli participants pointed out that they did not 
conceive the Intifada as a terror act, as it had been falsely portrayed to the 
Israeli public, but as a popular uprising.  
The Palestinian participants then said that despite their anger they felt 
that there was a relationship between Israelis and Palestinians. They pointed 





out that, also other Arab countries were on the look out to build such a 
relationship with Israel due to their economic and social problems.  
Both sides agreed that they had a shared interest of achieving security 
and that they should engage in finding practical ways to contain violence and 
find a functional structure for peace. These objectives should be the starting 
point for negotiations.  
In the final session both parties agreed to allow for citing the content of 
their conversations without attributing anything that had been said to a person. 
Together with the third party they discussed the organization of interim 
activities for the time until the next meeting and talked about ways of including 




During the evaluation of how the Intifada impacted on the conflict 
situation, an instrumental element of identity negotiation surfaced when 
Palestinian participants said that the Intifada failed to make Israelis feel 
responsible for the occupation. Some of the Israeli participants showed 
difficulty with accepting that statement, a reaction that caused anger among the 
Palestinian group members. The difficulty of accepting responsibility and 
taking blame for one's own actions represents a challenge to the clear-cut 
perception of viewing the inside group as entirely good and of projecting 
everything that is negative on the outside group. Altering that perception 
implies opening up learning channels for integrating negative aspects into the 






discussion only scratched the surface of the issue, a more profound negotiation 
of that identity aspect occurred at a later stage of the Continuing Workshop.  
 Another interesting aspect of the discussion about the scope of the 
Intifada was that both parties analyzed the Intifada in terms of their success and 
failure. This is quite astonishing on the part of the Israelis, as the Intifada – 
being an uprising against Israeli occupation – had been directed against them. 
Nevertheless they were able to discern elements of the Intifada that led to an 
improvement of the Palestinian situation. The workshop setting had enabled a 
change of perception allowing Israeli participants to see that an improvement of 
the Palestinian situation was in their own interest and part of the way to 
approach a peaceful solution of the conflict.  
 Also, the first meeting of the Continuing Workshop revealed a number 
of shared concerns like the fear that the conflict would take on a religious 
component and the worry about the endangered security of the two parties' 
communities through violent outbreaks. Participants realized that both sides 
had a common interest in achieving security for their respective constituencies, 
which they could only meet in a joint effort of developing practical measures to 
contain violence. Both parties understood that such measures could only be 
established and implemented through official negotiations, and recognized that 
readiness to engage in official negotiations would necessitate sufficient mutual 
reassurance. Formulating statements and actions that would generate such 
reassurance through joint thinking processes within the framework of the 
workshop were found to be an agenda priority.  





Second Meeting of the Continuing Workshop in June 1991 
When the continuing group convened for the second time, in June 1991, 
all six Palestinian representatives were present, while the Israeli team counted 
only five members. One of the Israeli participants wanted to be replaced. The 
participant felt that a person closer to the political right would provide a better 
representation of the Israeli political spectrum. The third party told the 
participants that they had been talking with several potential candidates but 
none of them had been able to participate in the present meeting, either due to 
time constraints or political restrictions.  
The third party had again reserved the first meeting-day for separate pre-
workshop sessions with Palestinians and Israelis respectively, to assess their 
current situations. The third party opened each meeting by presenting a review 
of what had been discussed during the November meeting of the Continuing 
Workshop, which contained the following four points:  
1) The reconstruction of a negotiating partner after a period of very 
serious deterioration, disappointment and skepticism. The third party 
pointed out that the November meeting had been one of the first 
major encounters between the two sides after Iraq had invaded 
Kuwait. The fact that workshop participants representing their 
respective communities were able to interact with each other in the 
framework of interactive problem solving showed them that there 
was still someone to talk to as a potential negotiating partner on each 
side.  
2) The importance of being aware of the weight of Palestinian and 






Palestinian public opinion does indeed exist. Each party had to 
accept that public opinion was a factor that needed to be taken 
seriously, as it imposes constraints and has a decisive impact on 
interactions occurring within each community as well as on 
interactions occurring between the two sides. The workshop 
discussions showed that actions of the leadership on both sides 
would remain confined by the support or lack thereof from their own 
but also from the opponent public. Both sides realized that it was 
vital to think about how public opinion could be addressed in 
reciprocal ways.  
3) The theme of possible negotiation outcomes had been widely 
discussed. Palestinians made it clear that they would only engage in 
negotiations if they could be certain of its outcome, while Israelis 
wanted open-ended negotiations. The third party said that in their 
view neither side wanted to enter negotiations if the issue left open 
was their national existence.  
4) Increased violence and the sense of loss of personal safety and its 
impacts on the two communities had been discussed. 
 
Pre-workshop Session with the Palestinian Group 
The reaction of the Palestinian participants to this review was 
affirmative. They confirmed that the group underwent a considerable 
movement that started from being locked in a psychological blockage caused 
by events that followed the Gulf Crisis, went through the process of telling 
each other the things that weighed on the group members' chests, and arrived at 





a point where each of the participants felt better and able to tackle a whole 
range of issues in a constructive discussion. They also said that they felt greatly 
supported by the third party throughout this process and that no one shied away 
from facing the tensions of such a difficult dialogue.  
With regard to the current political situation, the Palestinian participants 
said that they saw the position of the two participating groups as being 
asymmetrical. They explained that the Israeli participants represented the 
opposition who was losing influence in the Israeli political arena, while 
Palestinian participants represented the mainstream of their community. They 
wanted to make that point clear at the beginning of the meeting and make sure 
it would be taken into consideration along the discussions. They further wanted 
to put the following two points on the agenda: to develop mechanisms that 
would rebuild mutual understanding on an ongoing basis and to discuss 
measures to settle Palestinian fears about recent developments in the Occupied 
Territories.  
The third party asked them to explain what they meant by mutual 
understanding.  
They answered that in their view the Gulf WarH12 had caused serious 
misunderstandings between the two parties and cracked their dialogue. Further, 
they felt that developing measures to rebuild mutual understanding was an 
issue that could be fruitfully discussed with representatives of the Israeli 
                                                
H12 The Gulf Crisis had developed into a war on January 17th, 1991 when hostilities of 
the Operation Desert Storm began. A coalition of 34 countries under US lead had 






opposition. They saw this to be necessary, as they felt that although the two 
groups understood each other on an intellectual level, Israeli participants did 
not fully grasp Palestinian psychology and what was behind their political 
thinking.  
The third party also enquired about the second agenda point, Palestinian 
fears and what these entailed in detail.  
Palestinian participants answered that one of their fears was that 
Palestinian significance had declined on the international stage. The reason for 
this was the content and posture of the American Peace Initiative. Palestinians 
felt that American statements started to portray the conflict as being first and 
foremost an Arab-Israeli conflict again and no longer an Israeli-Palestinian one. 
Only six months earlier, Baker was using opposite terms, trying to establish an 
Israeli-Palestinian dialogue.  
They also mentioned the breakdown of the US-PLO dialogue again. 
They felt that the US did not only close that dialogue but broke off relations 
with Palestinians as a people. They showed themselves to be deeply 
disappointed about that and lacked understanding for it.  
The third party asked them to think about what they would want to ask 
the Israelis.  
Palestinian participants answered that they would like to tell the Israeli 
group members that they found the position of the Israeli political opposition to 
be ineffective. They wanted to ask them whether they had ideas for changing 
that situation.  
                                                                                                                                       
failed to bring Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. The war ended on 1 March 1991with 
the liberation of Kuwait (Tessler, 1994).  





Pre-workshop Session with the Israeli Group 
The Israeli participants proposed to add a further discussion point to the 
presented review. They deemed it necessary to deliberate what impact the Gulf 
War and other recent events have had on each community with regard to the 
issue of mutual reassurance.  
The third party agreed to that. They suggested taking one of the issues 
that were discussed during the last meeting as a starting point for elaborating 
how to achieve mutual reassurance. They recalled the following three topics as 
relevant discussion starters:  
1) how to address fears and concerns that were detectable in the public 
opinion on each side, as well as to think about what would stimulate 
a fruitful interaction between the two publics; 
2) how to formulate actions that would engender mutual reassurance in 
terms of creating readiness within both body politics to engage in 
negotiations. The third party recalled that the prevalent issue with 
regard to that topic was the problem of an ambiguous endpoint of 
negotiations. Israelis found open-ended discussions to be fruitful and 
offering room for creative solutions; while Palestinians wanted to 
know that a Palestinian state was a probable outcome of negotiations 
before being able to commit to them. Therefore, the third party 
proposed to set up negotiation parameters that would be sufficiently 
open for Israelis and adequately reassuring for Palestinians;  
3) how to build reassurance in the face of increased violence and 






In reaction to this outline, an Israeli participant mentioned having seen 
changes in Palestinian politics during the weeks preceding the workshop, which 
pointed to an increased readiness on their part to accept open-ended 
negotiations. Other participants agreed on that point and said that a more 
central discussion topic would be to assess: what kind of impact the American 
peace initiative had on the Palestinian situation and how each side reacted to it.  
The third party included that point in the discussion agenda. They 
further reminded the participants to focus on overcoming the obstacles towards 
negotiations that existed in the two body politics. They found the groups to be 
very well qualified to propel the erosion of obstacles that prevented each 
political leadership from accepting Baker's proposal.  
Some Israeli team members pointed out that their current government 
would not be receptive to a report from the workshop containing suggestions 
for the improvement of the situation. They held that what would indeed be 
possible for the group members to do was to acquire knowledge about attitudes 
and desires of the other side. They felt that it would be useful for the Israeli 
group to learn what local Palestinians as well as those living in the Diaspora 
thought about the nature of their linkage to Jordan, how they viewed the future 
of Jerusalem and Israeli security issues.  
 
 Joint Workshop Sessions 
 During the first two workshop sessions the participants told each other in 
a rather agitated atmosphere how they had experienced the difficult conditions 
that ensued from the Gulf War. Discussions centered on the Palestinian 
position towards Iraq. Israeli participants explained that the large Israeli public 





interpreted Palestinian behavior during the Gulf War as being a threat to Israel 
because it still looked as if they were siding with Iraq.  
In a next step the two sides engaged in assessing important changes that 
had occurred in both communities since their last meeting. Israeli participants 
found the following four changes to be far-reaching: 
1) Israelis became ready for seeking a solution to the conflict. However, 
after the Gulf War they conceived the conflict as involving more the 
Arab world than the Palestinians. After the Gulf War Israelis no 
longer felt existentially threatened by the Palestinian Intifada but by 
the conflict with the Arab world. This general Israeli perception was 
in line with the Likud policy and undermined the position of the Left.  
2) Israeli participants said they recognized considerable changes in 
Palestinian thinking. They saw them putting forth a much more 
moderate position and demonstrating readiness to accept interim 
solutions. This new attitude was, however, not reflected in the Israeli 
media and hence not absorbed by the Israeli public.  
3) The Gulf War had strengthened the Shamir government. The 
perception of Arafat leading Palestinians to support Iraq created a 
situation in which the Israeli public would never support negotiations 
with Arafat, although they might be ready to talk to the Palestinian 
people.  
4) The Gulf war led to a complete indifference and paralysis in the 
Israeli public with regard to any conflict issue. Keeping the status 






concentrate on creating an atmosphere that would make people 
realize that something needed to be done.  
In reaction to these statements, some Palestinian participants showed 
disappointment, first about the workshop format, which they expected to be a 
bit more structured preventing a situation in which too many different issues 
were discussed at once. Secondly, Palestinian group members were 
disappointed that topics were raised again, which had already been clarified 
during the previous meeting. Having said that, they engaged in identifying five 
areas, in which major changes had occurred during the past months: 
1) The Gulf War had been the biggest vehicle of change. They stressed 
once again that Palestinians did not side with Iraq because they 
approved of their invasion of Kuwait but because they were against 
the strategy of the West and Israel. Also, Palestinians tried very hard 
to clarify their political position by making statements about their 
opposition to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and about their rejection 
of a military solution, but their true stand had never been adequately 
communicated to the Israeli public.  
2) As a result, the Israeli peace camp also became subject to change as 
it had fallen into the same trap of being deceived by the image that 
the Israeli government portrayed of the Palestinians. The peace 
camp's activities even added negatively to the distortion of the 
Palestinian perception.  
3) A third area where change occurred concerned the Occupied 
Territories. The Israeli military authorities present in the Territories 
exploited the atmosphere that ensued from the Gulf War to move to a 





new policy of hardship. As a consequence the living conditions had 
become extremely difficult. For example, the Israeli military had 
divided the territories into four different regions interrupting both 
private and economic life and limiting market options to one little 
region. Also they imposed frequent curfews. An agricultural study 
conducted in Jericho showed that with each curfew prices dropped 
by half.  
4) Further, there had been an increase in settlement building and land 
confiscation stemming from heightened Soviet and Ethiopian 
immigration.  
5) Finally, the Palestinian political process underwent considerable 
change. From a Palestinian point of view Americans and Israelis 
became engaged in launching a peace process that built on the results 
of the Gulf War. The shift in balance of power in the region seemed 
to enable them to push for a conflict settlement that was more 
advantageous for Israel and less satisfactory for Palestinians. So far, 
all of Israel's preconditions for engaging into negotiations had been 
heard by the US while Palestinian issues had been postponed until 
the start of negotiations. Also, the US had been using the situation to 
pursue their own interests by asking Israel to stop building 
settlements and offering them in return to refrain from pushing for 







Israeli participants agreed on the point of a changed peace process and 
said that they did not approve of its current direction. They confirmed that an 
Arabization of the conflict had taken place.  
 Palestinian participants then drew attention to the fact, that Baker's idea 
of replacing the Palestinians with coalition members as partners for peace was 
an illusion. The rest of the Arab world would only agree to normalize their 
relations with Israel once they were ready to talk to Palestinians, which was a 
fact that even Baker needed to realize.  
 Israeli participants responded to the Palestinian worry about substantial 
immigration. They explained that the immigration issue was actually a chance 
for the Palestinians and the peace process, because Israel would need not only a 
lot of money to absorb the influx of immigrants, but also stability and peace. 
Shamir's argument that "big" immigration needed a "big" Israel would not 
work, as a bigger Israel would necessarily be unstable. Only a smaller Israel 
would be stable and thereby able to absorb more immigrants. The only hurdle 
they were facing was to convince the Israeli public of that fact.  
 
* * * 
 
In the next meeting Palestinian participants picked up on the issue 
concerning the Israeli opposition and explained finding it difficult to 
understand the program of the Left and what they were trying to develop in 
political terms. The statements, which had been made lately by the opposition, 
seemed to be directed at gaining approval from the right wing and the majority 
of the Israelis.  





Israeli team members answered that the reason for this was the attempt 
to gain support from electorates. They explained that not all of the Israelis who 
theoretically were in favor of an agreement with Palestinians also voted for the 
Left. There was a floating vote of about 10%, which the opposition tried to win 
as Labor voters. The reason why they adopted a mainstream discourse to 
convince them was that they believed that only by speaking in a hawkish way, 
the vote of these 10% could be won. Further, they pointed out that the Left was 
shying away from revealing some of their intentions with regard to the peace 
process because they feared to lose ground with that 10% and to lose the 40 
seats they had. This was the reason why they did not take clearer positions and 
adopted stands that were of instrumental nature.  
In a next step the Israeli team pointed out the following issues as their 
discussion priorities:  
- the constitutional linkage of the Occupied Territories and Jordan; 
- the future modality of Jerusalem;  
- whether Palestinians could relate to security guarantees that Israelis 
considered to be essential. 
The third party then asked the Palestinian participants to identify three 
priority issues as well.  
Some Palestinian participants had doubts whether the Palestinian group 
was able to represent the general Palestinian position or entitled to make any 
concessions on behalf of the Palestinian people. They thought the group should 
confine itself to defining what the Palestinian concerns were and identifying 






Among their priority issues were the Israeli settlement policy in the 
Occupied Territories as well as identifying possible modalities – that would be 
acceptable to Israel – for connecting Gaza and the West Bank  
The group then became entangled in a controversy about the usefulness 
of their effort to formulate suggestions for concrete actions. Participants on 
both sides voiced concerns about the difficulties their communities would have 
with implementing suggestions, which would eventually be formulated by the 
continuing group.  
In response to that the third party suggested that the Palestinian group 
members should make a list with all their personal concerns instead of arguing 
those that they associated with their polity.  
Palestinian participants distinguished the following three concerns: 
- lack of specificity: without the ability to talk about specific political 
issues there would be no possibility to recognize whether or not the 
group could reach a satisfactory level of political agreement; 
- Israeli activities in the Occupied Territories like land confiscation and 
economic deterioration; 
- how Israeli public opinion could be influenced: the Palestinian 
participants suggested that the workshop group should jointly formulate 
statements and jointly present them to an Israeli audience.  
The third party then pointed out that there was not a real difference in 
nature between the concerns that each side had identified. They therefore 
suggested leaving any kind of complicated distinction that might lead to further 
confusion out of the way. They asked each party to choose two issues during 
their joint dinner for next day's discussions.  





The group agreed to that.  
 
Reflections 
The difficult process of singling out discussion topics, that both parties 
found relevant and sensible with regard to producing a usable end product, 
mirrored the difficulty of the situation that both parties faced. Each showed 
considerable insecurity about where to place itself within the conflict spectrum. 
Especially the Palestinian position and their self-perception had been shaken. 
This became apparent when the Palestinian participants were reluctant to echo 
the Israeli account about the background of the Labor policy and said to be 
unable to state the official Palestinian position.  
The third-party intervention that suggested formulating personal 
concerns instead of concentrating on official positions for the purpose of 
identifying viable discussion topics soothed the atmosphere and brought the 
talks back to an analytical level.  
 
The third party opened the first session on the second day of the meeting 
by introducing the four topics the group members had chosen to discuss. The 
Palestinian participants named “the right to self-determination” and “how to 
change the de facto situation in the Occupied Territories” as their most 
prevalent issues, while the Israeli participants wanted to discuss “the right of 
return” and “the Palestinian relationship to Jordan”. The aim for the second day 
was to spend one session on each topic and thereby cover all of them in one 






For the purpose of making such a far-reaching topic more approachable 
in a joint discussion, the third party phrased it in the following question: “As 
we try to promote a peace process, how do we reassure Palestinians that they 
will have a Palestinian State at the end of negotiations considering the Israeli 
reluctance to give any guarantee at the beginning of the process?” The third 
party explained that tackling this issue in a problem-solving mode consisted of 
finding out why Palestinians were eager for assurance and why Israelis were 
reluctant to commit themselves to a pre-negotiation. Once the motivations of 
these objectives were uncovered the group would be able to explore ways that 
would be responsive to both parties’ requirements.  
 Israeli participants first asked the Palestinian group members to explain 
what they understood by “self-determination” in a concrete way.  
 They answered that first of all, the fate of the Palestinian people of being 
stateless needed to be seen as having started in 1948. They explained that what 
they wanted to achieve through the right of self-determination was to build a 
sovereign state. For the Palestinian participants it was conceivable that a future 
Palestinian state would form a federation with Jordan or Israel. Further, the 
Palestinian state was intended to comprise only part of their original homeland, 
and thereby accept a compromise with Israel.  
Israeli participants asked several questions about the status of 
Palestinians living in other countries and to which government they would 
respond to after the establishment of a Palestinian state.  
They answered that each Palestinian would be free to choose where he 
or she wanted to live and that they would be responsible to the respective 
government of their country of residence. That would mean for Palestinians, 





who would choose to remain Israeli citizens, to respond to the Israeli 
government.  
According to an Israeli participant Palestinian self-determination 
entailed at least the following three questions: 
- whether Palestinians would have political rights; 
- how Palestinians would fulfill their right to self-determination;  
-  and whether Palestinians living in Israel would have the right to 
 secede.  
Some Palestinian participants viewed the first principle of self-
determination consisted of unity of the Palestinian people anywhere and to 
provide statehood to that people. What needed to be worked out was the 
implementation of that objective and what the status of Palestinians living in 
Israel would be. In their view, the issue touched on the question of what could 
be repaired from the injustice the Palestinians became subject to in 1948 
without contradicting a two state solution with Israel.  
Other Palestinian participants added that the right of self-determination of 
the Palestinian people needed to be recognized even before it would become 
possible to implement or exercise that right. The Palestinian participants 
explained that recognition of that right was key to Israeli security, as the major 
reason for instability was the feeling of the Palestinian people that they were 
denied the right to self-determination. In a next step the right to self-
determination should be implemented by establishing a Palestinian state in the 
West Bank and Gaza.  
Israeli participants asked why a future Palestinian state would include these 






The Palestinian participants answered that this was what the Palestinian 
National Council had voted for.  
 Some Israeli participants said that they were not able to fully grasp the 
concept of a Palestinian nationhood, as there had been no Palestinian nation 
prior to 1948 but an area administered by the British Mandate. Israeli group 
members admitted that hearing them speak of Palestinian nationhood and 
implementing the right to self-determination felt very frightening to them and 
entailed a threat to Israel.  
Palestinian group members said to be very upset about the Israeli 
statement that revealed a lack of understanding of the fact that Palestinians 
conceived themselves as a nation. They explained that the right to self-
determination was the only way for Palestinians to express their nationhood. 
For Palestinians this was not a question of borders but a question of existence 
as a people. The Palestinian participants stated that it was a Zionist objective to 
keep others in the unknown about who lived in Palestine before the Jewish state 
was established. This was the reason why those creating the state of Israel 
thought they could be oblivious of the Palestinians who had been living in the 
area. It was indispensable for Palestinians and for the continuation of any kind 
of negotiations that Israelis recognized that.  
Palestinian participants illustrated further that as much as the Israeli 
fears were understandable, it was vital for the Israelis to understand that the 
most basic demand from Palestinians was Israeli recognition of Palestinian 
nationhood. Once Israelis recognized Palestinian nationhood, Palestinians 
would become able to talk about how to put their right of self-determination 
into practice without jeopardizing the nationhood of the Jewish people.  





Israeli participants replied, that the Palestinian participants seemed to 
expect more from the Israeli than from the Palestinian side. The Israeli group 
members felt that the Palestinian participants asked the Israelis not only to 
accept Palestinian rights but also their historical ideology, while Israelis did not 
ask Palestinians to accept Zionism. Israeli group members demanded to leave 
ideology out of the picture.  
A Palestinian participant replied that the discourse was not about 
ideology but about identity and explained that creating their own state was 
immensely important for Palestinians with regard to their identity. Palestinians 
did not know what to answer if people asked them where they were from. For a 
Palestinian any kind of traveling entailed issues of identity as they do not to 
know what to declare as nationality when passing a passport control. Many 
Palestinians’ "laissez-passer" may state Jordanian while in their hearts they feel 
Palestinian. A Palestinian group member told the group about the trip to the 
present meeting and the experience of having said to the immigration official to 
be of Palestinian nationality, following which the immigration official wrote 
down as country of citizenship "Palestine". The participant said having felt 
very happy because it looked as if it had been possible to create a fact.  
Other Palestinian group members explained that Palestinians had to 
accept that Jews living all over the world all see themselves as one nation. 
Palestinians only expected Israelis to grant them the same. They also stated that 
the existence of Israel was built on the denial of the Palestinians' existence and 
that Palestinians therefore demanded from the Israelis to recognize in an 
official statement of principles the fact that they displaced the Palestinians 






Some Israeli group members acknowledged the Palestinian demand and 
affirmed that mutual recognition was needed. They explained that self-
determination was always tied to recognition and that it was therefore 
completely legitimate for Palestinians to ask for that recognition prior to 
engaging in a peace process. They further illustrated that each side was asking 
the other for recognition of their existence as a nation. In terms of historical 
developments of the Palestinian nationhood, it was not origination of a nation 
that defined its status. By referring to Anderson's term of "imagined 
communities"1 they pointed out that it was a community's self-definition that 
determined their status of constituting a nation. It was therefore unquestionable 
that all Palestinians had the right to self-determination, including those with 
Israeli citizenship. The questions remaining were only about the 
implementation of that right. Implementation had to be undertaken in a way 
that would calm Israeli fears about their security now and in the future.  
Other Israeli participants admitted to be frightened by the improbability 
that a Palestinian state, confined to the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem, 
could have room for three to four million Palestinians. They felt that a future 
Palestinian state of that nature would be very likely to try to expand its territory 
to the West and absorb Israeli land.  
Palestinian participants replied that this would be a problem that a 
Palestinian state would have to solve within its own borders and that they did 
not see how this would be different from the Jewish law of return.  
Israeli participants replied that the probability for 12 million Jews to 
come to Israel was very low, if it were they would say the right of return would 
not be viable. They then reflected on the question whether it would be possible 





to limit the right of return to a certain number. In addition, they saw two other 
difficulties, one on the Arab-Palestinian level and the other one touched on the 
settlement problem. With regard to the Arab-Palestinian level, Israeli 
participants feared that an agreement leading to a Palestinian state would not be 
final and that the future Palestinian parliament would change its mind, as a 
Palestinian state within the proposed borders would not be viable. They felt 
more at ease with a scenario of a Palestinian federation with Jordan. With 
regard to the settlement problem, Israeli participants stated that a Palestinian 
state would mean to remove 112 settlements, including the reallocation of 
100,000 Jewish settlers from East Jerusalem, which would be a political 
impossibility for the Israeli government.  
The third party asked the Israeli participants what they conceived to be 
an assurance of the finality of future Palestinian state borders.  
Israeli participants expressed having a hard time trusting the Palestinian 
Parliament and that it would be reasonable to hold a referendum on that 
subject. Palestinian participants said not to see a reason for not trusting their 
parliamentarians, and that they would immediately agree on a referendum if 
Israelis could only convince Shamir of holding one.  
 
Reflections 
There was a key moment in the discussion about the right to self-
determination, when the Continuing Workshop addressed several negotiable 
identity aspects such as national narratives, the monolithic character of national 






The discussion started with a quarrel about Palestinian nationhood, 
when Palestinian participants linked the recognition of their nation to the 
injustice they had suffered during the war in 1948. The Palestinians implicitly 
asked the Israelis to acknowledge responsibility for what they did to the 
Palestinians during the war. The quarrel peaked when Israeli participants said 
that there was no Palestinian nation prior to 1948.  
The subsequent statement of a Palestinian participant that it was a 
Zionist objective to make Israelis believe that there was no Palestinian nation 
living in the area under British Mandate before the creation of Israel, triggered 
a shift in the atmosphere of the discussion. This shift was supported by the 
Palestinian statement that they understood Israeli fears of the consequences that 
acceptance of Palestinian nationhood could entail for them.  
The astounding explanation of Palestinian group members, that Israelis 
had been taught a false truth, demonstrated an openness towards information 
about the other side that generated understanding for the reasons of their 
believe system and thereby engendered a real negotiation of identity aspects. 
 The negotiation process was challenged, when Israeli team members 
were reluctant to accept the Palestinian statement and reduced the subject to an 
ideological plea. A Palestinian participant's insightful demonstration that the 
subject was not ideology but identity, by referring to the fact that Palestinians 
did not even have official papers that would document who they were in terms 
of national belonging, met that challenge well. The negotiation process was 
also furthered by the Palestinian affirmation that Palestinians accepted how 
Jewish people all over the world felt as one nation and that they only asked for 
the same acceptance on their behalf.  





Remarkably, the Palestinian explanation of their need for national 
identity and what it entailed was supported by the intervention of Israeli 
participants who illustrated that a nation existed if it perceived and defined 
itself as such. The Israeli participants' affirmation that the group's discussion 
revealed that both parties were actually asking for recognition of their national 
existence acted as an enormous boost to the negotiation process and 
represented a real turning point in the discussions. Following this exchange, the 
group was able to tackle concrete issues of how Palestinian self-determination 
could be approached in a way that would account for Israeli fear of losing 
territorial ownership and their very existence as a nation. The dialogue about 
self-determination paved the way to talk about the right of return, one of the 
most pivotal topics in the Israeli-Palestinian discourse.  
 
The remaining discussion sessions of the second meeting centered on 
closing the gaps between Israeli security concerns and the Palestinian need for 
an acknowledged acceptance of their existence as a people with a right to self-
determination. The group managed to partly close that gap by identifying 
Israeli concerns that prevented them from accepting the Palestinian request and 
by identifying the following three ways to meet these concerns:  
1) through explicit commitment from the Palestinians to the finality of 
the borders and arrangements of their future state; 
2) through a Palestinian commitment to build a confederation or 
another arrangement with Jordan 
3) through a Palestinian commitment to implement security 






The third party explained that these commitments needed to be clearly 
communicated in two ways, by making the readiness of Palestinian leaders to 
engage in negotiations under these conditions known to the Israeli polity, and 
by working out details of arrangements that could be considered in official 
negotiations.  
What needed to be worked on in a next step was to find ways of making 
this progress known to the two publics. The third party suggested picking up on 
the statement made by Israeli participants about the importance of 
communicating the existing Palestinian position to the Israeli public and that 
this would be something the Palestinians would not have to do alone but in a 
joint effort with the Israelis, who could explain how the Israeli public opinion 
can best be reached. Further, Israelis could make efforts to embed the 
communicated Palestinian statements in the Israeli public opinion in a firm way 
that would not be as easily reversible as the progress made in 1988.  
With regard to strategies for implementing that goal, Israeli participants 
suggested that many different groups should become involved in the manner of 
grass root activities because the workshop group did not have the capacity to 
respond to all tasks at hand. They also considered a summary statement, 
authorized by members of the PLO and the West Bank leaders, to be helpful. 
Further, Israeli participants deemed it as very productive to publish an 
interview with a high level PLO representative to show the Palestinian position 
clearly in the Israeli press.  
The group then engaged in a discussion about Palestinian elections as 
another means of expressing the changed Palestinian political stand. Israeli 
participants suggested their Palestinian counterparts to press for elections of a 





local self-government like the Shamir PlanH15 had suggested. Palestinian 
participants explained how absurd and dangerous it was to hold elections for an 
autonomous government of a people living under military occupation, a 
situation in which those elected by their own people risked to be arrested by the 
occupier. Israeli participants suggested holding elections anyway disregarding 
acceptance from Israel as they found the act of proof for the Palestinian 
capacity to elect a democratically representative political body to outweigh the 
obstacles that were to be expected from the Shamir government. According to 
Israeli participants, Palestinian elections were to serve three purposes: 
1) to have representatives able to engage in negotiations with Israel  
2) to negotiate self-government in the Occupied Territories 
3) to handle an administration in the Occupied Territories  
A Palestinian participant suggested adding a fourth point stating that 
elections for the appointment of a representative to the Palestinian National 
Council. Another Palestinian participant vehemently objected to the Israeli 
outline, according to which elections would only bring them the possibility of 
reaching an autonomy status of the Occupied Territories. The participant 
explained that Palestinians did not fight for 40 years to attain merely civilian 
rights for their occupied people and that they wanted more than just an 
autonomy status. The participant added, that if elections would only be seen as 
                                                
H15 Israel's Four Point Plan formulated in May 1989 by Prime Minister Yitzhak 
Shamir and Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin contained the following four basic points: 
-strengthening the peace with Egypt as a regional cornerstone, -promoting full 
peaceful relations with the Arab states, -improving refugee conditions through 
international efforts, -Palestinian elections and interim self-rule for a five year period 






serving the purpose of granting autonomy to the Occupied Territories, 
Palestinians should not agree to them.  
The third party reminded the Israeli participants that if they wanted to 
persuade their Palestinian colleagues that elections were worthwhile, they 
needed to convince them, that autonomy was not all that was to be attained 
through elections but that an autonomy status would only be an interim step.  
The third party then proposed to set plans for the next meeting that was 
scheduled to take place later during the year in August. The third party said that 
they planned to alter the workshop format a little bit and also hold meetings 
with subgroups to outline some ideas as it had been suggested by some of the 
participants during the present meeting. The third party recommended that the 
participants should prepare some draft papers reflecting the ideas that had been 
achieved so far, either individually or in small groups, they also reflected on the 
possibility that one member of each team could get together with a third party 
member at some point before the next meeting for that purpose. Further, they 
proposed four agenda items that could be addressed at their next meeting if the 
group was able to agree to them. The agenda items were intended to build on 
the discussions of the current meeting. They included: 
1) how to create a political environment that would allow closing the 
gap between the two sides and thereby enable them to engage in 
negotiations;  
2) discussing the relationship between Jordan, the Palestinian Nation, 
and Israel in terms of their future constitutional and economic 
arrangements; 





3) developing joint ideas for the purpose of communicating them to 
each body politic in the form of jointly developed articles that would 
be published within each community; 
4) discussing a unilateral Palestinian initiative for holding elections.  
  The group agreed to those propositions and the meeting ended on 
 friendly terms.  
  
Third Meeting of the Continuing Workshop in August 1991 
 The third meeting of the Continuing Workshop started directly with a 
joint discussion session. The third party opened the session by suggesting the 
following three issues as agenda items for the first day: recent developments; 
items of the Baker Plan that were relevant for the work of the Continuing 
Workshop; and identifying pertinent discussion topics for the current meeting.  
 The third party then asked both parties about the reactions to the process 
that the Baker Plan had set in motion.  
 Israeli participants referred to the memorandum of understandingH16 that 
the Israeli Prime Minister had requested as a precondition for agreeing to a 
                                                
H16 The Israeli government expected the US to negotiate with Arab representatives 
that the Palestinian delegation would form part of the Jordanian delegation, that it 
would not include PLO representatives, nor people living in East Jerusalem or 
outside the occupied territories and bring them to commit to these conditions in a 
memorandum of understanding that Israel and the Palestinian delegation would 
sign. The US on their part did not speak of a memorandum but of letters of assurance 
that would be sent to all parties eventually agreeing to attend the peace conference 
(including Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Israel) in order to broker outstanding 
reservations about their participation. Israeli officials just interpreted the US offer as 







possible peace conference. The Israeli group members argued that the reasons 
why an official peace conference became feasible were one, because the 
Palestinian community was weakened and two, because the Israeli public was 
alarmed by the scope of recent violent outbreaks exerting pressure on the 
Shamir government to alleviate the situation.  
 The Israeli group clarified, that while the format of a future peace 
process was almost agreed upon, its substance was not. In the Israeli 
participants' view, the US tried to draw two memos of understanding, one with 
Israel and one with the Palestinians; a procedure that would most likely cause 
contradictions. The memo of understanding reflected how wide the gap 
between the two parties was. Unless it were possible for them to bridge that 
gap, it would be difficult to discuss a possible agreement on the West Bank and 
Gaza in a potential peace conference.  
 In addition, Israeli participants raised another issue that had probably 
impacted on the current Israeli policy, namely that since June 1991 there had 
been a growing controversy on the national budget and about how to proceed 
on expenditure for immigration. The controversy was heightened by the fact 
that Israel had just suffered from an inflation of 3%, which frightened members 
of the Knesset and the public alike. Even the Minister of Finance, who was a 
hawk, had been heard saying that the economic situation might make him want 
to change his political view.  
Then, Israeli participants picked up on two major difficulties, which the 
peace process was facing: Palestinian self-determination bearing as a 
consequence the establishment of a Palestinian state and the development of a 
new modality for the city of Jerusalem. The difficulties with regard to these 





issues started, according to the Israeli participants, with the election procedure 
for putting together a Palestinian delegation for the negotiations. It was neither 
clear who the eligible Palestinian representatives would be (some candidates 
had been ruled out by the Israeli government), nor what segment of the 
Palestinian people would vote for them. The Israeli group members were of the 
view that these two issues were irresolvable at that moment and suggested to 
find other procedural structures for negotiations that would not touch on 
emotionally sensitive issues.  
Palestinian participants objected that these issues were unavoidable and 
pointed out that Palestinians had already made concessions with regard to the 
first issue by agreeing to form a delegation with Jordan.  
Other Palestinian participants summarized the events of the last three 
months and explained why it had been a difficult time for their community: 
1) the Palestinian polity had been struggling with a peace process that 
demanded essential decisions and assurances from their part; 
2) they had been facing serious political differences amongst 
themselves; 
3) and they had to juggle heightened financial problems, which resulted 
from the problem that no US funds were available at a time when the 
Israeli government had finally given green light for investments in 
US currency in the West Bank.  
 







Palestinian participants explained that the Palestinian community could 
not be sure about the content of meetings that Baker had been holding with 
various parties. They felt they were neither adequately informed nor did they 
have the possibility to attribute their share to the meetings. The lack of 
information and participation made them suspicious and led to a three way split 
of opinions. The leadership of the PLO adopted a positive outlook towards 
recent developments and viewed the American initiative as an opportunity to 
improve the Palestinian situation. A second strand of thought saw potential in 
the US initiative and wanted to cooperate. They did not fully agree with how 
the US had been proceeding so far, though, and deemed it necessary to involve 
Arab states. People taking that view, suspected that Baker avoided the 
discussion of significant topics with the Palestinians because he wanted to keep 
the door open for working out an agenda with Arab states, and then come back 
to the Palestinians with a set plan. A third opinion group took the view that 
talks should be boycotted altogether because it was just another American 
imperialist policy designed to uphold the status quo. 
The third party, then, asked the Israeli participants about their view of 
the current events.  
Israeli participants answered that they as well had little information 
about what was really dealt with during the negotiations led by Baker. They 
confirmed that the Israeli camp also felt that the lack of information was having 
a paralyzing effect. The public at large was confused and very reluctant to 
engage in any kind of discussion on the topic. One of the few points about the 
substance of the negotiations that was known to the public was that Shamir put 
Syria first. Some of the Israeli participants deemed this to be a wise move, as 





the Golan HeightsH17 were an easier topic to tackle compared to any other 
pertinent issue. The Israeli participants found this tactic to be strategically 
clever as it enabled Shamir to ensure support from the Likud as well as the 
Labor party.  
Israeli group members added that the Israeli public viewed the 
Palestinian cause to be marginalized, as no one would object to an agreement 
reached with Syria without consulting with the Palestinians.  
Even King Hussein of Jordan had been reported to having said that he 
would go along with negotiations without the Palestinians. Some of the Israeli 
participants deemed the marginalization of the Palestinians to be the reason 
why Shamir was ready to engage in negotiations. According to the Israeli 
participants, the task of the Continuing Workshop group, therefore, was to 
think about ways through which the Palestinians could be placed back in the 
process and be perceived by the Israeli public as having an impact on 
negotiations.  
Palestinian participants thought that discussing Syria would bring the 
parties back to the Palestinian issue.  
                                                
H17 The Golan Heights, a 100 square mile area stretching from above Lake Huleh 
along the River Jordan to south of the Sea of Galilee offering fresh water resources 
and strategic border control, have been an area of friction between Israel and Syria 
since the 1949 Arab-Israeli war. Under the UN-brokered armistice agreement the 
area became a demilitarized zone under Syrian control. Israel nevertheless tried to 
gain exclusive control over the Sea of Galilee for settlement and economic purposes, 
which led to repeated military clashes with Syria. In 1967, Israel occupied the Golan 
Heights during the six-day war. Although the loss of the are was represented a great 
strategic and economic setback for Syria, border clashes were minimal until the 1973 






Israeli participant disagreed, as the Israeli public did not perceive it that 
way. The participants insisted on finding ways to point the Israeli public in the 
Palestinian direction.  
The third party asked the Israeli participants how the Israeli public had 
reacted to the American initiative and whether the Israeli public supported the 
points that were suggested by Baker's plan, like the land for peace proposal. 
Israeli participants answered that these issues had been pressed to the 
margins and that the Israeli public was not interested in them. In the 
participants' view, the reasons for this were, first, that Israelis had learned to 
live with the Intifada up to the point that it had become almost a non-factor. 
Second, other issues were more prominent for Israelis, like Russian 
immigration and the Israeli ability to absorb it, as well as the stagnating 
economy – the Israeli public did not realize that an agreement with the 
Palestinians would alleviate this stagnation. Further, the new Shamir coalition 
had been facing a lot of problems in terms of a split into different factions.  
 
* * * 
 
The following sessions were spent on looking at two papers, one 
prepared by the Israeli and one by the Palestinian party, which the two had 
been working on since the last meeting. The group agreed to discuss the 
Palestinian paper first, as it outlined the most important points in which 
Palestinians would need reassurance in order to build a trusting relationship 
                                                                                                                                       
occupied territories. The war ended with the return of a small strip of territory and 
the establishment of a UN-patrolled buffer zone (Ma'oz, 1995: 210ff.).  





with Israelis. The paper contained some of the controversial issues that had 
been looked at in previous meetings, like acknowledgement of Palestinian 
nationhood and the right to self-determination, and caused renewed heightened 
discussions. Assisted by the third party, the group tried to elaborate a common 
understanding of what confidence-building measures needed to include, how 
they needed to be formulated and presented in order to be acceptable for both 
parties.  
In the afternoon sessions the group looked at the paper that had been 
prepared by the Israeli participants. The Israeli paper followed the same line as 
the one drafted by the Palestinian group members and enumerated the points in 
which Israelis needed reassurance from the Palestinians. The paper referred 
among others to the unclear picture of the Palestinian political elite in the 
Occupied Territories and their seemingly total dependency on the Diaspora 
leadership and other Arab political leaders.  
Palestinian participants objected to that and affirmed that the local polity 
had a long history of decisive influence inside the Occupied Territories, which 
had been expressed through the Intifada.  
Israeli participants explained that the Israeli public was aware of how 
much influence the PLO had within the Occupied Territories and that many 
Palestinians greatly feared restrictive reactions if they did not comply with PLO 
objectives. What Israelis felt insecure about was the final objective of the PLO 
with regard to the land they wanted to integrate into a future Palestinian state, 
whether it was only the West Bank and Gaza or all of Israel. What had also 






on what the local PLO said. They feared that more extreme moves would 
follow from the Diaspora affiliations.  
Palestinian participants confirmed that the objective of the Palestinian 
leadership in terms of a future state was confined to the West Bank and Gaza.  
To which the Israeli participants replied that this needed to be 
communicated in clear terms in order to ease the fear of the Israeli public.  
A member of the third party drew attention to the point about finality in 
the Israeli paper and asked the Palestinian participants whether they could 
confirm their statement that the future territory of a Palestinian state would 
definitely be confined to the West Bank and Gaza.  
The Palestinian participants confirmed that this was the PLO position 
and that acceptance of the UN Resolution 242 was final. They drew attention to 
the 1988 Declaration of Independence, which confirmed exactly that position, 
although the document had fallen into a trap because of recent political events 
and was not seen as being a relevant item on the Palestinian agenda anymore. 
Palestinian participants stated that most Palestinians would nevertheless accept 
the finality of a two state solution. What would, however, represent an 
enormous obstacle to Palestinian openness of committing to negotiations on 
that issue, was the impression that the Israelis did not trust Palestinians to abide 
by the finality of an accepted and agreed upon solution.  
Israeli participants reacted by saying that what would make Israelis trust 
the Palestinian commitment, was to convince them that the Palestinian 
delegation would be representative of their community. This would give 
leverage to the finality of a signed agreement. With this statement, Israeli 
participants picked up on another point of the paper under discussion, which 





referred to the Israeli need to be assured that those who negotiate were tied to 
the agreed upon solution and able to deliver it.  
Palestinian participants replied that this would depend on the nature of 
the delegation and how it would be established. A most convincing Palestinian 
delegation for both sides would probably be one whose members would be 
chosen through a joint procedure of both parties.  
Israeli group members applauded that and said this would convince at 
least 55% of the Israeli public to go along and trust the good intentions of 
Palestinians. With regard to the right of return, Israeli participants said that the 
problem might be solved if Palestinians could guarantee that the right of return 
for Palestinian refugees and those living in Diaspora would exclusively apply 
to the future Palestinian state and not to territories that belonged to the Israeli 
state.  
Palestinian participants answered that this would need to be discussed in 
more detail.  
 
* * * 
 
During the next session the group picked up on the discussion of the 
Israeli paper. Palestinian participants expressed their frustration about getting 
through to the Israeli public in terms of generating reassuring measures. They 
felt that they had already made reassuring gestures and covered a lot of points 
that the Israeli paper asked for but had never seen a result or positive 
resonance. Apparently their statements had not been heard and their gestures 






Israeli group members replied that it was necessary to repeat such 
statements and gestures many times.  
According to some of the Palestinian participants, it was risky for the 
Palestinian elite to keep repeating these kinds of gestures without visible 
success, as it would influence Palestinian public opinion negatively and lead to 
a loss of the elite's credibility.  
The third party suggested to think about ways of injecting such an 
exchange of reassuring statements into the media and thereby making them part 
of the public debate in both communities. Further, they resumed the topics 
which had been presented by the papers and recommended to continue a 
structured discussion on some of the following topics: thinking about concrete 
measures to reduce the pain of occupation; finding a way to illustrate 
Palestinian nationhood and self-determination to the Israeli public in a rhetoric 
acceptable to both sides without de-legitimizing the Palestinian political elite, 
finding out how to reassure each side about their sincere commitment to the 
finality of a negotiated solution, as well as developing mutually acceptable 
statements on the right of return.  
The group agreed to focus on Palestinian nationhood and the right of 
return as discussion topics for the following sessions.  
 
* * * 
 
The third party opened the first session of the following day by giving 
an outline of the agenda for the ensuing discussions. They recalled that the two 
chosen topics, Palestinian nationhood and the right of return needed to be 





looked at within the framework of developing ideas for mutual reassurance. 
The third party explained that they recommended using the term 'mutual 
reassurance' instead of 'confidence building measures' because the latter term 
was linked to a European context and was commonly used to refer to specific 
measures that should be taken. Mutual reassurance, on the other hand, 
originated from an analytical framework and could be used as a conceptual tool 
to identify needs and fears of two conflicting communities. Mutual reassurance 
was more of a conception of what would be required by each conflict party to 
be reassured, than a prescription of delimited steps.  
The third party hoped that the group would manage to jointly produce a 
statement or formulation regarding the chosen topics, which could be used for 
further dissemination if the participants wished to do so, once the Continuing 
Workshop was completed. The third party explained that such a statement 
should include the affirmation from both sides that the statement was 
responsive to their concerns and only included what each was prepared to say. 
In terms of Palestinian nationhood such a statement could include the 
perspectives of both the Israeli and the Palestinian participants: how Israeli 
participants viewed Palestinian nationhood, how they considered a significant 
segment of the Israeli public to view it; how Palestinian participants responded 
to theses images and whether or not it covered what they needed in terms of 
reassurance. Further, the third party considered it possible for the continuing 
group to produce an action proposal with regard to one or more discussed 
issues that would include concrete actions that could be implemented by an 






In a next step, the third party asked one Israeli and one Palestinian 
participant to draft a paper from the discussion content, in order to have written 
material for the purpose of analyzing the results of their talks. For the following 
morning, the third party planned to break the plenary group into two sub-
groups each discussing one of the drafts. Both sub-groups groups would 
develop a formulation or action proposal and bring that back to the plenary 
meeting in the afternoon.  
Participants on both sides had doubts whether it was possible for them 
as an unofficial group to formulate concrete political views and whether they 
would be able to bridge their widely differing views on certain issues in order 
to produce a written statement to which they could all agree.  
The third party reminded the group that the aim of drafting a paper was 
not to frame official political views, but rather to formulate ideas that private 
citizens developed in an analytical academic framework.  
Still, some Palestinian participants wanted the group to understand that 
they were concerned about developing a written statement because of the 
perceived asymmetry between the two parties. If the Palestinian participants 
committed to a written formulation it would reflect the commitment of their 
whole community and leadership, while for the Israeli participants it only 
reflected the commitment of a segment of the Israeli society and not of their 
whole people and government. Nevertheless, they were ready to accept that for 
this group and the purpose of the workshop. The asymmetry of representation 
was irrelevant, because the group would be able to open channels for improved 
mutual understanding.  





Other Palestinian group members confirmed that they were attending as 
private individuals and that therefore one party was not more representative 
than the other. At times personal views might happen to be congruent with 
one's leadership position or one's society's mainstream opinion and sometimes 
not. Palestinian participants encouraged those who had expressed their 
concerns, to have confidence in the process and just take the opportunity of 
exploring new possibilities without feeling coerced. They added that it was not 
a problem if some among them could not agree with a proposed idea and that 
what mattered was the discussion.  
Some of the Israeli participants picked up on the argument and prompted 
the rest of the participants to engage in the experiment of coming up with a 
written formulation not because they did not have anything to lose but because 
they could only gain in terms of fostering understanding and acquiring 
knowledge about each other. They acknowledged the Palestinian perception of 
asymmetry and explained that although the Israeli participants did not represent 
their government they were able to exert a lot of influence on the public 
opinion of their community, probably in a more decisive way than the 
Palestinian participants were able to reach their society. They added that if the 
Palestinian participants gave up on working with the Israeli workshop 
participants, they would also give up on the chance to change Israeli public 
opinion. Israeli participants confirmed that they did not want to give up but 
wished to understand Palestinian fears further and find out where and how it 
was possible to build a bridge between the two sides and how to channel that 








The preceding discussion session displayed a true negotiation process. 
Although identity aspects were not directly addressed, the discussion was 
responsive to psychological prerequisites that need to be met before identity 
aspects can be negotiated. By bargaining about workshop procedures, the two 
parties were able to develop a shared language that generated an atmosphere of 
working trust. Participants on both sides were able to communicate with each 
other in a responsive way, taking concerns of the other into account while 
trying to come up with convincing arguments that would bring other group 
members to engage in the exercise of formulating joint statements. The 
discussion proved to be conducive to enabling conflict parties to address core 
identity aspects in the ensuing sessions.  
 
The second session of the third day dealt with Palestinian nationhood. 
The third party recalled that the aim was to explore the topic in an analytical 
way without worrying about the feasibility of an agreement and to separate that 
concern from the discussion. They added that Palestinian nationhood carried a 
lot of implications that needed to be included in the discussion, like what the 
Palestinian nation entailed precisely in terms of its members living inside and 
outside the Occupied Territories and about its representation.  
Palestinian participants began to give a short historical overview of the 
development of Palestinian nationhood. They referred to the beginning of the 
20th century when Palestinians identified themselves as Moslems and did not 
differentiate themselves from other Islamic states. When nationalist movements 
in Europe started to emerge, the Arab movement followed. As Arabs were split 
into separate states, Palestinians started to differentiate themselves and did no 





longer call themselves just Arabs but Palestinians. Palestinian national identity 
was reinforced by the 1948 events. The Palestinians who were able to remain 
on their land of origin, started to institutionalize their national identity by 
writing down their history and establishing a political and social framework.  
Israeli participants replied that most Israelis accepted that Palestinians 
were a nation. They explained that those Israelis who denied that Palestinians 
were a nation did so because they were scared that acceptance of it would entail 
a concession from their part that might jeopardize the existence of their state. 
What was tremendously important for Israelis with regard to the issue was to 
learn what Palestinian nationhood entailed, especially in terms of Palestinian 
territorial claims. Some participants asked whether one could say that every 
Arab between Jordan and the Mediterranean was a Palestinian.  
Palestinian participants confirmed that this was the case, except for 
Palestinians living in Israel. The participants viewed those Palestinians to have 
the same status as a Jewish citizen in the US.  
Israeli group members asked whether or not the nationality of such a 
person would be considered to be Israeli.  
Palestinian participants answered that it would be up to each person to 
decide about that.  
An Israeli participant than pointed out that it was necessary to 
distinguish between the concept of citizenship and nationhood, as the two were 
not correlated.  
The group then engaged in a discussion about the relationship of a future 
Palestinian state to Jordan and the status of Palestinians who would continue 






Palestinian participants explained that their status would be the same as 
of any other nationals of a sovereign state living in another country. They saw 
Palestinians to be free to decide to remain in Jordan or in Israel after a 
Palestinian state would be established and be loyal to their country of residence 
without jeopardizing their Palestinian identity.  
Palestinian participants made it very clear that their concept of 
nationhood and its expression in terms of exerting the right to self-
determination as a nation did not endanger the existence of the Israeli state, that 
Palestinians would accept the finality of the borders of their future state, and 
that they would not interfere in either Israel's or Jordan's internal affairs. They 
confirmed that this was also true on behalf of their compatriots who would 
remain in Israel or Jordan. They assured that their statements were to be 
understood as gestures of mutual reassurance and asked the Israeli participants 
to give them a reassuring signal in return.  
The third party appreciated the Palestinian move and asked them to 
assist the Israelis to formulate a statement that would reassure them.  
In response, Israeli participants confirmed that the right to self-
determination of Palestinians was widely accepted not just by the people in the 
group but also among the Israeli public. They were of the view that this could 
be stated in a public way to Israelis and Palestinians. They added that the 
existence of Palestinians as a people was fully accepted by the Israeli public not 
least as a consequence of the Intifada, which established the fact that 
Palestinians would never concede to be absorbed by Israel, Jordan, Syria, or by 
any other state.  





Further, Israeli participants added that it was just as vital for Israelis that 
Palestinians accepted Israeli national existence, as it was the other way around. 
More so, it was essential for Israeli participants on a personal level as well as 
terms of being members of the Israeli polity that Palestinians understood who 
Israelis were as a people. They saw this mutual acceptance and understanding 
of each other's identity as being an indispensable foundation for peaceful 
relations, especially with view to a probable interdependence between the two 
political entities.  
Palestinian group members said they were very pleased with this 
analysis and agreed that peace could not be reached if the two sides were 
reluctant to exchange recognition of their national existence. They also agreed 
that only if Israelis could understand the complex nature of Palestinian 
nationality, it would become possible for them to deal with other issues that 
were vital for Palestinians, like the right of return. Palestinian participants 
confirmed that they were able to understand that Israelis felt threatened by the 
refugee problem.  
Palestinian participants explained, however, that the violent attacks that 
threatened Israelis stemmed from the fact that the Palestinian people was forced 
to live in two dimensions, some of them in the Occupied Territories and others 
in Diaspora, and more prominently, that some of them had to live in refugee 
camps and were stateless. The only way to end violence was through the 
establishment of a Palestinian state and by making sure that this state would 
absorb the Palestinian people within its territory encompassing the West Bank 








The foregoing discussion session testified to a crucial moment in terms 
of displaying an ultimate identity change, namely removing the negation of the 
other as a central component of each conflict party's identity. First, participants 
of both parties told each other how important it was that the other accepted 
their national identity. Second, both sides affirmed that they did indeed accept 
the existence of the other as a nation. In the following session, the group turned 
to the discussion of the right of return. 
 
Palestinian participants explained that for them the right of return 
contained two layers, a theoretical and a practical one. The theoretical level 
was about the recognition of this right. They stressed how important this 
recognition was for the Palestinian people on a theoretical or more particularly 
on a psychological level, independent of a later practical solution. If Israelis 
would insist on denying, that Palestinians – at least theoretically – had the right 
to claim to return to the homes they lost in 1948, Palestinians would experience 
that denial as an enormous injustice imposed by a powerful party on a 
powerless one. They added that receiving such recognition did not entail that a 
given person would indeed try to return to a home that did not exist anymore, 
as this was unfeasible. Palestinian participants made it clear that what 
Palestinians needed in a most vital way was to receive Israeli recognition of 
their right to return on a theoretical level as a form of acknowledgment of 
Palestinian dignity. 
Some Israeli participants replied that from an Israeli perspective 
recognizing the Palestinian right of return did not equal taking responsibility 
for the injustice that Palestinian people had experienced. In Israeli eyes the 





responsibility for what happened during the war between 1947 and 1949 was 
shared, as both sides had suffered from those events. They explained, that to 
grant Palestinians the right of return on those premises was an unacceptable for 
Israelis, as it would mean for them to say that the state of Israel was born in sin.  
 Other Israeli participants added that in the Israeli view, Palestinians were 
the ones who committed a sin in 1947. While the Israelis were ready to accept 
the partition plan and the very disagreeable borders, the Palestinians were the 
ones who started the war and thereby created the refugee problem they were all 
facing today. Responsibility for the refugee problem was, thus, on the 
Palestinians not on the Israelis. According to those participants' view, the 
refugee problem was key to a possible ending of the conflict. If it remained 
only vaguely unresolved a new conflict would ensue after the establishment of 
a Palestinian state, triggered by one million refractory refugees.  
Palestinian participants then said, that the refugee problem did not just 
have a political but also a humanitarian dimension. Even if the refugees would 
have a passport, a flag, and an address, their living conditions would remain 
deplorable and would eventually lead to a renewed upheaval. Further, they 
suggested not to use the term right of return, as it connoted an a priori 
concession in Israeli eyes, but to speak of a solution of the refugee problem.  
The third party pointed out that the strong reactions from the Israeli side 
showed how much reassurance they needed with regard to this issue and 
reminded the group that the objective of the discussion was to think about 
reassuring measures.  
Palestinian participants insisted on their point, that the Israelis and the 






their former homes on a theoretical level and trust them that they would deal 
with the refugee problem within the agreed upon borders of a future Palestinian 
state.  
Several Israeli participants replied that they did not want to negate the 
Palestinian right to claim their losses, but that they just could not conceive of 
the practical implications that the acceptance of their claim would have. With 
regard to reassurance they said they would feel more comfortable if the group 
could come up with a formulation containing the concern about the practicality 
of dealing with the refugee problem within the borders of a Palestinian state. 
Further, the formulation should clearly express that the Palestinian state did not 
have any territorial aspirations to solve the refugee problem within the 
boundaries of the state of Israel. They suggested that Palestinians should 
declare unilaterally their claim of lost property and ancient homeland, while 
Israelis would officially state their claim for Eretz Israel. Through such honest 
statements of their respective claims a compromise was much more prone to 
emerge than from any kind of well formulated promises.  
Some Palestinian participants agreed that the problem to be solved was 
about refugees and not about the right of return. However, the solution of the 
refugee issue would mostly stem from the right of return. They affirmed that 
returning to Israel was out of the question and that granting the right of return 
to Palestinians would in no way threaten Israel’s existence or the Jewish 
character of the state. All that was needed to successfully solve the refugee 
problem through the acknowledgement of the right of return was to discuss it 
further. In the eyes of the Palestinian group members the Israeli participants’ 
readiness to discuss the problem was a gesture of reassurance in itself.  





The third party directed the group’s attention toward the multiple 
meanings of the term “right of return”. One of them referred to the right to 
claim lost properties, another one to the right to receive compensation for the 
deep-seated grievances caused through the unjust loss of homes, while a third 
meaning pointed to the right to own houses and land in general. The third party 
assumed that splitting up the complex term might help all members of the 
group to understand the sense of injustice that people have suffered, how 
important it was to recognize that sense of injustice, and to grant the 
establishment of new homes.  
The group welcomed that statement.  
Israeli participants confirmed that it was easier to acknowledge 
Palestinian loss than to acknowledge the right of return as such because there 
was a big difference between offering compensation and taking responsibility. 
As the discussion had shown, from an Israeli point of view the question of 
responsibility for the loss was debatable. They added that it was enormously 
important to them that Israeli acknowledgment of Palestinian grievances was 
met with a reciprocal move from the Palestinian side. They made it clear that it 
was vital for Israelis that Palestinians acknowledged the Israeli right of return 
as well and Palestinians realized that Israel also deplored grievances. They 
continued explaining that it was essential for them that Palestinians would 
understand that Israelis were ready to compromise on areas, to which they feel 
ideologically tied, for the sake of peace.  
A third party member asked the Israeli participants whether they meant 
that they ideologically claimed a greater Israel but were willing to give up that 






Two Israeli participants simultaneously answered that their previous 
statement expressed exactly that.  
Palestinian participants reacted to the previous Israeli statement about 
the Palestinians having started the war in 1947 and that they were therefore 
responsible for their own suffering. They reminded the group that Palestinians 
had been repeatedly expelled from their territories long before the war started. 
Further, they saw the war as having resulted from the way Israelis imposed 
their state. Some Palestinian participants took the view that the group could 
either continue a futile discussion about history or acknowledge that the 
situation was different for each side but that they both needed each other and 
had to make concessions in order to reach peace.  
Israeli group members held that historical realities could not be changed. 
Some Palestinian participants countered by asking the Israeli colleagues 
whether or not it was conceivable for all of them that the political situation was 
changing toward taking on new realities. They suggested that the Palestinian 
right of return should be recognized by both parties for the following three 
reasons: first, because a political settlement was the only way to reach an 
agreement; secondly, because of the moral reasons that had been reiterated 
during the previous discussion; and thirdly, because the right had been 
recognized by the UN and international law and was therefore of legal 
legitimacy.  
Other Palestinian participants agreed with the stand of leaving historical 
accounts out of the equation. It was important to understand each other’s 
histories and grievances, and that they could and need not to be reversed or set 
right by a negotiated solution. Palestinian thought was not a continuum from 





ancient past to the present point but was future oriented toward a political 
settlement. The Palestinian participants found reciprocity to be a good way of 
proceeding but said that acceptance of Israel as a Jewish state represented an 
obstacle to this attitude.  
Israeli participants reacted to that statement with some frustration and 
asked why Palestinian participants had difficulties to accept the religious nature 
of Israel.  
The Palestinian participants explained that the non-Jewish minority in 
Israel would always be at a disadvantage.  
Israeli participants answered that minorities in all states faced certain 
difficulties of getting heard.  
Palestinian participants countered that in the US the Bill of Rights did 
not decide about the rights of its citizens on the basis of religion. They felt that 
a Jew in Brooklyn had more rights than a Palestinian in Israel.  
 
Reflections 
As the group had been able to successfully engage in the complex 
discussion about the right of return, the difficulty of acknowledging 
responsibility for what had happened in the past surfaced again. The discussion 
about taking on responsibility led to a difficult confrontation with each party's 
own history and elements of their national narratives. It became clear how 
interdependent the narratives of the two parties are, and that accepting the 
other’s narrative may entail a change in ones one.  
The discussion was eased when the third party intervened by suggesting 






one at a time. The intervention showed how the introduction of a conceptual 
tool, can help to transform a quarrel into an analytic discussion. 
Through this intervention, the Israeli group was able to formulate that 
they as well deplored grievances for which they needed acknowledgement. 
Israeli participants even upheld that they also needed their right of return to be 
acknowledged. This statement demonstrated that reciprocity in dialogue and 
gesture is pivotal for resolving conflict issues. The statement touched again on 
the acknowledgement of national existence, which a confirmed right of return 
implies.  
In addition, the Israeli statement revealed that Israeli participants were 
aware that it was necessary and possible that the ideological dream of greater 
Israel (an element of their national narrative that jeopardizes the 
acknowledgement of a Palestinian state) no longer informed their political 
program.  
The subsequent statement of the Palestinian group made clear that 
participants started to realize that each group had experienced past events 
differently and that these experiences had consequently formed different 
national narratives. Both of these narratives were true to the respective group 
and, therefore, had to be accepted as such by the other.  
A further decisive step in the confrontation occurred, when Israeli group 
members said that historical realities cannot be reversed and Palestinian 
participants countered that what was changeable, was the political present by 
integrating new realities.  
 
 





At this moment a true identity change occurred, as some of the 
participants realized that identities can be altered by including new facts into 
exiting perceptions.  
 
 Subgroup Discussions  
The afternoon sessions of the forth day were spent in mixed sub-groups 
accompanied by a split third party team. One group went through the paper that 
had been prepared by an Israeli participant while the other group looked at the 
one prepared by a Palestinian participant. The objective for both sub-groups 
was to formulate concrete ideas about how to provide the assurances that each 
side asked for, while third party members would take notes of the findings for 
the purpose of eventually putting together a written formulation.  
The first item that was discussed in the sub-group looking at the paper 
drafted by an Israeli group member concerned violence. The group agreed to 
formulate a paragraph on the issue and to head it with the title: condemnation 
of murder of civilians. The group reached consensus that the killing of civilians 
on either side was a horrendous act, which reinforced the dehumanized image 
each held of the other.  
Israeli participants suggested that their Palestinian colleagues could 
lobby within their community for forming a petition against civilian killings 
and address it to their leadership, a measure that should be reciprocated by the 
Israeli participants lobbying for a petition addressed to their government to 






In response, Palestinian participants told a story about a suicide attack 
that had been launched in an Israeli bus. A group of Israelis then asked a group 
of Palestinians to condemn the attack. They did and produced a document with 
22 signatures and published it in an Arabic newspaper. According to the 
Palestinian participants, the Israelis who asked for such a statement showed 
that they did not think of all Palestinians as killers, but were able to 
differentiate between fanatically orientated individuals and the larger non-
violent Palestinian population. The Palestinian participants pointed out that this 
had to be noted as a decisive progress in changing the existing enemy image. 
However, the Palestinian public never heard such differentiated statements 
from the Israeli side and did not ask for such statements either. Palestinian 
participants found that condemnation of violence should occur on both sides. 
Both sides needed to be seen as victims of a situation that needed to be changed 
in order to stop violence.  
Then, the group agreed to write a statement that there should be a 
general public condemnation of indiscriminate killings of civilians, and that 
this joint condemnation should be issued by a group of prominent Israelis and 
Palestinians representing a wide spectrum of political opinion. The statement 
further included that the joint condemnation should include the 
acknowledgment that both sides were victims of the situation.  
The group then moved on to the next issue, which referred to dialogue. 
Both sides agreed that there should be increased possibilities for Israelis and 
Palestinians to exchange their views. The group discussed existing hurdles to 
increased interactions. A member of the group mentioned that Palestinians 
would sometimes refuse to attend professional meetings with Israeli colleagues 





because they feared that their community might interpret their participation as 
an act of pretending that occupation was non-existent. A Palestinian participant 
mentioned a personal experience where an Israeli colleague asked for a donated 
supply of children's books to a hospital. The participant managed to collect 300 
books but when trying to deliver the books to the hospital, the colleague told 
the participant that they were not allowed to accept one book donated by an 
Arab. 
The third party recommended taking limitations of that kind into 
consideration when formulating a statement on increased contact and dialogue 
and to accept limitations caused by the existing situation, as anything else 
would only have a backfiring effect.  
Israeli participants picked up on the possibility of diversifying dialogue 
through the media. They saw this as a possibility for changing the state of 
ignorance in which each side found itself about the other. The problem was not 
only that each side knew so little about the other but also that they did not 
realize how much they did not know. They explained that this ignorance led to 
fear and refusal of agreeing to publish statements made by representatives of 
the other side in their own press.  
The group agreed to an exchange of published articles in the press on 
both sides on a regular basis as well as appearances on television as a means to 
break-up the monolithic view each side had of the other.  
The group then moved on to discuss the issue of what could be done to 
increase acceptance of a gradualist approach toward peacemaking.  
Palestinian group members said they had no problem with a gradualist 






status would not become permanent and they could be sure that the 
negotiations would lead to a final separate state. They made it clear that if they 
could be sure that the final step of a gradualist approach was to attain an 
independent self-determined state they would agree to it.  
Both sides agreed that a lot of time was needed to establish a Palestinian 
state and that therefore there needed to be interim phases.  
The group then tackled the issue of security.  
Israeli participants explained that they were aware that Palestinians 
viewed Israeli fears about the security of their state to be unreal and to serve 
only as a tactical instrument. The Israeli participants assured them that their 
fear was real and that they wished to have more room for explaining them why.  
Palestinian participants responded that both sides had security needs and 
that they also felt the issue needed to be discussed in more depth especially 
with regard to other Arab countries involved in the conflict.  
 
* * * 
 
The other sub-group discussed the paper that had been presented by a 
Palestinian group member. The third party team recalled that the purpose of the 
discussion was to look at some of the items proposed in the paper and think 
about concrete steps to address them by building reassuring measures.  
The group first addressed the issue of how to improve living conditions 
in the Occupied Territories in terms of making education more accessible. 
Palestinian participants asked for the reopening of universities that had been 
closed during the Intifada. Israeli participants did not see this to be possible 





with the current leadership. They directed the focus of the discussion more 
towards reopening schools that had been closed because curfews prevented 
pupils as well as teachers to come to school and because they did not have 
enough funds to pay teachers. Israeli group members recommended increasing 
the exchange of information between schoolteachers and authorities also on a 
political level.  
In a next step, the group looked at how to improve the economy in the 
Occupied Territories. An Israeli participant suggested lobbying with the Israeli 
Division of Labor for the purpose of developing concrete measures. Those 
measures could be directed towards stopping discrimination against the West 
Bank and Gaza; towards increasing EU and US financing; towards the 
development of better support systems in health, education, road construction 
and maintenance as well as for the recruitment of the local police. Further, they 
advocated revising the tax system in a way that indirect taxes paid for social 
security and the like by Palestinians who worked in Israel would flow back to 
the Occupied Territories. A Palestinian group member added that taxes should 
be collected on an economic and not on a political basis. The participant 
explained that their tax rates were estimated on an extremely arbitrary footing.  
The next item tackled by the group was the right to political expression.  
Some Israeli group members said to have problems with supporting the 
right for political expression under occupation.  
Palestinian participants replied that if the Israeli government continued 
to prohibit the distribution of leaflets, a free press, the organization of political 







Israeli participants acknowledged that a vicious circle had ensued from 
how the Israeli government asked to negotiate with inhabitants of the Occupied 
Territories but failed to allow them to get politically organized. The only 
possibility the participants saw for stepping out of that vicious circle was to 
create a consensus within the Palestinian community on what their political 
program should look like and communicate that to the Israeli authorities before 
they would start implementing it in terms of political organization.  
The discussion then led on to addressing the problem regarding 
Palestinian family reunions. Israeli fear of Palestinian political upheaval had 
resulted in prohibiting family reunions.  
Palestinian group members said that even husbands and wives were 
sometimes unable to live together if one of them needed a residence permit that 
had to be renewed every three weeks at the cost of 100 US Dollars.  
The group then talked about how to counteract Israeli settlement policy.  
Some Israeli participants viewed that issue to be the most important one 
to lobby against and the most controversial topic in Israeli society. They 
explained that the reasons for this were fourfold: first settlements were very 
cost intensive; second most settlers were of an extreme right wing orientation 
which was not shared by most of the Israeli public; third there existed an 
American and an international campaign against it; and fourth the government 
had no argument to prove that settlements were not impeding peace. Some 
Israeli participants suggested the following measures to lobby against the 
settlement policy: by establishing a settlement watch through Peace Now; by 
informing the US-press about how much of their funds were spent in the West 
Bank; and to organize demonstrations inside settlement areas. But not all Israeli 





group members supported that proposition or were able to agree to sign a joint 
statement that condemned the establishment of new settlements.  
 
Plenary Sessions 
On the fifth day, the group went through the two papers in a plenary 
session and worked on the discussed formulation in precise details in order to 
merge the two documents into one. The participants spent time on discussing 
the exact meaning of certain expressions and their possible interpretation of 
their respective communities. It became clear to them that the choice of the 
accurate wording was decisive for the acceptance of a formulation as well as 
for its reassuring effect. Finding the right terms to express extremely complex 
realities proved to be a real challenge and brought the participants back to some 
of their most pertinent subjects, questions, and concerns with regard to the 
conflict. In some instances the group members re-experienced certain aspects 
of the foregoing talks.  
The first formulation, that the group tried to formalize, captured their 
conception of nationhood and its implications for both parties in terms of 
exercising their right to self-determination within agreed-upon borders.  
Some Palestinian participants had a problem that the formulation read 
within agreed-upon borders while they did not even have borders yet.  
The third party reminded them that the purpose of the formulation was 
to serve as a reassurance measure and asked the Palestinian participants 
whether or not the formulation reached that aim.  






The group then moved on to look at the formulation on the right of 
return. This issue gave rise to a renewed quarrel.  
Palestinian group members explained that there was no way for them to 
give up their claim for recognition of their right of return from the Israelis.  
Israeli participants were ready to recognize that both sides needed to 
deal with the problem of Palestinian refugees before a negotiated solution could 
be reached. However, they were not ready to recognize the right of return as 
such and in that wording.  
The third party reminded the participants that the purpose of the 
workshop was not to produce negotiation statements for official purposes but 
that it would be useful to capture the progress that had been made by the group. 
According to the third party the main achievements of the discussions were, 
that Palestinians confirmed that they were prepared to take several steps to 
meet Israeli objectives if their right of return was recognized; and that Israelis 
were not ready to acknowledge the right of return but came close to it. The gap 
on that issue was therefore not closed but narrowed.  
Israeli participants, opposing the recognition of the right of return, 
proposed the following formula for a joint statement: while Palestinians 
remained firm that the right of return could not be compromised and Israelis 
said they could not recognize that right despite their acknowledgment of 
Palestinian suffering, both sides agreed that they needed to solve this problem 
in ensuing negotiations.  
The group then moved on to discuss the issue about the finality of a 
negotiated agreement.  





Israeli participants found the formulation, which the sub-group had 
elaborated, to be acceptable but quite unkind to the Israeli side. The 
formulation read that the Palestinian movement had officially accepted the 
establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, alongside of 
Israel, as the solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; and that this decision 
had received widespread support in Palestinian communities, inside and outside 
the Occupied Territories. According to some Israeli participants, the majority 
of Israelis would feel uncomfortable with the language that had been used and 
suggested to replace the initial statement of their formulation with the PNC 
Resolution of 1988.  
The Palestinian group members welcomed that suggestion. They on 
their part expressed to having a problem with the formulation of the Israeli 
concerns that the PLO leadership’s commitment to that solution was not 
genuine but only a tactical maneuver to ultimately reach their original goal of 
destroying Israel in stages; and that if they really were genuine about 
negotiating a two-state agreement, the PLO would be unable to persuade its 
constituencies to accept the finality of such an agreement.  
The group engaged in a discussion about a better wording of the issue 
and agreed that the formulation should read that: the Palestinian participants of 
the workshop were prepared to assure Israelis that they, along with the PLO 
and the Palestinian people, viewed the two-state solution to permanently 
resolve the conflict.  







Palestinian participants expressed how important a strong statement 
from their Israeli colleagues on this subject was for them in terms of 
reassurance.  
Some Israeli participants said to have difficulties with expressing a total 
ban on building settlements. Nevertheless, the group managed to agree to a 
formulation reading that: Israeli workshop participants considered settlements 
in the Occupied Territories to represent an obstacle to peace and insisted that 
settlements and all related activities should be stopped.  
The third party then recaptured that the group had been able to agree to 
three joint formulations on nationhood, finality of agreement, and settlement 
policy, which they found to be a very good result. They also showed 
themselves happy about the progress that had been made on the very difficult 
issue of the right of return They felt that most participants learned something 
new with regard to the topic, which should be considered as a successful 
outcome, considering that all workshop participants were already very 
knowledgeable about the matter. They reminded the group that not having 
reached an agreement on a joint formulation on the topic was not to be 
considered as having failed but that the decrease of the gap between the two 
sides’ perception was an achievement. Furthermore, it would still be possible 
for the group members to reach an agreement at some point in the future.  
 
Reflections 
The agreed formulations regarding the two parties' conception of 
nationhood, the finality of a negotiated agreement, and Israeli settlement policy 
show that identity elements have been successfully negotiated. The most 
prominent element among them surely is the inclusion of the other party's 





existence as a nation into the identity perception of each group. This move was 
only possible, because each group heard and understood the other's concerns 
and needs and because both groups were able to comprehensively communicate 
their understanding to the other. Thereby one group was able to formulate their 
conditions in terms that were non-threatening and acceptable to the other 
group.  
 
During the last session of the third Continuing Workshop meeting the 
group looked again at the formulations they managed to agree on. The third 
party encouraged the participants to think about possible ways to make further 
use of the formulations also with regard to the future of the group. The third 
party reminded the group members that, according to their initial agreement, 
these formulations could be published as long as they were kept confidential in 
the sense that none of its content would be attributed to a specific person.  
A Palestinian participant said to have reread the formulations and to feel 
happy about the achievement they all made together and congratulated the 
group on that. 
An Israeli participant suggested that the group should meet again for at 
least one more time to discuss the link of the Israeli-Palestinian with the Israeli-
Arab conflict, the right to self-determination and its implications, security, the 
future status of Jerusalem, insurrection and terrorism, settlements and future 
procedures in relation to them, as well as the refugee problem. Another Israeli 
participant asked what the group should do if the current peace process failed. 







A Palestinian group member found that to be a good idea.  
Another Israeli participant added that even if the group was not to meet 
again, the meetings had been very important, as each party's understanding of 
their anxieties and fears increased as well as their knowledge of what motivated 
their actions. The participant was sure that many group members would be able 
to use the new insight within the framework of their professional activities.  
A Palestinian group member found the agreed-upon formulations should 
be disseminated among the public of both sides as it would reassure them and 
make them more ready to believe in the possibility of a conflict settlement. 
Further, the participant suggested informing the Israeli, Palestinian and US 
leaderships about the newly gained insight on how gaps between Israelis and 
Palestinians could be bridged. The participant envisaged sending the group's 
formulations together with an explanatory cover letter to opinion leaders on 
each side as well as to people in Baker's entourage.  
An Israeli participant agreed with that and was in favor of publishing 
their achievement with names as that would prevent suspicion among potential 
audiences on both sides and provide more weight to their endeavor. The 
participant further suggested to include Palestinians from Jerusalem in future 
meetings and to continue to prepare discussion papers in advance.  
A Palestinian participant agreed to the suggestion of making the names 
of the group members known when publishing the formulations and added that 
a publication should include a statement on the fact that the workshop activities 
had been active prior to the current peace process as an ongoing effort and that 
it was not just a reaction to the official procedure. The participant continued to 
stress that this workshop had shown how important it was to address the Israeli 





public and alter their conflict perception. The opportunity to do so should 
therefore not be missed.  
An Israeli participant expressed to have difficulties with signing a 
document produced by a group that counted a member of the PLO.  
The group then agreed to only publish the results of the workshop in 
their own names or anonymously.  
A Palestinian group member then asked how it would be possible to 
reassure their respective communities that way.  
An Israeli participant answered that one way of reassurance would result 
from participants' personal testimonies in conversation with compatriots about 
the stand of Palestinians and Israelis on issues discussed in the workshop. For 
example, if an Israeli participant were to be asked about a specific issue and the 
chances to reach agreement on it with the Palestinians, the participant would be 
able to give a steadfast answer and justify it with testifying of personally 
having discussed it with an influential Palestinian.  
The third party explained that the group members should make two 
important distinctions with regard to dissemination. One was to distinguish 
between signing a document and saying to have met with this or that person. 
The other was about distinguishing between a political manifesto and 
statements that resulted from an exercise of jointly finding formulations to 
which both sides could agree. They repeated that the group agreed on 
disseminating their formulations without referring to people’s names and 
providing information that would allow for indirectly identifying names.  
The group then engaged in a discussion about the future of the 






as far as possible for at least one next meeting. Only at a later stage if, for 
example, they would agree to annual meetings participants could vary.  
The third party said that with regard to the workload it would be 
reasonable to schedule two more meetings. To make that possible the group 
members would all have to commit themselves to support fundraising and 
engage in preparatory work.  
Group members were very firm on providing that commitment and 
offered to write a joint Palestinian-Israeli letter to potential donors. They 
further agreed on keeping the format and ground rules of the workshop and on 























                                                
Notes  
 
1 Anderson defined a nation as "an imagined political community". According 
to Anderson a nation is imagined because the members of even the smallest 
nation will never know most of their fellow-members, yet in the mind of each 
lives the image of their community (Anderson, 1991: 6). To underline his 
designation Anderson quotes Seton-Watson's definition that "a nation exists 
when a significant number of people in a community consider themselves to 




































6     Interactive Problem Solving during Official Negotiations  
 
Before the continuing group was able to convene again, the US and the 
USSR launched the official Peace Process in Madrid on October 30, 1991. 
Participation of the parties to the negotiations followed a formal letter of 
invitation from the conveners dated October 18, containing the parameters for 
the peace conference. The convening of the Madrid Conference and the 
ensuing negotiations owed much to the strong position of the United States 
after the Gulf War and its willingness to confirm its credibility in the Middle 
East as well as to the diplomatic abilities of US Secretary of State, James 
Baker. By engendering the formation of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian 
delegation, Baker managed to broker the diametrically different positions 
between the Palestinians, who wanted to negotiate the parameters of a 
Palestinian state with PLO representatives and Israel, who wanted to negotiate 
an autonomy status for the Palestinians without the participation of the PLO. 
Baker also found a new form of negotiations by splitting them into different 
tracks that persuaded Israel and its Arab neighbors to participate in an official 
peace process.  
Forming the joint delegation was a lengthy process, marked by the 
Palestinian effort to obtain more independence as a negotiation partner. The 
formation of the joint delegation relied on a Jordanian-Palestinian agreement, 
which stipulated that the Jordanian part of the delegation would hold talks 
regarding Jordanian issues, while the Palestinian team would handle the 
Palestinian track. The joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation represented both a 






key Palestinian concession to Israeli demands as well as a sort of compromise 
between the two positions. To meet Israeli demands for not negotiating directly 
with the PLO, the Palestinian delegation counted only Palestinian 
representatives from the West Bank and Gaza (no residents of Jerusalem) who 
were not associated with the PLO (Aly, 1994: 40). To meet Palestinian and 
Arab demands for making the PLO the only legitimate representative of the 
Palestinian people, the Palestinian representatives in the joint delegation would 
have equal status as their Jordanian colleagues Further, the Palestinian part of 
the joint delegation was able to establish a group of experts, including 
Palestinian residents of Jerusalem, which would de facto consult with the PLO 
(Bentsur, 2001). With the indirect control of the negotiations by the PLO, 
Israel's condition was only technically fulfilled.  
 
A Three-Tier Process 
The new form of negotiations within the Madrid framework consisted of 
a three-tier process. The three-tier format enabled the conflict parties to 
negotiate in separate yet complementary tracks and thereby disentangled some 
of the protracted Arab-Israeli conflict issues. The first tier contained the 
opening Madrid Conference and met Arab demands for an international 
conference. Next to Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinians, 
representatives of the European Community, the Gulf Cooperation Council and 







The second tier contained bilateral negotiations between Israel and 
Syria, Israel and Lebanon and Israel and the joint Jordanian-Palestinian 
delegation. The negotiations aimed at achieving peace treaties between Israel 
and the Arab confrontation states and at reaching an agreement for the 
establishment of interim self-rule for Palestinian Arabs. The bilateral talks 
hosted the first-ever public direct talks between Israel and its neighbors, apart 
from Egypt, and signaled a breakthrough in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a 
Palestinian delegation was participating in official negotiations with Israel for 
the first time.  
The third tier contained multilateral negotiations, which were to be 
attended by not only by Israel and its immediate neighbors but also by other 
Arab countries like Saudi Arabia, the US, Russia, the EC, Canada, Japan, 
Turkey and others who wished to help resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. The 
multilateral track aimed at building confidence and at improving social-
economic conditions in the Middle East. The negotiations comprised five 
forums, each focusing on a major regional issue including water supply, 
environment, arms control, refugees and economic development.  
The Madrid framework upheld that negotiations between the Jordanian-
Palestinian and the Israeli delegation needed to comply with Security Council 
Resolution 242 and 338, recognize Israel and respect its security interests, and 
follow the formula "land for peace". Land referred to the Occupied Territories 
including East Jerusalem, while peace referred to the full normalization of 
relations among all the involved parties. The extent of Israeli withdrawal from 






Arab territories would be determined through negotiations. During an overall 
five-year period an autonomous Palestinian entity should be established and 
linked with Jordan in one federal or confederate state. The final status of this 
entity would be determined in renewed negotiations after a three-year interim 
period of Palestinian self-rule (Eisenberg and Caplan, 1998).  
During the first round of bilateral talks, held between 3rd and 4th of 
November, Palestinian delegates handed their Israeli counterparts a 24-points 
document as a basis for the official start of their negotiations in December, 
which Israel rejected.  
Israeli delegates refused to participate in the second round of talks in 
Washington in December, because they disagreed with the stipulations of the 
Jordanian-Palestinian agreement underlying the joint delegation. Israel refused 
to hold separate talks with the Palestinian part of the delegation and insisted on 
negotiating with the joint delegation over both Palestinian and Jordanian tracks. 
As a result, Palestinians and Jordanians proposed to form a Palestinian team 
containing two Jordanian representatives and a Jordanian team containing two 
Palestinian representatives, which Israel finally accepted at the onset of the 
third negotiation round (Abbas, 1995).  
In reaction to continued Israeli settlement activities, Palestinian 
delegates refused to enter the third round of negotiations in January 1992, until 
UN Security Council Resolution 726 condemned Israeli procedures. The 







Governing Authority (PISAG), which would have legislative, executive and 
judicial powers in all domains except external security. Its legislative assembly, 
elected by Palestinians living in the Occupied Territories, would be the source 
of authority. Following the Palestinian proposal, the Israeli side came under 
great US pressure to offer concrete propositions on their part for the parameters 
of Palestinian self-rule (Baker, 1992).  
During the fourth negotiation round on February 24, Israeli delegates 
presented a draft document, containing ideas for peaceful coexistence during 
the Interim period, while the Palestinian delegation presented an expanded 
outline of the PISAG, containing concepts, preliminary measures and election 
modalities. The Israelis tried to avoid the issue of elections, speaking instead of 
the delegation of administrative powers from Israel to the Palestinians in 
administration of justice, administrative personnel matters, agriculture, 
education and culture, budget and taxation, health, industry, commerce and 
tourism, Labor and social welfare, local police, local transportation and 
communications, municipal affairs, and religious affairs. The content of the two 
documents demonstrated how far apart the positions on either side were at that 
time. 
During the fifth negotiation round between April 27 and 30, the 
Palestinian delegation wrote off the Israeli proposition to hold municipal 
elections in five West Bank cities as a delaying tactic and an attempt to 
circumvent a comprehensive interim phase agreement (Mansour, 1993).  






After five rounds of futile discussions between the Jordanian-Palestinian 
and the Israeli delegation within the framework of the official peace process, 
the Continuing Group convened again for consultative meetings.  
 
Reflections 
The bilateral talks between the Palestinian and the Israeli delegations 
were confronted with difficulties from the start. For one, the parties lacked 
commitment to the negotiation process because they did not participate out of 
motivation to solve their conflict but because both parties had too much to lose 
from declining the US invitation. The way parties were pressured to attend the 
peace conference prevented them to explore tentative options for bridging the 
gap between their fundamental differences (Kelman, 1992).  
The parties were not negotiating on an equal footing. First, the 
appointment of Palestinian delegates was constrained by the Israeli refusal to 
negotiate with representatives of the PLO or Palestinians living in Jerusalem.  
Second, Israelis and Palestinians did not depart from the same premises 
nor did they negotiate for a congruent objective. The Palestinians aimed at 
negotiating the basis for a Palestinian state on the grounds of the 1947 UN 
Partition Resolution 181. Further, Palestinians wanted Jerusalem to become the 
capital of a future Palestinian state as an expression of the Palestinian right to 
self-determination. For Israelis, the UN partition plan had become outmoded. 







Israeli delegation aimed at determining the guidelines for a Palestinian 
autonomy status. Jerusalem did not appear on the negotiation agenda of the 
Israeli delegation, as it was perceived to be the eternal capital of Israel. Third, 
the ambiguous reference to Resolution 242 made by the US during the 
preparation phase of the peace process obstructed the official talks. The letter 
of invitation to the Peace Conference stated that only the final status of the 
Palestinian territories would be subject to the Resolution 242 stipulation for 
Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Territories. The US letter of assurance to 
the Palestinians issued the same day as the invitation, failed to provide that 
kind of specification but gave indications that the Resolution would guide all 
the stages of the negotiations. This ambiguity was constructive to convene the 
Madrid Conference, as everybody felt their interests to be met, but very 
obstructive to engage in real negotiations, as Israelis and Palestinians felt that 
they were not talking to each other on the same ground at all (Said Aly, 1994).  
With regard to the national identity perception of the two conflict 
parties, the start of the official negotiations demonstrated, that the political 
elites on each side held on to the status quo. Refusal to accept the PLO as a 
negotiation partner reflected Israeli refusal to acknowledge Palestinian national 
existence. Palestinian insistence on departing from territorial distribution of the 
1947 partition plan as well as Israeli refusal to engage in negotiating 
parameters of a two-state solution reflected, that national identity perception of 
either side had not expanded towards accepting new parameters with regard to 
territorial ownership.  






Intermediary Consultation Meetings of the Continuing Group 
The start of the official talks introduced new factors that needed to be 
considered for the structuring of further workshops. To discuss these factors the 
third party convened three consultation meetings with subgroups of the 
Continuing Workshop in May 1992 (Kelman and Rouhana, 1994).  
The discussions of the consultation meetings circulated around how the 
workshop format needed to respond to the fact that the discussions were no 
longer an instrument of pre-negotiation. Some participants feared the public 
might construe the meetings as a parallel process to the official meetings and 
that this might harm the workshop and its participants. Four out of the six 
Palestinian participants had become part of the official process either as 
members of the negotiation team or as consultants thereof (some of the Israeli 
participants would become involved in the negotiation team after the election 
of the Rabin government in June 1992). It thus became necessary to consider 
whether their participation in the official negotiations would overlap in a 
problematic way with their participation in the Continuing Workshop.  
After taking all the different aspects into consideration, the participants 
decided together with the third party that it was necessary to convene a forth 








Fourth Meeting of the Continuing Workshop in July 1992 
 Shortly after a new Labor government was elected in Israel on June 23, 
1992, the Continuing Group convened their fourth meeting. The discussions 
focused on the new reality, which the Peace Process and the Israeli election had 
introduced, as well as on the new role of the participants who were engaged in 
the official process. The group was busy finding out whether and how these 
participants would manage to be part of a formal and an informal peace 
initiative at the same time. An Israeli as well as a Palestinian group member felt 
that they could not fulfill both roles and decided not to take part in the fourth 
meeting. Other participants involved in the formal process found the two 
engagements to be combinable.  
The third party asked a Palestinian group member who was part of the 
official delegation how the participant viewed that double role with regard to 
eventual future meetings of the group.  
The Palestinian participant answered that a continued activity would 
depend on what function the group would choose to take on in the light of new 
developments. The participant saw a variety of possible future functions for the 
group; some of them would allow for simultaneous formal and informal 
engagements, while others would not.  
 The third party asked whether the participant could think of concrete 
criteria for the function of the workshops that would allow for a double role of 
group members.  
 The Palestinian participant took the view that it would be necessary to 
establish equilibrium between group members who were official delegates of 






the negotiation teams and members who were not, but who were closely in 
touch with the public on each side.  
 The third party agreed to that thought but saw difficulties of upholding 
the continuous character of the existing group with four out of six Palestinians 
being engaged in the formal endeavor while a lot less of the Israeli group 
members were involved. A third party member suggested that the Israeli 
participants could think about how they could establish a close relationship to 
their public and to those engaged in the official talks, in order to balance the 
situation.  
 Some of the Israeli participants voiced concerns about their ability to do 
that. One of them then found that there should be more informal groups like 
their own. The participant envisioned establishing up to a hundred Track II 
groups each counting 10 to 12 influential members of the respective 
communities that would meet on a monthly basis. The participant showed 
motivation to raise funds for such a compound of informal groups, as an effort 
of that scope could a have multiplied impact and decisively influence decision-
making processes.  
The third party considered that the future of their effort would have to 
respond to the nature of the peace process. It was necessary to look at possible 
future scenarios in order to decide what form of informal initiatives would 
complement the general peace process in an efficient manner. For this purpose 
the third party introduced the following three possible scenarios for official 







1) if the negotiations had a difficult start, were to stagnate or even fail 
completely, the continuing group would remain with their original 
workshop format of discussing how to overcome obstacles to 
engaging in negotiations; 
2) if the official process was to be difficult and prolonged, the group 
could look at problems and develop alternative solutions through 
creative problem solving, which could not be done within the 
framework of official talks; 
3) if the official negotiation process was to be smooth and successful, 
the continuing group could engage in peace-building activity; 
For the time being the third party suggested to keep the group’s focus on 
tackling issues that blocked official talks, or on elaborating peace-building 
measures. 
 
* * * 
 
In a next session, the group addressed as one of the most prominent 
issues the Palestinian interim self-government, which had been the primary 
item on the official agenda. To start the discussion, some Palestinian 
participants gave an outline of how the Palestinian interim self-government had 
been presented and discussed at the official negotiations: 
4) in terms of territory, the interim self-government would comprise the 
land that was occupied during the 1967 war, including East 
Jerusalem; 






5) in terms of authority, the interim self-government needed to be 
established through elections voted for by Palestinians living in the 
Occupied Territories and by no other way, the elected authority 
should extend to the use of land and roads, as well as to economic, 
social and religious affairs; 
6) in terms of jurisdiction, the interim self-government was intended to 
become the only authority in charge as it was not acceptable nor 
implemental to have two sets of rules applying to the same piece of 
land;  
7) in terms of durability, the interim self-government should – as its 
name implies – be a transitional phase in terms of the guidelines 
provided by the UN Resolution 242, and be in place only until all 
Israeli troops had been able to withdraw from the land occupied 
since 1967 according to the principles of the land for peace formula.  
 
Other Palestinian group members added that Palestinians needed a 
neutral body to monitor a free and democratic election. The presence of such a 
body should grant freedom of political expression and organization as well as 
free movement. Israeli authorities should no longer hinder Palestinians in their 
free movement, arrest them for their political views, and should release 
political prisoners. Once elections had been run successfully, the Palestinian 







enforce law and order, to maintain security, and to strengthen their police force 
with regard to handling problems with settlers and the Israeli army.  
 Israeli participants, then, asked whether Israeli security forces were to be 
deployed on the east or the west side of the Green Line.  
 Palestinian group members replied that they respected Israeli security 
concerns with regard to that and would leave the decision up to them. They 
added that this was also the case in terms of legislation. According to the US 
stand on the issue, the Palestinian interim self-government should only have 
legislation on certain issues. The Palestinian participants were ready to limit 
their legislation in cases where Israeli security responsibilities would be 
contradicted as long as the basis of Palestinian legislative authority was not 
jeopardized.  
 A third party member asked who would decide about granting entrance 
to passengers to the West Bank during the interim period.  
 Palestinian participants answered that the right to passage would be 
extended to include people that did not have the right to pass the borders so far.  
 Israeli group members asked how the passage of bridges in those areas 
would be regulated.  
 Palestinian participants answered that they should be under joint control 
and that the fees for passage should be the same for everyone and shared 
equally between the Palestinian and Israeli authorities.  
 Israeli participants then inquired how their Palestinian colleagues felt 
about the prospect of agreeing to an interim arrangement and whether they 
would want to avoid it if they had the possibility.  






 Palestinian group members affirmed that they disliked the proposed 
interim arrangement because they found it flawed. They criticized that 
Palestinians living outside the West Bank and Gaza had not been allowed to 
participate in the official negotiations.  
 The third party reminded the group that it was interesting to talk about 
the realities of the formal negotiations, but that the purpose of the continuing 
group was to engage in a discussion that was free of official constraints. They 
motivated the group to forget about official limitations and try to think freely 
again about ways for solving current problems that would be satisfactory to the 
people in the room and then see how these ideas could be fitted into the larger 
process.  
 In response to that statement Palestinian participants said that the 
objective would be to find a way for Palestinians to live in dignity and freedom. 
This would allow both Palestinian and Israeli to grow and thrive. The question 
was how to find a formula that would respond to their needs and hopes and 
provide a multi-group arrangement allowing both sides to grow culturally and 
economically on a basis of equality while recognizing their respective national 
objectives.  
 Israeli participants said that it looked as if the interim period was 
imposed on the Palestinians and asked whether they personally disliked the 
idea of it.  
 Palestinian group members replied that an interim period was necessary. 







the final step. They explained that a clear picture of the final status of a future 
Palestinian state would reassure Palestinians, that interim arrangements 
represented a step along the way and would make it much easier for them to 
negotiate measures for a transitional period. 
 Some Israeli participants replied that the interim period should be seen 
as a way to change perceptions of the two publics and bridge the gap between 
their positions. Palestinians should not insist on getting confirmation from the 
Israelis on the final status of the Palestinian future polity right now. According 
to the Israeli participants, the fact that the Israeli government saw the state’s 
security endangered by making concessions to the Palestinians now, did not 
rule out that a change in position would become possible, once Palestinians 
managed to work out an efficient governmental structure. With such 
developments in place, the Israeli public would also become ready to accept a 
negotiated solution that would respond to Palestinian aspirations.  
 Other Israeli group members added that the Israelis needed an interim 
period, probably more than the Palestinians did, as an educational phase. Also, 
the participants found it necessary for both parties to have the opportunity to 
sort out a number of issues during that time and thereby preparing the ground 
for a solution that would last.  
 Palestinian participants disagreed with certain aspects of that view. What 
made them feel uncomfortable was its experimental nature that allowed Israelis 
to change their mind if the Palestinian community would not behave according 
to prescribed parameters.  






 Israeli group members said that they had to accept the fact of still being 
in a war-like situation.  
 Palestinian participants countered that the Israelis had the possibility to 
reverse that.  
Israeli participants asked what would happen if the Palestinians failed to 
respond to the agreed upon requirements. 
Palestinian participants replied that in that case they would again have to 
sit together and find new solutions. 
Israeli participants then asked what would happen if the Israelis failed to 
comply with agreed requirements.  
Palestinian participants answered that the Israelis should not accept any 
arrangement that might lead to the destruction of Israel.  
Israeli group members responded they accepted only what would allow 
them to live in peace.  
Palestinian participants countered that the same was true for them. 
Israeli participants closed the conversation by saying that it was still not 
sure whether that was feasible.  
 
* * * 
 
During the final session of the fourth meeting of the Continuing 
Workshop, the group and the third party discussed in depth whether or not it 







take. They agreed that it was impossible to uphold the continuity of the group, 
as four out of six Palestinians were too heavily involved in the official process. 
Even if the current group members felt that the two efforts were compatible on 
political terms, their time-schedules would probably not allow them to commit 
to further meetings. The group generally agreed to keep all options open for 
them to meet again after future developments of the official peace process 
would have become clear and decided to develop a meaningful format and 
group composition at that point in time. The third party asked the group to 
decide about new possibilities on their own and not to wait for an initiative 
from them. The third party made it clear that the mandate for new workshop 
meetings should come from the participants.  
The third party recaptured that the group had worked very well during the 
four meetings. The fact that they had been able to continue to meet and engage 
in fruitful discussions during the height of the Gulf Crisis and alongside official 
negotiations was found to be an achievement by itself. They reminded the 
participants that they had met the aim of the Continuing Workshop. Its aim was 
not to produce a publishable written agreement, but to achieve an exchange of 
views between knowledgeable and influential people from each conflict party 
that would allow them to develop new ideas for possible solutions through joint 
analytical discussions. Through that the each party had managed to reach an 
understanding of the other’s priorities, needs, fears, and constraints.  
During the first meeting the group made a great effort of trying to 
understand what motivated each side’s acts and statements. During the second 
meeting when the dehumanizing events of the Gulf War had led to enormous 






distrust between the two parties and negotiations seemed almost impossible, the 
group was able to create a sense of possibility and work out a lot of ways on 
how to influence the public opinion of their communities. By the time of the 
third meeting, the group had become ready to really engage in joint thinking. 
They were able to analyze specific problems and formulate ideas to solve them 
that were acceptable to both conflict parties. Although the group decided not to 
publish the formulations as a product of the workshop, participants did use the 
newly gained ideas in their writings and political speeches. More than that, 
participants confirmed that they were able to use their new insight in an 
effective manner every day by formulating certain issues in a different way that 
would eventually transform the barriers on either side.  
An Israeli group member described the situation by quoting a statement 
from Churchill saying that this was not the end, not the beginning of the end, 
but the end of the beginning. The participant opted to leave the options for 
future meetings open by all means as the group had reached a stage where their 
efforts could achieve a lot of impact. The participant felt that over the course of 
the years, rapprochement and openness in asking and answering questions had 
grown steadily from one meeting to the next among the members of the group. 
In addition to those positive developments the Israeli group member pointed 
out that it was remarkable that so many participants had become involved in the 
official process in one way or another, which reflected a very skilful choosing 
of participants by the third party. Further, the participant found it interesting, 







Israeli participants did not represent their political mainstream and efforts were 
made to take a member of the Likud party into the continuing group, and that 
over a short period of time political realities had changed to such an extent that 
the Israeli group members had indeed become mainstream representatives.  
A Palestinian participant suggested that the group should remain in 
contact for arranging a meeting after the next round of official talks in which 
the new developments could be discussed and a future format for the workshop 
group could be developed.  
The third party welcomed that proposition and asked the participants to 
take the responsibility of forming a team on each side. The third party could 
then propose a new agenda from which the participants could choose possible 
discussion topics.  
 
Reflections 
Remarkably, the continuing group was able to address the salient issue, 
astonishingly through the remarks of the Israeli party, that the parameters of the 
officially proposed Palestinian interim self-rule had been imposed on the 
Palestinian community. This shows how the informal nature of dialogue groups 
and the established discussion culture of continual meetings allowed the 
approach of conflict issues that were difficult to tackle in an official setting.  
Thereby, one of the realities that had acted as a barrier during the 
official talks surfaced during the fifth workshop. The parties pointed out that 
there had been a lack of participation, or of the possibility for participation, on 






the Palestinian side with regard to the preparatory stage of the official 
negotiations and the setting of parameters for an interim phase.  
Furthermore, it became clear that the Palestinian community lacked 
official reassurance from the Israeli side about the finality of the future 
Palestinian polity. The informal discussion format allowed the Israeli party to 
explain that their government was unable to confirm how a final solution would 
look like because it equaled a threat to the existence of their state. They assured 
their Palestinian colleagues that this inability did not mean that the Palestinian 
vision of their future polity was unattainable.  
In return Palestinian participants were able to reassure Israeli group 
members that they understood the centrality of safeguarding the existence of 
the Israeli state and their focus on security. Thereby they addressed another 
major issue that acted as a barrier during the official talks.  
Quintessentially, both parties were able to say to each other that their 
shared interest was to build the groundwork that allowed both of them to live in 
peace and security. Unlike the delegations of the official negotiation process, 
workshop participants were able to find common ground, on the basis of which 
possible parameters of their future relationship could be explored.  
 
Fifth Meeting of the Continuing Workshop in 1993 
 Due to the developments of the official peace process, three members of 
the Palestinian team were no longer able to attend the meetings. The third party 







Continuing Workshop. The new situation meant for existing group members to 
integrate the new arrivals. The group reflected on the future of the Continuing 
Workshop and although they could not decide on how to proceed in light of the 
new situation they did not decide to discontinue the meetings.  
 
 Secret Negotiations   
After the Israeli elections in June 1992, the Norwegian Foreign Minister 
Thorvald Stoltenberg authorized his deputy, Jan Egeland, to contact the Israeli 
Deputy Foreign Minister, Yossi Beilin, with the suggestion to arrange a 
meeting with high-ranking representatives of the PLO. For Beilin such a 
meeting was not possible, as Israeli law still prohibited contact with the PLO. 
Beilin referred Egeland to his friends and colleagues Yair Hirschfeld and Ron 
Pundak. Both of them were historians and had worked with Beilin in his 
research group called Economic Cooperation Foundation. The small think-tank 
was dedicated to finding ways to advance peace through direct contact with 
Palestinians (Egeland, 1999).  
To facilitate further contacts, Egeland was helped by his friend Terje 
Rod Larson, a sociologist and the director of the Norwegian Institute for 
Applied Social Sciences in Oslo called FAFO, which had been conducting a 
field study on living conditions in the Occupied Territories, as well as by Mona 
Juul, Larson's wife, who worked as Egeland's assistant.  
Before attending a university seminar in London, Hirschfeld had 
consulted Hanan Ashrawi, the spokeswomen of the Palestinian delegation to 
the Madrid Conference, about further possibilities to enhance Israeli-






Palestinian contacts. Ashrawi offered to speak to Ahmed Qurei, known as Abu 
Ala, whom she believed to be interested in the link between peace and 
economic development and coordinated the Palestinian participation in the 
multilateral talks held in London at that time. Larson happened to be based in 
London as well and was instrumental in convincing Hirschfeld to meet with 
Abu Ala. The two agreed to an exploratory meeting in Norway (Corbin, 1994).  
The first brainstorming session between Hirschfeld, Pundak, Qurei, 
Hassan Asfur, a political advisor to the PLO in Tunis, and Maher El Kurd, a 
Palestinian economist, took place on January 21, 1993 in Borregaard, Norway. 
The meeting occurred only two days after the Israeli Knesset abrogated the law 
forbidding contact with the PLO. The five men were supported by Egeland, 
Larsen, and Juul, but were left alone to discuss their issues. The talks went 
well. Both sides shared the view that the talks should not just be an academic 
meeting but should serve the aim of developing ideas on how to reach 
agreement and thereby working towards a "Declaration of Principles". Among 
the concrete proposals shared between the two sides, was Abu Ala's statement 
that the peace process would have to start with the withdrawal of Israeli forces 
from the Occupied Territories and should occur first in Gaza. The coastal strip 
would be a testing ground for working out the mechanisms of returning control 
to the Palestinians. The PLO representative knew that this concept was 
attractive to the Israelis and thereby showed his commitment to the informal 







both sides consulted with their superiors and were advised to continue without 
any further official involvement.  
During the next session on February 12, Abu Ala, Asfur, and El Kurd 
presented a plan containing terms of reference for an interim agreement on 
autonomy for the Occupied Territories and what jurisdiction the Palestinians 
would have during the interim period. The plan called for implementation of a 
final accord settling the status of the disputed land and set aims for negotiations 
to reach that aim. Further, the plan contained references to Jerusalem and 
included a massive international aid effort: a Marshall Plan for Gaza.  
The Israeli team presented a paper, echoing the concept of Gaza First 
and containing ideas about economic cooperation. Most importantly, 
Hirschfeld and Pundak introduced the idea of "graduality", a staged withdrawal 
of Israeli forces and gradual establishment of an interim autonomous regime 
first in Gaza and then in other parts of the Occupied Territories. Hirschfeld 
suggested transferring one authority after another, month by month. Thereby, 
matters like health, education and cultural affairs could be handed over one by 
one. The February meeting ended on a high note. The two groups managed to 
synthesize their two proposals into one Declaration of Principles (Pundak, 
2002).  
When Beilin was informed about the idea of gradualism he was 
positively surprised. The principle of gradualism allowed for a halt to the 
process or a reversing of it, if anything should go wrong. This met with the 
Israeli official objective and would calm security concerns that had blocked the 
peace process. The even bigger surprise was that the Palestinian leadership 






accepted the prospect of proceeding gradually. Beilin informed Foreign 
Minister Shimon Peres about the draft document and the latter informed Rabin. 
Although they were both in favor of the development, no further involvement 
of the Israeli government occurred (Beilin, 1999).  
The group continued to meet. In April, Abu Ala introduced – on behalf 
of Arafat – the idea that the Israelis should withdraw from Gaza and Jericho 
simultaneously and pushed for increased official involvement from the Israelis. 
After some phone conversations with the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, Beilin 
was ready to consider further involvement in the secret channel if Abu Ala 
were able to prove that Arafat was really behind him and that he could deliver 
what he promised. At the next two rounds of the official bilateral talks Abu 
Ala, who was still chairing the Palestinian steering committee, was able to 
prove his influence This ultimately let Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin to send 
Uri Savir, the Director-General of Israel's Foreign Ministry, in May and Joel 
Singer, a former negotiator of the Camp David Accords, in June to join the 
team. Involvement of the senior officials on both sides turned the informal 
Norwegian track into an official secret channel of negotiations between the 
PLO and the government of Israel. 
By July, new points were added to the discussion, points that clearly 
showed the involvement of each side's political leadership. As a result the talks 
became more comprehensive but also more strenuous. First, the Israeli 
representatives introduced a new document that altered the previously agreed 







Nevertheless, the group managed to alter the paper and include Palestinian 
demands. In the end only five points remained to be resolved: the inclusion of 
UN Resolutions 242 and 338, permanent status negotiations, the Gaza/Jericho 
First approach, elections in Jerusalem, and the fate of Palestinians displaced 
during the 1967 war.  
At the next meeting the Palestinians presented a completely changed 
proposal that shocked the Israelis. The proposal employed "Palestine Liberation 
Organization" wherever "Palestinian" had been used before. It further 
stipulated that the Palestinians should have control over the passage between 
Gaza and Jericho and proposed that this passage should be a wide linking road 
belonging to Palestinian territory. When the Israelis refused to consider the new 
document, the Palestinians offered to go back to the original Declaration of 
Principles. The Israelis, however, insisted on continuing with the document 
they had been working on to resolve the five outstanding points. After some 
shuttle diplomacy between the Norwegian Foreign Minister and the leaderships 
in Israel and Tunis to foster trust in the endeavor on both sides, the group met 
again.  
Despite diplomatic efforts, the Palestinian document changed only to 
exclude East Jerusalem and the road between Gaza and Jericho of the blueprint 
for interim arrangements, but did not pick up on the points that had been 
discussed on the basis of the Israeli document. The group then decided to take 
both of the two new documents and try to combine them by going through 
them word by word in order to find a compromise. This plan proved to be 
unfeasible, as sixteen points of the twenty-five under discussion remained 






unresolved, and the talks faced a serious crisis. Abu Ala announced his 
resignation. Savir countered that move by stating that this proved how the PLO 
would never seize the opportunity to make real peace, and that they cared more 
about themselves than about the Palestinian people, who would be forced to 
continue living in hardship just because of sixteen open points in a close 
agreement. Hirschfeld backed Savir's statement by saying that he felt misled by 
the PLO, that the Israeli representatives would have to tell their leadership that 
the gap between the two could never be bridged, and that this would slam the 
door on finding a solution to the conflict for generations to come (Corbin, 
1994).  
The situation was reversed, when Savir had the idea of splitting the 
sixteen open points into two packages of eight. Each side should choose eight 
points on which they and their political community were flexible. In a next 
step, each team should convince their leaderships to compromise on those 
points and make a concession to the other side, which should encourage a 
reciprocal concession. He suggested that the Israeli team should focus on 
security issues, while the Palestinians should concentrate on the Gaza/Jericho 
First deal. In addition, Savir and Singer had prepared an agreement stating that 
Israel would formally recognize the PLO as the official representative of the 
Palestinian people, while in return Yasser Arafat's organization would 
recognize Israel's right to exist and renounce violence. After some "go-







agreed on going ahead with the two documents and work towards obtaining 
confirmation from their leaderships (Savir, 1999). 
At their next meeting on August 13, the group managed to close all open 
points except for the security aspects of the Gaza/Jericho First approach. When 
Abu Ala failed to receive the necessary concessions on the outstanding issues 
from Arafat, the Israeli Foreign Minister, Shimon Peres, closed the final gap. 
Peres was supposed to pay an official visit to Scandinavia on August 17 and 
meet with Johan Jorgen Holst, his Norwegian counterpart, in Stockholm. Holst, 
as the representative of the Israeli party, discussed over the phone with the 
Palestinian party in Tunis the last outstanding points and managed to hammer 
out an agreement that satisfied both of them. Each side held out for its most 
crucial concerns, the Israelis for the security of their people and the PLO for the 
Gaza/Jericho First agreement as a first step along the road to self-government 
in the Occupied Territories (Egeland, 1999).  
 
Declaration of Principles 
The final agreement contained concrete steps for a Palestinian self-
governing structure with the following parameters: The Gaza Strip and the 
West Bank town of Jericho would be transferred to the authority of a 
Palestinian self-government that would have more powers than an autonomous 
or self-ruled entity. Free movement would be granted between the two parts of 
the Gaza-Jericho area. An autonomy status would apply to the rest of the West 
Bank, while the status of Jerusalem would remain unchanged. For the 
administration of Gaza-Jericho a council would be appointed. To govern the 






rest of the West Bank the local population would elect an administrative 
authority. On August 20, 1993, Peres – celebrating his seventieth birthday on 
that day – witnessed Abu Ala and Savir sign the historic agreement entitled 
"Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements" (Savir, 
1999).  
Two weeks later, on September 9, the Letters of Mutual Recognition 
were exchanged between Arafat and Rabin containing the points hammered out 
by Savir and Ala transforming the two parties from enemies to neighbors. 
Arafat's letter confirmed the PLO commitment to the recognition of the state of 
Israel, to the acceptance of UN Resolutions 242 and 338, and to the peaceful 
resolution of the conflict and all outstanding issues relating to permanent status 
through negotiations. Rabin's responding letter confirmed that the Israeli 
government had decided to recognize the PLO as the representative of the 
Palestinian people and commence negotiations with the PLO within the Middle 
East peace process (Buchanan, 2000).  
On September 13, the Declaration of Principles was officially sealed 
with Yassir Arafat signing for the PLO and Shimon Peres signing for the State 
of Israel in Washington. The Declaration was designed as a preamble defining 
the principles of Palestinian self-government in the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
and providing a framework for further negotiations, and did not claim to be a 
final settlement of the conflict.  
As stated in Article I, the primary aim of the Declaration was the 







Council – for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip for a 
transitional period of not more than five years and leading to a permanent 
settlement based on UN Security Council Resolution 242 and 338. More 
concretely, the Declaration of principles laid out a central timetable for the 
transitional period, which was to begin with the withdrawal of the Israeli 
Military (IDF) from the Gaza Strip and Jericho in the West Bank. In the wake 
of the IDF withdrawal, arrangements were to be made for the transfer of 
authority to the Palestinian residents of these zones in the areas of education 
and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism.  
 Further, the Declaration of Principles stated that members of the Council 
were to be selected through general elections and the Council's jurisdiction 
would cover the West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that 
would be decided during the Permanent Status negotiations. The structure, 
makeup and authority of the Council were, however, not made explicit in the 
Declaration of Principles. Instead, these issues were to form the substance of an 
interim agreement to be negotiated subsequently by Palestinian and Israeli 
delegations.  
 In order to guarantee public order and internal security, the Declaration 
of Principles recognized that the Council would be called upon to establish and 
supervise a Palestinian police force. In reality, the organization and training of 
this force had already begun informally even before the agreement was signed. 
Nevertheless, Israel was to retain responsibility for defending against external 
threats and for the overall security of Israelis living in the Occupied Territories.  






Finally, the Declaration called for permanent status negotiations to 
commence no later than the third year of the interim period. These negotiations 
were to include all remaining issues including the status of Jerusalem, 
Palestinian refugees, the fate of Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories, 




The Norway Channel negotiations produced changes in the national 
identity perception of both parties. When the Israeli team gained official 
support in negotiating directly with PLO representatives, it equaled an implicit 
Israeli acknowledgement of Palestinian nationhood. This confirmed the 
national identities of Palestinians and paved the way for engaging in official 
negotiations.  
The ensuing efforts of both parties showed that they both had moved 
towards accepting to negotiate the parameters of a two-state solution. When the 
Palestinian team accepted the Israeli proposition of a gradual process leading to 
the establishment of a two-state solution, a possibility they had been opposing 
so far, a true shift in their perception surfaced, showing that the Palestinians 
had gained enough trust in the Israeli commitment.     
 The achievements displayed in the Oslo Accords testify of the most 
salient shift in each party's national identity perception. The shift consisted in 







Declaration of Mutual Recognition. Mutual recognition of each other's 
nationhood made direct negotiations between Israel and the PLO possible, to 
which the Declaration of Principles laid the groundwork.  
One of the shortcomings of the accord was that it left the nature of the 
Palestinian polity and its relationship to the State of Israel open to be 
determined in the final status negotiations. Many of the central issues that the 
two parties were supposed to resolve in an interim period, however, depend 
precisely on that nature of the Palestinian future polity.  
 
 Establishment of the Joint Working Group 
After the announcement of the Oslo Agreement, third-party members of 
the Continuing Workshop group organized a meeting in Jerusalem with some 
of the participants. They decided to end the Continuing Workshop and start a 
new effort. They agreed to form a new group and convene further meetings that 
would follow a slightly different format than the Continuing Workshop. They 
felt that the most valuable contribution the group could make at that stage of 
the conflict was to draft joint concept papers on some of the political issues, 
which the Oslo accord had left to be resolved in the final-status negotiations. 
To this end, they established the Joint Working Group in early 1994, as a 
project of the Program on International Conflict Analysis and Resolution 
(PICAR), based at Harvard's University's Weatherhead Center for International 
Affairs in Cambridge, USA.  






After the Gaza-Jericho Agreement H18 was signed on May 4, 1995, the 
Group held its first three sessions and developed a set of general principles to 
guide a final agreement, which would open the way to a durable peace and 
reconciliation. The seven principles included: responsiveness to the needs for 
security, identity, dignity and prosperity as well as to the sense of justice of 
both parties transcending the balance of military, political, economic and 
demographic power; conduciveness to a relationship based on trust and 
equality; comprehensiveness, by including all individuals belonging to each 
people (also those living in the diaspora) and all outstanding issues; acceptance 
of the finality of the agreement balanced by gradualism and flexibility and 
relinquishment of past claims; security arrangements; economic well-being; 
national rights and self-determination.  
During consecutive meetings, the Group drew on these principles to 
evaluate proposed options for resolving outstanding issues. At a later stage the 
Group revised the established principles in the light of new developments and 
published them as a PICAR Working Paper and as an article in the Middle East 
Journal (Joint Working Group, 1998).  
Furthermore, the Group found that without a defined nature of the 
Palestinian polity none of the outstanding issues could be discussed and agreed 
                                                
H18 The Gaza-Jericho Agreement between Israel and the PLO in Cairo established the 
Palestinian Authority and became known as the “land for peace” bargain as Israel 
commitment to turn territory over to the PA, and the Palestinian commitment to 







to base their analysis on the conception of a two-state solution, establishing a 
genuinely independent Palestinian state alongside of Israel.  
 
Concept Paper on the Refugee Problem and Right of Return 
Between 1995 and 1997, in the time-span between the signing of the Taba 
AccordH19 and the conclusion of the Hebron AgreementH20, the Joint Working 
                                                
H19 In the Egyptian resort Taba, Israel and the PLO concluded an interim agreement 
also known as Oslo II, which was signed in Washington on September 28, 1995. In 
general, the agreement dealt with civil affairs, economic relations, legal matters and 
security arrangements. In particular, the agreement included the Palestinian election 
of an 88-member Palestinian Legislative Council. The Accord divided the West Bank 
into area A, B and C. in Area A, Israel was to redeploy from six cities, whose overall 
security would be placed in Palestinian hands. Area B comprised Palestinian towns 
and villages for which Israel would be responsible for security and the Palestinians 
for public order. In area C – covering only unpopulated land – Israel would maintain 
full control. Negotiations for permanent status of the territories were to begin in May 
1996, but were delayed for four years (Enderlin, 2002).  
H20 The Origins of the Hebron Agreement go back to 1994, when an Israeli from 
Kiryat Arba shot 29 Palestinians who were at prayer services at the Tomb of the 
Patriarchs.  
 The Tomb of the Patriarchs is described in the Book of Genesis as the field, 
which Abraham purchased as a burial place for his wife Sarah. According to Jewish 
Tradition, next to Sarah also the Matriarchs Rebecca and Leah the Patriarchs 
Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, are buried in the Tomb. In 1266, the Islamic Mameluke 
rulers of Hebron barred Jews from entering the Tomb of the Patriarchs, allowing 
them only to ascend to the fifth and later the infamous seventh step outside the eastern 
wall.  The incident resulted in demands for Hebron security guarantees from 
Palestinians, which were answered by the Oslo II suggestion to establish an 
International Presence in Hebron.  
 In 1996, riots and violence had brought the Israeli-Palestinian peace process 
close to collapsing. But faith in the peace process continued and on January 15, 1997, 
when the Hebron negotiations were completed, a Protocol concerning the 
Redeployment in Hebron was signed, specifying arrangements for the implementation 






Group engaged in a thorough discussion of the issue of Palestinian refugees 
and the right of return and in this context, resumed their efforts to understand 
each other's national narrative, as some of the group members had started 
during the Continuing Workshop. The Group alternated between plenary group 
discussions and drafting sessions for which a subcommittee was appointed 
consisting of one Israeli and one Palestinian. After the first discussion session 
the subcommittee drafted a first outline identifying options for resolving the 
refugee problem. During the next plenary session, the Group discussed the 
prepared outline, from which the subcommittee prepared a first draft paper. The 
paper went through three drafts until the Joint Working Group was able to 
adopt it (Alpher and Shikaki et al., 1999).  
The concept paper laid out four options for dealing with the issue of 
Palestinian refugees and the right of return and evaluated each of them in terms 
of its responsiveness to the concerns and needs of each side and its conformity 
with the established general principles. The first and second option represented 
the respective preferred solution of the Palestinian and Israeli side, reflecting 
each side's needs and concerns without responding to those of the other side. 
The third and forth option represented compromise solutions from each side 
that try to address the needs and concerns of the other side.  
                                                                                                                                       
of the remaining redeployment provisions of the Oslo II Interim Agreement in three 
phases, ending no later than 1998. The Agreement included Israeli troop withdrawals 







The first two options reflected the radically different narratives of the two 
parties. The Palestinian narrative maintained that Zionists forcibly expelled 
Arab refugees in 1948. Palestinians, therefore, insisted on the right of those 
refugees to return to their homes or to receive compensation. Further, they 
demanded that Israel unilaterally acknowledge its complete moral 
responsibility for the injustice they inflicted on the refugees. The Israeli 
narrative upheld that the Arabs caused the Palestinian refugee problem by 
declaring war upon the newly created State of Israel and therefore refused to 
accept the refugees' right of return. Moreover, Israel saw the return of 
Palestinian refugees as an existential threat, as it would undermine the Jewish 
character and the viability of the state.  
The compromise options narrowed the gap between the two positions but 
did not fully reconcile them. The Palestinian compromise solution maintained 
that Israel acknowledge both its responsibility for creating the refugee problem 
and the individual moral right of Palestinian refugees to return. It recognized, 
however, that in view of the changed situation of the refugees over 50 years, 
and taking into account Israel's constraints, the return of only a "limited" 
number would be feasible. Israel would pay both individual and collective 
compensation. The Palestinians’ case for an Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 
borders would be strengthened as a result of their willingness to absorb the 
refugees in the Palestinian state. The Israeli compromise solution 
acknowledged Israel's share, along with the other parties to the 1948 war, of 
practical but not moral responsibility for the suffering of the refugees, and 
agree that rectification of their plight was a central goal of the peace process. 






The solution further accepted repatriation of tens of thousands of refugees 
under Israel's family reunification program, and payments of collective 
compensation to the Palestinian state if paralleled by Arab State compensation 
for Jewish refugees from 1948.  
 
Reflections 
 The compromise solutions reveal that the participants of the Joint 
Working Group have progressed in negotiating national identity aspects. The 
group members were now able to put in published form that Israel recognized 
its historic role in the events that created the refugee problem and that 
Palestinians realized that a massive exercise of the right of return was 
unrealizable. Israeli participants developed greater trust in Palestinian 
assurance that their future state would absorb a large number of refugees, while 
Palestinian participants received written confirmation that Israeli participants 
agreed that they were entitled to compensation for past grievances.  
Both parties accommodated to a certain degree the view the other side has 
of their own history but have not yet fully understood the suffering of the other 
and failed to fully assume their own responsibility. For example, Israeli 
participants refused to acknowledge moral responsibility for Palestinian 
suffering, while Palestinians did not want to accept that resettlement of 
refugees cannot occur without certain organizational and monetary limitations 
on both sides, and that the reduction to a "limited" number of returning 







Concept Paper on the Future Israeli-Palestinian Relationship 
The framework within which the Joint Working Group discussed the 
issues that the Oslo Accords had left to be resolved in the final-status 
negotiations was the long-term relationship between the two parties once a final 
agreement would have been signed. For each final-status issue, the question for 
the group had been what that relationship needed to look like if the final 
agreement were to provide the basis for a stable peace between the two parties.  
According to the Group, a desirable relationship, granting both societies 
mutually beneficial cooperation, ultimate reconciliation and sustainable peace, 
needed to be embedded in a political agreement acceptable to both parties. The 
only feasible political arrangement on which the desired future relationship 
could be built was a two-state solution (Ma’oz et al., 2000).  
 While the premise of a two-state solution had already formed the basis 
to approach the refugee issue, the group picked up on the content of that 
premise itself in discussions held over the course of several meetings between 
1996 and 1998 with the objective to establish the rationale for a two-state 
solution in a concept paper. The written product resulted again from a mixed 
process between subcommittee drafting, this time including a member of the 
third party in addition to one Israeli and one Palestinian participant, and plenary 
sessions in which the writings were reviewed and modified until the group 
agreed to a final version.  
 According to the Joint Working Group, a two-state solution required that 
both states would be sovereign, viable and secure. The Group, thus, called for 
an end of occupation and for the establishment of a genuinely independent 






Palestinian state with mutually agreed-upon borders existing alongside of 
Israel. The Palestinian state must not be fragmented but free of extraterritorial 
enclaves, able to secure the rights of its citizens, and exercise control over its 
land, resources, and population.  
 Without proposing specific formulas for resolving final-status issues, the 
Joint Working Group sketched a general approach to resolve outstanding 
issues. Conflicting issues should be tackled by addressing both sides’ central 
concerns and by seeking arrangements that are consistent with a genuine two-
state solution and conducive to a desirable future relationship and ultimate 
reconciliation. Issues should be addressed as parts forming a whole, providing 
the possibility for negotiating trade-offs between concessions in different areas. 
The group outlined concrete terms for some of the outstanding issues.  
 The terms stipulated for the area of security – an issue most vital to the 
Israeli side – that each party should be protected by mutually acceptable 
arrangements responsive to both sides’ concerns. Any constraints accepted by 
the Palestinian side would have to be balanced by Israeli reciprocal steps in 
another final-status category.  
 For setting the final borders, the points of departure for negotiations 
would have to be UN Resolution 242 and the 1967 lines. Border negotiations 
would need to respond to both sides’ concerns: Palestinian insistence on the 
1967 lines as the basis for accepting a partitioned Palestine, and Israeli stress 







 The solution of the Jerusalem problem should respect the national, 
cultural, religious, political, legal and historical rights of both peoples. 
Remarkably, the Joint Working Group agreed that Jerusalem should serve as 
the capital of both states being an open and undivided city and offering free 
access to the holy sites.  
 The problem of Israeli settlements should be resolved without 
compromising the Palestinian state and the national rights of its citizens and 
maintain the civil rights of Israelis remaining under Palestinian sovereignty.  
 In a next step, the Joint Working Group drew models and stages for a 
two-state solution describing the precise nature of the relationship between the 
two states and their societies. The Group advocated a relationship that would 
slowly move towards extensive cooperation and institutionalized arrangements, 
given their strong interdependence on issues like security, water supply and 
economic opportunities of participating in each other's markets.  
The Group stressed the importance of building such cooperation in a 
gradual way of two or three stages, giving both societies enough time to 
transform their relationship and prepare for peaceful coexistence and historic 
reconciliation. Stage one would call for political separation of the two states 
and the establishment of essential cooperative arrangements. The separation of 
the two societies into two states would reduce friction and make it easier to 
combat terrorism. It would allow Palestinians to exercise their right to national 
self-determination, while it would help to legitimize Israel and facilitate its 
integration in the region. As a result the security of both states would be 






enhanced and trust between them could develop and engender cooperation. The 
arrangements for Jerusalem would be implemented at the first stage.  
The second stage would consist of establishing closer political, 
economic and cultural ties between the two states. Depending on experiences 
during stage one, such activities would be expanded and eventually 
institutionalized in for example, joint economic ventures, the establishment of 
free trade zones and joint airports and seaports. Also socio-political activities 
would be intertwined in joint meetings of town councils and parliamentary 
groups as well as in professional and cultural activities. During this stage, 
cooperation would increase gradually, based on the experience that such 
activities were of mutual benefit, and enhance trust and respect between the 
two societies. The Group held that, cooperation developed in such a way 
contributes to reconciliation.  
Stage three would involve more integration, based on the establishment 
of joint institutions. The Group recognized that to opt fur such a scenario was 
quite utopian and strengthened that such development was not necessary for 
reconciliation.  
 Lastly, the Group also looked at the general mood of their societies and 
their inclination towards agreeing to a two-state solution. In a poll of the Israeli 
population conducted in May 1999, 78 percent of the respondents indicated that 
they expected that the Peace Process would lead to the establishment of an 
independent Palestinian state, while only 42 percent expressed that they were in 







however, 56 percent of Israelis said that Palestinians deserved a state of their 
own and that the Palestinian demand for an independent state, was morally 
justified1. In a Palestinian poll conducted in June 1999, 45 percent of the 
respondents indicated that they expected the Peace Process to lead to the 
establishment of a Palestinian state, 27 percent were that it would not lead to a 
state while 29 percent said that they were not sure. In 1997, it were still 62 
percent of the Palestinians, who expected the establishment of a state2.  
The approval for a two-state solution had been fluctuating over the 
preceding two years and the Joint Working Group recommended seizing the 
opportunity of realizing a mutually acceptable two-state solution while the 
parties were moving toward final status negotiations and before events could 
overtake the possibility for such a solution.  
For that purpose, the Working Group recommended to start promoting 
the envisaged relationship right away through the fostering of existing 
functional relations – like economic ties, human rights activities, training of 
ambulance drivers and treatment of waste-water – and the development of new 
cooperative activities that work towards closing the political and economic gap 
between the two societies.  
 The Joint Working Group further advocated systematic efforts to change 
hostile attitudes and reduce stereotyped views in order to promote the proposed 
relationship. The Group suggested five types of information that might 
contribute to such change if conveyed in a context of equality and mutually 
rewarding activities, which would make it difficult to dismiss positive qualities 
of the other as atypical and to keep the stereotype intact. The first type of 






information involves getting to know each other's history, religion and culture, 
to establish points of contact and common interest. The second type proposed 
that each side present the other with its national narrative and national self-
image in order to gain understanding of each other’s perspective. In a next step, 
it should become possible for each side to acknowledge the other's experience 
and own truth and thereby learn to respect the claims and concerns resulting 
from that reality. If the parties succeed in learning about the other's experiences 
they could become open toward exposing each other to the variety and 
complexity of their societies and replace the monolithic view with a dynamic 
conception of the other society. The fifth type of knowledge consists of 
exploring common elements between the two societies, like the shared 
Abrahamic background, historic and cultural links as well as common values 
such as the importance of the family.  
 
Reflections 
 It is remarkable that the Joint Working Group managed to agree on 
parameters of a two-state solution incorporating recommendations for solving 
the most central final-status issues. The Group's agreement to publish their 
written statements revealed that it was possible for Israelis and Palestinians to 
conceive of sharing the land that they both claim. This shows that the 
participants have were able to negotiate national identity aspects with regard to 
territorial ownership. This move also included the seemingly insurmountable 







The participants were able to conceive of turning their capital into a shared city 
and envisaged Jerusalem as an open and undivided city with free access to all 
holy sites.  
 
In subsequent meetings of the Joint Working Group a paper on Israeli 
settlements was drafted, which has remained unpublished (Kelman, 2002: 84).   







                                                
Notes:  
 
1 The Joint Working Group cited in “Future Israeli-Palestinian Relationship” 
published in the Middle East Policy in 2000 on page 11, polls conducted by the Tami 
Steinmetz Center for Peace Research at Tel Aviv University.  
2 In the same publication the Joint Working Group cites opinion polls conducted by 
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7  Influence of the Identity Factor on the Peace Process 
 
The influence of the identity factor on the Peace Process will be 
discussed in three steps: by evaluating the long-term impact of IPS as a conflict 
resolution method applied during the Peace Process, by looking at what kind of 
identity changes the method was able to provoke, and by analyzing the nature 
and quality of the observed changes.  
In a first step, the general impact of IPS as a conflict resolution method 
– on the micro-level of workshop discussions as well as on the macro-level of 
Israeli and Palestinian policy-making processes – is evaluated on the basis of 
the author’s personal interviews with former workshop participants.  
In a second step, the specific impact of IPS as an identity management 
tool will be examined. The author first reviews the identity changes that 
appeared in the workshop transcripts prepared by third-party members, and 
assesses whether the six identity elements, as singled out by Kelman, had been 
negotiated during workshop discussions. The author then compares the 
observed findings to the experience of former participants.  
In a third step, the study analyzes the observed identity changes with 
regard to their quality and sustainability, by pointing to different critics of the 
Oslo Accords – some of them former workshop participants – and by referring 
to Kelman’s model of social influence. The observation of events occurring 
during the Peace Process has revealed a number of crucial changes in Israeli 
and Palestinian national identity. At first glance it seemed that these changes 
would be sufficient for the achievement of a comprehensive solution of the 
conflict. The fact that such a solution has not been reached until the present 
day, leads to a questioning of the nature and quality of the observed changes 





 Long-Term Impact of Interactive Problem Solving  
For the purpose of evaluating the long-term impact of IPS, the author 
has interviewed five Palestinians and eight Israelis between 2002 and 2006, 
who have participated either in the Continuing Workshop or in the Joint 
Working Group, or took part in both sets of meetings1. All except one of the 
interviews are included in the annex.  
The interviewees were asked how they rated their experience of 
participating in interactive problem-solving workshops in general, what they 
perceived as positive impacts of the method on the conflict resolution process, 
and what they saw as limitations. They were further asked about new ideas that 
were generated through the discussions and to what extent the new ideas had 
been transferred to the larger policy-making process.  
To account for the view of third party members, the author interviewed 
Herbert C. Kelman and Harold Saunders with regard to their experience with 
the method, how they rated its ability to induce change and transfer change 
from the individual participant to decision-makers.  
The interviewees’ vivid memory of details of discussions held some ten 
years earlier demonstrates that Interactive Problem Solving had a lasting 
impact on workshop participants. The method’s strengths were found to lie in 
uncovering underlying conflict causes, in generating empathy for the suffering 
of the other, and in building respect for both parties’ traditions and beliefs. 
Most of the interviewees on both sides were impressed with the crucial 
additional knowledge they gained about the other party, although they had had 
encounters with members of the other constituency prior to the workshop 
participation. Many referred to the method as engendering a circle of people 
engaged in conflict resolution, giving them the opportunity of getting to know 
influential representatives of the other party and to develop necessary 
communication skills to uphold a sustainable dialogue. A number of the 
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interviewees mentioned that the method managed to generate new ideas and 
provoke a distribution of the new inputs to the wider policy-making process of 
their constituencies. Interestingly, Kelman referred to similar strengths of the 
method that favorably contributed to the Peace Process in his interview with 




On the whole the interviews support that, five of the most prominent 
features of the method’s impact are the development of cadres, training in 
negotiation skills, generating new ideas, transferring new ideas to the policy-
making process, and creating a political atmosphere favorable to official 
negotiations. The ways in which the method has impacted the peace process are 




ideas for conflict solutions, and professional negotiation skills, contribute to a 
successful transfer of new perspectives to the decision-making level and 
prepare the ground for negotiations. These developments create an atmosphere 
that in turn, strengthens and supports ideas spread by former workshop 
participants.  
Israelis and Palestinians mostly agreed on the nature of the effects that 
IPS was able to produce. To sketch a differentiated picture of the participants’ 
evaluation of the method’s impact, the author cites some individual answers of 
representatives from each side.  
 
Developing Cadres 
The term cadre refers to the dozens of Israelis and Palestinians who 
have participated in one or more of the over fifty workshops or similar forms of 
direct communication facilitated by IPS over the years. Through the workshop 
activities this group of people had acquired in-depth knowledge about the other 
side and their concerns. Further, they gained experience and skills in 
communicating with the other side.  
Many workshop participants were in positions to influence the policy-
making process, they were natural candidates for making a contribution to the 
peace process, and because of their engagement in direct communication with 
the other party they had the qualifications and effectiveness to be involved in 
the official negotiations. Indeed most of the participants in the Continuing 
Workshop became engaged as advisors or negotiators in the official talks that 
started with the Madrid Conference. Also during the process ensuing from the 
Oslo Agreements, workshop-"alumni" had an active role in the Israeli and 
Palestinian cabinet, parliament and foreign ministry and in leading positions in 
other official agencies.  
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Ten out of 13 interviewees mentioned the impact of IPS on the creation 
of cadres and seven rated that impact as strong. Those who referred to IPS as 
creating a cadre, or a like-minded group of influential individuals, linked that 
creation to the ability of IPS to teach negotiation skills, and to contribute to a 
favorable atmosphere for negotiations.  
Israeli views: One former participant referred to the workshops as 
bringing the “right” people together in a specific atmosphere that was able to 
build trust to work with someone from the other side.  
Palestinian views: one interviewee felt that the meetings created 
confidence and a familiarity with regard to the people and the positions on each 
side, which was very helpful for the later involvement in the official 
negotiations.  
 
Training in Negotiation Skills 
Negotiation skills in the context of interactive problem-solving 
workshops have been referred to as the ability to formulate one’s own 
objectives in a non-threatening way and to develop a language that both sides 
were able to speak and understand.  
Seven interviewees mentioned that the workshops developed their 
negotiation skills, and all except one of them rated it as a very valuable 
experience. Many participants felt that the workshop discussions prepared them 
for official negotiations as well as further Track II engagements.  
Palestinian views: An interviewee, who had formed part of the official 
Palestinian negotiating team in Washington, reported that he had benefited 
greatly in terms of learning how to formulate Palestinian concerns in a way that 




Israeli views: One Israeli participant pointed out that the problem-
solving workshops were a pioneer Track Two initiative that created a sort of 
school for negotiators and for the development of diplomatic skills.  
 
Creating a Favorable Atmosphere for Negotiations  
The atmosphere conducive to negotiations was strengthened by the new 
relationship between significant segments of the two communities that evolved 
over the years. The atmosphere was generated by the development of a more 
differentiated image of the other, a de-escalatory language, and a working trust.  
The contribution of the workshops to a peace-conducive atmosphere 
was mentioned by 85 percent of the interviewees, one participant rated that 
contribution as minor, while ten believed this impact to be very strong.  
Israeli views: One participant maintained that the workshop meetings 
were instrumental in bringing about a revolutionary change in Israeli public 
opinion leading, first, to a gradual acceptance of the existence of the Palestinian 
people and, subsequently, to a realization that it was necessary to talk to the 
PLO and that a two-state solution was possible. 
Palestinian views: One interviewee saw the workshops as being part of 
the phenomenon of the time, in which many politically active Palestinians were 
engaged in, to work towards reaching a peaceful settlement and to create a state 
for the Palestinians. The workshops were one of many important initiatives that 
were undertaken at various levels, which were all fed back into what was 
happening on each side within the political leadership.  
 
Generating New Ideas  
All former participants referred to the potential ability of workshop 
discussions to generate new ideas for possible solutions. One felt that at the 
time the Joint Working Group met, the workshop format could not contribute 
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anything new or anything more to the peace process than the official efforts. 
All other participants were happy with the many new stimuli they received 
from their workshop participation.  
An example of a new idea that was generated among workshop 
participants is the creation by one Israeli and one Palestinian participant of an 
online platform called Bitter Lemons, where representatives of both sides are 
able to communicate their view of current issues. This online platform 
continues to operate today. 
Israeli views: The Israeli participant who co-founded Bitter Lemons 
mentioned that the realization of the online platform was the pinnacle of a 
process instilled in both sides through the workshop participation. On a 
personal level, the discussions made him realize that it was not necessary to 
agree with the other side in order to have an open dialogue about conflict 
issues.  
Palestinian views: The Palestinian co-founder of Bitter Lemons said he 
had learned more about each side’s boundaries and the possibilities for 
constructive change in regard to particular components of the conflict. He 
gained a better understanding of how contrasting views of different political 
parties as well as the divergent demands and requirements of the two sides’ 
constituencies shaped the positions that the two parties defended in the official 
negotiations. He also recognized to what extent the positions on either side 
were flexible and where each party set its limits.  
 
Transfer to the Policy-Making Process 
Eleven out of the thirteen interviewees referred to the issue of 
transferring new ideas to the policy-making process. Only one of them rated 
the transfer process as ineffective, while four described it as successful. Three 




generated ideas into their publications and discussions with policy-makers and 
colleagues, but rated it as only partially successful because they felt it did not 
reach enough people and had only limited impact. 
Palestinian views: One participant mentioned that some Palestinian 
participants in Kelman’s workshops had subsequently become negotiators in 
official talks with the Israelis. Also, some Israeli participants in Kelman’s 
workshops had become advisors to the official Israeli delegations of the formal 
peace talks. The participant rated this as an example for effective transfer from 
Kelman’s workshops to the formal policy-making process.  
Israeli views: One participant referred to the wide distribution in Arabic 
and Hebrew of the Joint Working group's paper "The Palestinian Refugee 
Problem and the Right of Return"(Alpher, Shikaki et al., 1999). He explained 
that the paper had also been sent to members of the Knesset and that Ehud 
Barak in one of his first speeches as Prime Minister said with regard to the 
refugee issue that Israel had to show empathy for the Palestinian suffering and 
had to recognize that Israel formed part of the overall problem, even though it 
does not take sole responsibility for what happened to the Palestinians. The 
participant was convinced that Barak had taken the wording from the Working 
Group's paper, although he never asked him to confirm that. Another 
participant maintained that the workshop meetings were instrumental in 
bringing about a revolutionary change in Israeli public opinion leading, first, to 
a gradual acceptance of the existence of the Palestinian people, and 
subsequently, to a realization that it was necessary to talk to the PLO and that a 
two-state solution was possible.  
 
The Method's Limitations 
 Interestingly, many interviewees were concerned with the structure of 
the method, just like the third-party members. A number of former participants 
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preferred the structure of the Continuing Workshop, where the focus was 
placed on discussions only, to the proceedings of the Joint Working Group that 
aimed to produce publishable documents. In the interview with the author, 
Kelman reflects on the preference of a model that focuses on free discussions 
that do not explicitly aim at producing a written document, but offer the 
possibility thereof.  
Another point that Kelman has been concerned with since the very early 
start of the method is the difficulty to maintain achieved changes and to 
transfer them to the policy-making process. According to Kelman, the ease of 
maintaining achieved changes depends first, on the nature of the workshop 
setting and second, on the surrounding to which participants return (Kelman 
and Cohen, 1976: 83). If workshop settings do not reflect the reality of the 
participants’ home environment, the chances are for maintaining changed 
attitudes in the social-political environment are slim. The reason for this is that 
new attitudes may be associated with the unique stimuli of the workshop 
setting and that these attitudes may fail to generalize to the home 
environment’s radically different stimuli. A workshop setting with little 
resemblance to conditions at home reduces resistance to change but fails to 
build immunity against the pressures to which the new attitudes will be 
exposed at the return of participants. Fellow nationals may reject attitudes and 
views generated within the workshop if they are perceived as too unrealistic or 
idealistic. An Israeli participant confirmed this view. He mentioned that he had 
worked very effectively with his Palestinian counterpart in the small sub-group. 
When they presented their work in the plenary session, the other Palestinian 
participants objected vehemently to the suggested ideas.  
The capability of participants to feed changes into the policy process 
also depends on the nature of these changes. If they consist of information from 




lines of negotiation, decision-makers will be likely to act on it. If the changes 
consist of suggestions for reformulating some policies of a participant’s own 
government, the chances for adopting them are very slight despite the 
participant’s proximity to the decision-making center.  
The former participants were also very much concerned with what the 
method could not achieve or where their expectations were not fulfilled. 
Generally, Israelis were more satisfied than the Palestinians with the results 
that the members of the Joint Working Group had published, while both parties 
felt that the remaining gaps between the notions of the two constituencies 
reflected political reality.  
Israeli views: Some Israeli participants criticized the Joint Working 
Group for departing from the initial structured workshop format and adopting a 
less social-psychologically oriented but rather unstructured form; while others 
felt that the method’s emphasis on theoretical patterns was fairly strong and 
favored a more intuitive approach. Some mentioned that the method was 
preaching to the converted and that, from their point of view, mainstream 
opinion was not fully represented by participants on either side. One of them 
held that the method’s abilities to reach decision makers were limited.  
Palestinian views: Some Palestinian interviewees saw the method's 
limitations in failing to bridge the gap between the different arguments 
discussed with regard to the refugee problem and ownership of the land, and 
reaching an agreement that satisfied both sides. Two participants said that the 
pressure of producing a written document constrained progress. One of them 
thought that the method was able to contribute more to the peace process 
during the pre-negotiation phase than while accompanying official 
negotiations. This participant, who became a member of the official negotiating 
team, felt that the method helped to create readiness for talking to the other side 
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1 Excerpts from the interviews held with former workshop participants have been 
previously discussed by the author in the article “Herbert Kelman’s Contribution to 
the Methodology of Practical Conflict Resolution” that was published in 2010 in an 
honorary issue for Herbert C. Kelman of the Pioneers in U.S. Peace Psychology series 
in the Peace and Conflict Journal.  
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8 Achievements of Identity Management 
 
To review the specific impact of IPS as an identity management tool 
with the objective to negotiate identity elements, the identity changes that 
appeared in the workshop testimonies are assessed by comparing them to the 
six identity elements, which Kelman has proposed as being negotiable: 
monolithic identity perception, exclusive national identity, ideological dreams, 
order of priorities, national narratives, and negation of the other (2001). The 
author then compares her own interpretations of the identity negotiation 
process to the experience of former workshop participants  
The negotiation of ideological dreams and a new order of priorities did 
not appear in the testimonies of workshop discussions. Form the participants’ 
discussions, however, can be concluded that these identity aspects had already 
been altered to a considerable extent prior to the workshop meetings. This 
became apparent, for example, during the third meeting of the Continuing 
Workshop, when Israeli participants confirmed that it was no longer a policy 
objective to pursue the ideological dream of Greater Israel; while Palestinian 
participants made it very clear that their primary objective was to strengthen 
the form of their political organization and build an autonomous political 
entity, rather than control the whole of Palestine.  
During a Joint Working Group meeting a new order of priorities was 
noticeable, when Palestinian participants were able to engage in a debate about 
limiting the number of returning refugees. Although they would not accept 
such limitation, they were ready to hear why Israelis are concerned about the 
issue. On the side of Israeli participants a reordering of priorities was 
recognizable, when they debated the possibility of giving up their exclusive 




In a more vivid and explicit manner, the parties negotiated their 
monolithic as well as exclusive identity perception. During the discussion of the 
Gulf Crisis in the first meeting of the Continuing Workshop, the parties were 
able to distinguish between the boundaries of their political interests and the 
boundaries of their emotional attachments. By hearing the underlying 
motivations of the other polity’s positions, both sides discovered that enormous 
changes had occurred in how they viewed their own role in the conflict and that 
those changes were not yet reflected by their polities.  
As a result, the parties engaged in negotiating the inclusion of a new 
perception of their conflict roles into an additional layer of identity that enabled 
them to keep their emotional attachments as well as to develop new political 
objectives. Thereby they were able to move towards a transcendent identity 
perception that opened the possibility for pragmatic cooperation within their 
confrontational relationship and for a committed negotiation process.  
The negotiation of the monolithic identity perception also surfaced 
during the discussion of the future Israel-Palestinian relationship in the Joint 
Working Group. The wording of the formulation, hammered out by the group, 
shows that representatives of the conflict parties were able to address their 
perception of territorial claims by distinguishing between their need to uphold 
the attachment to their homeland and their need for keeping or establishing 
ownership and sovereignty of a given territory engulfing only part of their 
homeland.  
The exclusive perception of national identity was negotiated when 
participants discussed their perception of the other with regard to the issues 
raised by the Gulf Crisis. By learning what the underlying motivations of the 
other side's action were, each side was able to understand the other's reasoning 
and discovered that their objectives were less threatening than what they 
seemed. Moreover, both parties realized that each was motivated by the same 
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objective: to safeguard security for their own polity. In due course, participants 
on both sides acknowledged the role and the shortcomings of their polities with 
regard to the deterioration of the situation. This acted as a catalyst for opening 
up to a new understanding of the other with regard to more central conflict 
issues.  
During the discussion of the Intifada each side was able to look at their 
own acts through the eyes of the other. Interestingly, Israeli participants were 
able to identify positive aspects of the Intifada, in the sense that by 
consolidating the Palestinian leadership, the Intifada produced a necessary 
condition for negotiating a political conflict solution. Subsequently, the two 
parties started to revise their view about their objectives being mutually 
exclusive to discover that they were mutually inclusive, in the sense that they 
needed each other in order to attain their security objectives.  
Most prominent were the negotiation of national narratives and the 
negation of the other. During the discussion of the Continuing Group about the 
right to self-determination, the perception of some participants shifted from 
completely denying the impact of their community on the course of the conflict 
towards accepting the reality of the other and of how the other experienced the 
acts of their own party. The negotiation process further evolved during the 
discussion about the right of return, which confronted the parties with their own 
history and with the history of the other. Both parties realized that they 
deplored grievances and needed the other to acknowledge those grievances. As 
the parties began to realize that each of them had experienced the same events 
in a completely different way, they were able to accept the story of the other as 
being true to them. In a next step, participants understood that their own party 
formed an element in the narrative of the other and vise versa. Each party, then, 
was able to acknowledge that their own actions had consequences for the other. 




when the participants managed to agree to a written formulation, stating that 
they both shared responsibility for past actions.  
The discussion about the right to self-determination also bore aspects of 
negotiating the acceptance of the other. The deliberations revealed that the 
Palestinian motivation for claiming self-determination stemmed from the need 
for national identity. The discussions further clarified that both parties were 
ultimately asking for the recognition of their national existence. Israelis and 
Palestinians both realized that they shared the fundamental need for recognized 
national identity. For Israeli participants this meant that it was easier for them 
to understand why the right to self-determination was so important for 
Palestinians. For Palestinian participants this meant that it was easier for them 
to understand why their claim for self-determination was frightening to Israelis.   
The negotiation process evolved and reached a most important peak, 
when Palestinian participants confirmed that exerting their right for self-
determination would not aim at endangering the existence of Israel. A future 
Palestinian polity would respect the finality of their state borders and thereby 
the borders of Israel. In response to this implicit acceptance of the Israeli state, 
members of the Israeli group declared their acceptance of Palestinians as a 
people and affirmed that this acceptance was widely shared among the Israeli 
public.  
To further asses the nature of the achieved changes in the identity 
structure of Israeli and Palestinian participants, it is indispensable to compare 
the author’s findings with the first-hand experience of workshop participants, to 
see whether their understanding differs from the author’s observations, and 
how they experienced the negotiation processes and the ensuing changes. The 
author was careful to capture differences and similarities in the experience of 
Palestinians and Israelis.  
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Israeli and Palestinian Experience of Identity Negotiation 
To assess how workshop participants experienced the observed 
processes of identity negotiation, the interviewed participants were asked how 
their perception of themselves, their own constituency, and the other side had 
changed throughout the workshop discussions. They were also asked to identify 




When looking at the answers of the interviewed participants with regard 
to Kelman’s six negotiable identity elements, all of them are referred to – some 
only implicitly, some very directly – as having been tackled during workshop 
discussions. With regard to the quality and comprehensiveness of the 
negotiated aspects, however, the answers of the interviewees do not always 




Unlike the observation of the author, interviewed participants found that 
most decisive changes occurred in the way each party sees asymmetries of 
power distribution and security concerns – issues that belong to the identity 
aspect of an exclusive national identity perception. Similar to the author’s 
interpretation, interviewees felt that decisive changes had occurred in the way 
each side understands the national narrative of the other. Also, the experience 
of the interviewed participants confirms the author’s impression that some 
change was reached with regard to accepting the other’s national existence, 
although the participants did not rate it as prominently as the author. A 
contested identity element was the monolithic identity perception, which more 
than half the participants mentioned as having been discussed, but none of them 
rated the negotiation a successful.  
The negotiation of an exclusive or rather inclusive identity perception 
was referred to by 77 percent – ten out of 13 - of the interviewees. Some of 
them mentioned how they discovered that, while the conflict was asymmetric 
in terms of power distribution, it was symmetric in terms of security concerns. 
23 percent of those, who mentioned the issues, said that the discussions 
successfully pointed them to shared claims and common identity elements, 38 
percent rated the discussion as reaching that end to a certain extent, while two 
participants found the discussions to be unsuccessful.  
69 percent of the interviewed participants referred to the discussions of 
national narratives. Many interviewees commented how the discussion about 
the right of return of Palestinian refugees had triggered tremendous changes 
with regard to how each side related to their own and to the other's national 
narrative. Many described it to be a very useful but also difficult process. 46 
percent of those mentioning the topic rated the discussions as having led to a 
changed view of the other's narrative and an acceptance of how the other party 
views past events, while 23 percent thought that the discussions reached that 
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end only to some extent. Some said that hearing the other's story made it 
possible for them to accept the other's truth without necessarily having to 
approve of everything it entailed. Other participants said that, hearing the other 
side's story of their shared history, made it possible for them to understand their 
own role in that story. Accepting that role did not equal to just accept blame but 
had more to do with accepting the other party's reality.  
While the author found that the identity aspect negation of the other was 
constructively discussed in workshop meetings, the interviewed participants 
were not of the same view. Nine out of 13 interviewees referred to the issue, 
while only three confirmed explicitly that they accepted the existence of the 
other.  Four participants felt that the acceptance of national existence was to 
some extent successful and one participant rated that negotiation process as 
clearly unsuccessful.  
There was a general tone in most of the former participants' accounts of 
their workshop experience that it was not possible to completely close the gap 
between what the representatives of the conflict parties needed on a 
psychological level in terms of accommodating the existence of other within 
their own identity definition, and what that did or did not entail in terms of 
political concessions. Some participants referred to clear limits in their 
counterparts' position towards making concessions that would follow from a 
true acceptance of the other's national identity.  
Interestingly, 62 Percent of the workshop participants, again nine out of 
13 interviewees, mentioned instances, in which their monolithic identity 
perception was addressed. But while the acceptance of the other had been rated 
as successfully negotiated by 23 percent, not one participant on either side 
found that a transcendent identity had been reached. While many participants 
were able to recognize that their sentimental attachments do not coincide with 




practical terms of limiting their sovereignty and control only part of the shared 
homeland.  
Similarly to the author’s observation the interviewed participants did not 
attribute a pivotal role to the negotiation of ideological dreams or the 
reordering of priorities. Only six interviewees referred to the two aspects and 
only one commented in a negative way about those aspects. One interviewee 
confirmed that exaggerated images had been excluded from their political 
agendas; while another felt, that all workshop participants had obviously buried 
old exaggerated images, as they were ready to commit themselves to discuss 
relevant conflict issues with the primary objective to finding a political solution 
to the conflict.  
With regard to the quality of the negotiated identity aspects, which 
former participants referred to most prominently in their interviews, it is 
interesting to look at the answers of Israelis and Palestinian separately as they 
do not always agree with regard to the comprehensibility of negotiated 
changes. Also, the different angles from which the two sides look at the same 
issue reveal important insight for future tasks of conflict resolution methods 
and the further refinement of identity management tools.  
 
National Narratives 
National Narrative was the identity element that the interviewed 
participants referred to most vigorously and as the most prominent realm of 
change. Israelis and Palestinians experienced the negotiation process 
differently. Two out of five Palestinians did not refer to the identity aspect, 
while on the Israeli side 75 percent mentioned the discussion of national 
narratives. The two sides were closer in their rating of the quality of the 
negotiation process. The majority on both sides of those who referred to the 
negotiation process rated it as successful or as partly successful.  





Israeli views: One participant said he had experienced a change in his 
own perception with regard to the refugee issue. Initially, he had thought that 
Israelis had no reason to apologize for what had happened during the war of 
1948, as they did not start the war but were attacked by neighboring Arab 
states. Hearing the Palestinian side of the story made him realize that Israelis 
indeed needed to apologize and assume a share in the responsibility of causing 
Palestinian refugees.  
Another participant mentioned a pivotal moment of the same discussion 
when the group had reached a complete deadlock. An Israeli participant said to 
the Palestinians, addressing one in particular who had been in Israeli prison for 
many years, that he was aware of what Palestinians had been going through and 
that his participation was very moving and strongly appreciated by all members 
of the group. This manifestation of empathy and respect for the suffering of the 
other led the group out of the discussion impasse and opened the way for 
constructive discussions. One participant said that the workshop participation 




a better understanding of how deep their connection to the land was and that it 
was just as important as their own.  
Palestinian views: One interviewee remembered how demanding the 
discussion about the right of return had been for her and that her strong reaction 
to some arguments had triggered an Israeli participant to realize, for the first 
time, how difficult the issue was for Palestinians. The participant felt that her 
own perception of the Israeli side changed a lot as she began to understand the 
Israeli narrative and accept it as a given. The participant realized that one of the 
reasons for Israeli reluctance to acknowledge responsibility for the refugee 
situation was their fear that this acknowledgement would entail material 
concessions. She felt that the perception of the Israelis changed when they 
heard that it was indispensable for Palestinians to receive an apology for what 
had happened in 1948, and that the apology would not require Israeli 
concession of more land.  
 According to the participant, both sides learnt to distinguish 
between claiming an apology from the other for past acts and claiming 
restitution for past acts. The interviewee remembered being asked by an Israeli 
participant whether Palestinians could agree to refrain from asking for the 
return of their former houses in Jaffa. She answered that emotionally they 
would cling to that claim but knew rationally that they had to give it up. 
Important for her was the acknowledgement of Israelis that Palestinians had 
paid an enormous price in order to get to the point of being ready to forgo such 
claims. The participant rated that kind of negotiation, which touches on all the 
wounds and then looks at how to heal them, as building confidence and trust in 
a very strong manner.  
 Another interviewee said she had gained understanding why Israelis 
resisted to listening to the Palestinian story, as hearing the Palestinian narrative 
meant undoing their own stories about descent and origin, which they had 
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grown up with. She explained that those stories about one's state, and about 
who one is, were very hard to change.  
 
Exclusive Identity Perception  
Interestingly, Kelman confirms the experience of interviewed 
participants. He said in his interview with the author that both sides had 
decisively moved towards an inclusive identity perception. While in the early 
days of interactive problem-solving workshops, Palestinians tended to trivialize 
the security concerns of Israel as a nuclear power, they had realized over time 
that everyday concerns about the safety of people traveling on a bus, for 
instance, were not minimized by nuclear weapons. Also, they realized that the 
strategic situation of Israel in the Middle East does create real security 
concerns. On the Israeli side, participants came to be more aware of the power 
asymmetry between the two groups and started to compensate for the power 
differences. They learnt not to dictate to Palestinians how things had to be done 








Looking at the perspective of the interviewed participants, four out of 
eight Israelis rated the negotiation process leading from an exclusive to an 
inclusive national identity as partly successful, and two even rated it as 
completely successful. On the Palestinian side, on the other hand, 40 percent of 
the participants rated the process as not being successful at all.  
Palestinian views: Some interviewees felt that the discussions reflected 
the political realities of Israel being the dominant party. One participant said to 
have felt that the Israeli dominance dictated the solutions that the group was 
approaching and that the solutions dictated the arguments. The same participant 
said he had realized that Palestinians had a stronger stand with regard to their 
own identity than Israelis, who went through a complicated process of identity 
formation. Other Palestinian interviewees accepted that Israeli security 
concerns were real and that everyday life security threats were not minimized 
by the fact that the Israeli state held nuclear weapons.  
Israeli views: One participant stressed he had learned that a perceived 
threat was a real threat and how to communicate about one’s fears. Another 
Israeli participant, who at the time of the interview was a member of the 
Knesset, said that she was aware of the difficult conditions, which the 
occupation bore for the Palestinians, and that their point of departure for 
negotiations was very different. The participant further said she had learned 
that Palestinians had different policy-making structures and that the Israeli way 
of proceeding was not the only right way.  
 
National Existence  
The majority of both Israelis and Palestinians mentioned the key topic of 
accepting the other’s existence as a discussion topic. From the statements in the 
interviews, one gains the impression that the acceptance of the other’s 
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Interviewed participants hence rated the centrality of the topic during 
workshop discussions not as strongly as the author had interpreted it from 
following the observers’ notes. None of the interviewed Palestinian participants 
confirmed in their answers explicitly that such acceptance had been negotiated 
during the workshop sessions in a comprehensive way, only two of them 
confirmed that acceptance of the other had been negotiated to some extent. On 
the Israeli side five interviewed participants mentioned the discussion of the 
topic and three of them felt that acceptance of the other’s existence had been 
successfully negotiated.  
 
Monolithic Identity Perception 
From the fact that none of the interviewed participants felt that the 
monolithic identity perception was successfully or comprehensively overcome, 
it follows that while participants were able to recognize that their sentimental 




conceive of a two-state-one-country scenario in which the entire land belongs 




Two out of five Palestinians mentioned that the monolithic identity 
perception had been discussed and found the negotiation process to be partially 
successful. On the Israeli side six out of eight mentioned the issue and five of 
them found the discussions to some extent successful.  
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9 Limitations of the Identity Factor  
 
The identity changes that became visible during the Peace Process have 
been in the making for a long time and cannot be solely characterized as 
resulting from the different efforts and instruments applied and employed 
during the Peace Process. During the process, however, these changes became 
palpable and were expressed in a more comprehensive and also responsive 
way. What crystallized at some point in the Peace Process was the realization 
that it was necessary to negotiate between legitimate national representatives 
and that it was possible to find those representative negotiation partners on the 
other side. This realization reflects an alteration in the identity element 
expressed in moving towards accepting the other's national existence. The 
exchange of letters of mutual recognition between the PLO and the State of 
Israel seemed to express the identity change necessary for resolving the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict.  
The sense that an agreement was necessary evolved out of changes in 
the political environment in the Middle East, events on the ground and changes 
in long-term interests and domestic political concerns of the policy makers. The 
parties' long-term interests built on the consequences of the 1967 War, which 
brought the Arab-Israeli conflict back to its core, the dispute between Israelis 
and Palestinians (Kelman, 1997). For the Palestinians the withdrawal of the 
surrounding Arab states and the grievance over the occupation of the West 
Bank and Gaza led to a reemergence of Palestinian nationalism, which 
culminated in the Intifada. The political objective of the uprising had clearly 
moved away from maximalist positions towards accepting the idea of 





In Israel the developments divided the polity. According to the 
nationalist right the occupation of the rest of Palestine presented an opportunity 
to achieve their ideological dream of a greater Israel. Many other Israelis 
realized that the objective of incorporating the occupied territories would force 
them into a dilemma. Israel could either maintain its democratic character by 
extending citizenship to the Palestinians and lose its Jewish character, or deny 
citizenship to the Palestinians and thereby jeopardize its democratic stature. 
The majority of the Israelis, hence, saw the established control over the 
occupied territories as an opportunity to trade land for peace with the 
Palestinians and the Arab states. The increasing impact of the Intifada as well 
as the emerging geopolitical developments turned this opportunity into a 
pressing option.  
The events preceding the beginning of the official peace process had a 
weakening effect on the PLO and Israel. The loss of former Cold War 
allegiances and their support of Iraq during the Gulf War left the PLO 
financially cut off and politically isolated. For Israel the end of the Cold War 
led to a decrease of their strategic role as a US ally in the Middle East. The 
situation was further exacerbated during the Gulf war when Israel was 
excluded from the military alliance against the Kuwaiti invader and was forced 
to rely on the US for its own defense against missile attacks from Iraq.  
In this situation neither party could resist US pressures to enter the 
negotiations in Madrid, although without commitment. While the Israeli public 
wanted a peace process their government did not, and while the PLO was eager 
to negotiate they were not officially admitted to the talks. True commitment to 
the process only emerged after the election of a new Labor government in 
Israel with Yitzhak Rabin at its head and after the PLO became an 
acknowledged negotiation partner through the brokerage of the team in 
Norway.  
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The sense of possibility evolved from increased interaction between 
politically engaged and influential Israelis and Palestinians, which had been 
active since the 1970s and increased with the start of the Intifada. The mostly 
unofficial but politically relevant activities, like dialogue groups or economic 
development projects, opened communication channels and augmented the 
knowledge each party had of the other. Through those interactions each party 
learnt that there was a genuine readiness on the other side to make the required 
concessions and was persuaded that negotiations could lead to an agreement 
that would not jeopardize their national existence (Kelman, 2005: 13). 
 
Changes in National Identity at the Macro-Level 
Some of the identity changes that ensued from the Peace Process have 
survived until today. The realization among Israelis (and the international 
community), that the Palestinians are a people, is irreversible; and the conflict 
parties' mutual acknowledgment of their rights as a people, had an 
unprecedented impact on their relationship. The changed parameters translated 
into a legal framework that remains embodied in the Palestinian Authority at 
least in the West Bank. The Oslo definition of the issues to be discussed in final 
status talks continue to define the agreed agenda of the government of Israel 
and the PLO in their political negotiations (Alpher, 2008).  
The tenor of Israeli national identity shifted from disregarding the 
Palestinians' rights as a people to accepting the expression of Palestinian 
national identity through a Palestinian state. It moved from banning the PLO as 
a participant in the official talks towards acknowledging them as the legitimate 
representative of the Palestinian people and as an official negotiation partner. 
Recognizing the PLO symbolized Israeli acknowledgement of Palestinian 






Palestinian national identity had moved from refusing to accept the 
existence of Israel towards acknowledging the legitimacy of the Israeli state. 
Palestinians thereby said that they no longer saw Israeli Jews as being only a 
religious group but also a national community. Palestinian identity perception 
moved from reclaiming their entire homeland towards accepting a Palestinian 
state within the area of the Occupied Territories. While these suppositions had 
been referred to in the 1988 Declaration of the Palestinian National Council in 
a rather implicit way, the signing of the Declaration of Principles expressed an 
explicit commitment to those postulations. The commitment further extended 
to the acceptance of negotiating the parameters of a Palestinian state in a 
gradual process – which the Palestinians had always been strongly opposed to – 
even without receiving unequivocal Israeli commitment to the establishment of 
an independent state. 
Yet, these changes did not translate into far-reaching political action. 
The Israeli recognition of the PLO as the official representative of the 
Palestinian people did not translate into an acceptance oft the idea that the 
Palestinians possessed an equal national right to the territories that both peoples 
claimed. Contrary to the promise of the Peace Process, no subsequent Israeli 
administration has ended occupation.  
The Palestinian recognition of Israel and their acceptance of a two state 
solution with the implied territorial limitations did not turn into effective state 
building (Khatib, 2008). The national movement Fatah was not able to 
consolidate its leadership or contain endemic violence, but lost power to 
Hamas, who reject the very promise of Oslo.  
Subsequent developments led to a gradual reversal of achieved identity 
changes. The influential Hamas does not accept the existence of Israel and the 
latter does not agree to negotiate with representatives of the Hamas. This led 
Israelis to continue to argue that they have no negotiation partner, although on 
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different grounds than prior to the Peace Process. While they have claimed that 
there was no legitimate political representation prior to accepting the PLO, they 
now hold that the Palestinian authority lack leverage to implement an eventual 
agreement. 
Critique of the Oslo Accords and its ensuing agreements has 
predominantly focused on it origins and motivations. Some critics say that the 
accords resulted more from a convergence of strategic interests than from a 
change in the conflict party's relationship (Buchanan, 2000); as well as on their 
ambiguity and vague structure (Klieman, 2000). Some of the critics find the 
accords asymmetrical and leading to an institutionalization of Israel's 
predominance and possibilities to pursue its security objectives at the expense 
of the Palestinians (Ashrawi, 1995; Said, 1995; Jones, 1999). Others argue that 
the Oslo Agreements were not an expression of a changed national 
consciousness (or identity) of the conflict parties but of a continued one that 
allowed Israel to consolidate its occupation without having to police the 
Palestinians (Raz-Krakotzkin, 1998; Weinberger, 2006).  
The author argues, that one of the macro-level obstacles was that parties 
were forced to the negotiation table by the negative incentive of a mutually 
hurting stalemate that made negotiations more attractive than continuation of 
the conflict. Once at the table, the parties were not ready to negotiate on an 
equal basis. What was lacking was the positive incentive of mutual 
reassurance. Israelis and Palestinians both recognized that a negotiated 
agreement was in their interest, but feared that negotiations may lead to ever 
more costly concessions that will ultimately jeopardize their security, their 
national identity and hence their very existence as a people. What would have 
been necessary to advance negotiations are gestures of mutual reassurance, like 
acknowledgements, symbolic gestures, or confidence-building measures that 





recognition of the two sides in the Oslo Accords, which created the 
breakthrough, needed to be echoed in further gestures of mutual reassurance 
throughout the ensuing negotiations. Mutual reassurance has occurred during 
IPS workshops, but not during official negotiations.  
 
Identity Changes at the Micro-Level 
The most crucial changes achieved through identity negotiation in 
problem-solving workshop discussions include – and Kelman confirms that in 
his interview with the author – that participants began to see themselves as 
being able to work with representatives from the other side. The complete 
monolithic view of the opponent has ceased. The “other” is no longer evil, 
dangerous and stupid but has become a potential partner. Workshop 
participants discovered that there are people on the other side to whom one can 
talk and with whom one can work.  
In his interview with the author, Kelman also identifies as an irreversible 
change, the acceptance of the other, at least in the sense that both groups 
recognize each other as being a people. A change that had emerged slowly 
through macro-level events like the First Intifada, was further supported by 
Track Two efforts, and expressed in an Israeli newspaper article that the 
Palestinians’ joy over the Oslo agreements reminded Israelis of what had 
happened in the Jewish community in Palestine in 1947, when the UN 
resolution for partition was passed, implicitly calling for a Jewish state. 
Kelman saw that reaction to be an empathic recognition by Israelis of the 
Palestinians being a people aiming for a state.  
These changes have only occurred in a small percentage of the two 
constituencies’ populations. Some of the workshop participants are 
experimenting with a new relationship, a relationship that may expand if only 
to a small circle of people. Nevertheless such small circles can diffuse social 
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change that may not spread to the entire population, but that can sufficiently 
expand for the purpose of establishing peaceful and productive relations.  
The workshop discussions have contributed to establishing peaceful and 
productive relations by offering indispensable gestures of mutual reassurance 
in the form of acknowledgements that confirmed the parties’ national 
narratives. The Israeli acknowledgement that the establishment of Israel 
constituted a profound injustice to the Palestinian people, even though they 
accepted only partial responsibility for causing that injustice, acted as a 
reassurance. The reassuring Israeli gesture was replicated by the Palestinian 
acknowledgement that Israelis have grown up with a different history than they 
did. A history that did not conceive of the events in 1948 as an expulsion of 
Palestinians but rather of an armed combat between Arab inhabitants of 
Palestine supported by the armies of neighboring Arab states and inhabitants of 
the Jewish community that resulted in a flight of the Arab inhabitants. 
Palestinian participants confirmed to believe their Israeli counterparts that 
some of them did not know any other truth when growing up.  
Workshop discussions were able to provide reassuring gestures because 
they addressed the needs of conflict parties’ representatives. By addressing 
some of the central needs of the participants, the workshop discussions have 
engendered changes in the relationship between the representatives of the two 
conflict parties. Nevertheless, the negotiated changes, which the author had 
traced in the observatory notes of third-party members, have not all been 
mirrored in the interviews held with the participants of the time. Complete 
acceptance of the other’s existence, the most important identity element 
accounting for a reconciliation of the two sides, had not been remembered by 
some of the participants.  
Following Kelman’s theory of social influence, some of the changes 





identification and not by internalization. The parameters of the new 
relationship between workshop participants have not become part of their 
identity structure – at least not for all of the participants – but remained 
dependent on external circumstances to remain intact.  
This micro-level scenario is mirrored in the macro-level situation of 
having accepted the other’s existence but not yet the implementation of that 
acceptance. Implementing the acceptance of the other would equal the 
achievement of a transcendent identity that enables both parties to share 
ownership of their homeland by each being sovereign over part of their 
country. The micro-level finding, that the monolithic perception of identity 
attachment was not completely changed into a transcendent identity perception, 
reflects the macro-level situation: the two parties were ready to engage in the 
negotiation of new parameters of their future relationship, but were not able to 
agree on the definition of the new parameters.  
 
Conditions for Sustainable Identity Changes 
The reason why most of the identity changes that developed during the 
Peace Process did not lead to a comprehensive solution of the conflict stems 
form the nature of those changes, their origin, quality and consequence. For a 
changed identity aspect to lead to a reconciliation of the conflict parties, it must 
be fully integrated into the existing identity structure of the conflict parties. An 
identity change can only be integrated if it is induced by internalization, that is, 
if it corresponds to the conflict parties' value system. If a change is induced by 
compliance to reward or punishment or by identification with an emerging 
relationship between the conflict parties, it will not withstand the challenges of 
different social-political circumstances. Only internalization leads to a 
sustainable identity change that is independent of external influences and can 
add to a sustainable conflict solution.  
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Not all changes in the aspects of Israeli and Palestinian national identity 
that surfaced during the Peace Process were fully integrated into the existing 
structure of the two peoples’ national identity. Some changes were induced by 
compliance to macro-level forces leading to a settlement of conflict interests. 
Other changes derived from identification of the conflict parties with the new 
relationship as pragmatic negotiation partners, which addressed the needs of 
conflict parties for security and expression of national identity. Although the 
new relationship between the conflict parties contained an accommodation of 
the existence of the other within their own identity definition, it did not yield a 
reconciliation of Israelis and Palestinians because the acceptance of the other's 
national existence was not integrated into the existing structure of their national 
identities.  
The evaluation of interactive problem-solving workshops by the former 
participants revealed that lack of integration. Although the former participants 
confirmed that relevant identity aspects had been addressed and even 
successfully negotiated to some extent during the workshop discussions, they 
said that the negotiation process met limits and could not dissolve all remnants 
of animosity. Old attitudes, like the refusal to accept full responsibility of past 
actions reflecting the negation of the other, have remained intact although new 
attitudes associated with the new relationship had taken shape. Palestinian and 
Israeli participants did not experience the negotiation processes in the same 
way. While a number of Israeli participants felt that the acceptance of the 
other’s existence had been successfully negotiated, none of the Palestinian 
participants felt that way.  
The coexistence of old endemic and new cooperative attitudes toward 
the other have created instability in the new relationship and made it vulnerable 
to the challenges of unresolved conflict issues, which triggered old attitudes to 





were, thus, vulnerable to external influences. The negotiated identity changes 
did not entirely stand the test of resisting to the challenging consequences of 
the Oslo agreements. The unclear outline of a two-state solution represented 
too big a hurdle to reach agreement on territorial issues. Moreover, the virtual 
institutionalization of Palestinian dependence on Israel in economic, 
administrative and structural terms resulted in a policy conflict between 
pursuing Palestinian economic integration and safeguarding Israeli security 
concerns. The degeneration of the pragmatic partnership ultimately resulted in 
a reversal of the achieved identity changes. 
From the particular example of Identity Factor mechanisms through the 
application of IPS during the Peace Process, a general conclusion can be drawn 
about the validity of identity management tools: that they need to generate 
internalization-induced changes, leading to a sustainable identity negotiation 
process, and producing new identity structures that last. Only an internalized 
identity change is independent of external forces and brings about true 
reconciliation.  
The study reveals that a systematic application of identity management 
tools brings about more sustainable identity changes than macro-level forces. 
The unofficial and private realm of interactive problem-solving workshops 
offers a favorable climate for internalized identity changes, as each participant 
is free to weigh negotiated identity aspects against their individual value 
system and against the values of their polity, the way they perceive and 
understand it. At the macro-level of official negotiations the pressures are too 
high for the development of such a differentiated process.  
The statements of the interviewed participants clearly demonstrate, that 
the most important identity aspect, in terms of attaining a resolution of the 
conflict and a reconciliation of the two peoples, has changed. Representatives 
from both communities confirmed that they negotiated an acceptance of the 
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other’s existence and accommodated that acceptance into the definition of their 
national identity – a perception that was still intact some ten years after the 
discussion process. Further, former participants integrated a much more 
differentiated image of the other and learnt that it is possible to negotiate with 
representatives from the other side and how to phrase their objectives in a way 
that the other side can understand. 
 Former participants of interactive problem-solving workshops represent 
only a minuscule percentage of the two polities. Nevertheless, the cadres of 
people that integrated changed identity aspects do exist and continuously 
transfer their changed identity definition to the wider policy-making process. 
Identity management in the form of interactive problem-solving workshops 
leads to sustainable identity changes that will be instrumental for the 
implementation of future conflict resolution and true reconciliation between 







Interviews with Workshop Participants and Facilitators 
 
Interview with Yezid Sayigh, Cambridge, UK, 6 June 2002 
 
Yezid Sayigh is a senior associate at the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut.  
Previously, he was professor of Middle East studies at King’s College London. 
From 1994–2003, he served as assistant director of studies at the Centre of 
International Studies, Cambridge, and from 1998–2003, he headed the Middle 
East programme of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. 
Sayigh was also an advisor and negotiator in the Palestinian delegation to the 
peace talks with Israel from 1991–1994. Since 1999, he has provided policy 
and technical consultancy on the permanent status peace talks and on 
Palestinian reform. Sayigh is the author of numerous publications including: 
Armed Struggle and the Search for a State: The Palestinian National 




What were you doing in your professional life, when you participated in 
interactive problem-solving workshops? 
 
 Until April 1994 I was a research fellow at St. Anthony's College in 
Oxford, UK, working on developing countries and security. From October 
1994 onwards, I was teaching International Politics here in Cambridge, UK.  
 
How did you learn about interactive problem-solving workshops? 
 
 Someone of Professor Kelman's group, who told me that they had been 
meeting for some time, approached me. And I had a feeling that they had a 
well-set framework. I was approached because by then everyone sort of knew 




involved in Track two initiatives. As I had been doing a lot of such work, I was 
just a “usual suspect”.  
 
How would you describe your personal experience of participating in a 
problem-solving workshop? 
 
I participated in a workshop that had a different structure [Joint Working 
Group] than the ones Professor Kelman had held previously, in the sense that 
they aimed at producing some sort of publishable material. The sort of dialogue 
groups, that I had participated in before, had not sought explicitly to produce a 
written draft.  
 The purpose of the discussions was to support the official process that 
had agreed on an interim arrangement by suggesting principles for resolving 
issues concerning settlements, refugees and so on.  
 I was somewhat of two minds about the effort, partly because there was 
already a formal negotiation process underway and I was not sure that we in the 
group were going to do so much better than they were. Particularly for the 
reason that, when you get to produce a written text, Israelis and Palestinians 
become much more careful about protecting what they see as their core interest 
or about properly representing – maybe not themselves – but their broader 
constituencies. So, you immediately get into a sort of formal negotiating 
situation, in which you discuss formulas and act like lawyers in a way.  
 I thought: why do I have to go through two of these negotiation tracks, 
as I had already been involved in one negotiation track [the official 
negotiations] and it did not make sense to me to be involved in a second 
negotiation effort with people, who at the end of the day, had no decision-
making power and faced the usual problems of intellectuals, who often act 
more cautiously than the politicians.  
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Why did you decide to participate in a problem-solving workshop, despite your 
two-mindedness about taking part in an official as well as in an unofficial 
initiative?   
 
 Because I did not have a political objection, I just wondered, whether 
this would have any added value to what was already happening and to what I 
was already engaged in otherwise. And I was concerned that all the participants 
would be very cautious and I was also afraid, frankly, that the end goal of 
producing a published paper of some sort, which was going to be a joint 
[Israeli-Palestinian] paper while worthy in principle, in practice would result in 
something that was going to be too general. I was just not convinced that we 
could come up with anything that would have broken new ground.  
 
And why did you participate nevertheless? 
 
Because Professor Kelman is someone, whom I respect and because 
there were people there, whom I have regard for; and because I believed it was 
a worthy cause. I did not attend all the meetings, not because I just did not 
bother but because I was not able to. After the two years, I did not go back to 
any further meetings because I had too much on my plate and those meetings 
were not something that took a high priority at that time.  
 
Did you get any new insights from the workshop meetings? 
 
 No, not from these particular meetings; I had been involved in the 
[official] negotiations from 1991 until 1994 and I had been an advisor and a 
negotiator and thereby gained immense experience of negotiation in 




been trained for. So I got a lot out of the official negotiations. Also, I had been 
involved in dialogue groups since 1988, so that by 1994, I knew many Israelis; 
and I had been to the country, to Israel and Palestine, so I did not really learn 
anything new or made any significant new acquaintances through the problem-
solving workshops. At the time when I came into the group, I had been doing 
dialogue groups for eight years, I felt that I learnt all that I could from that type 
of effort and I had given all that I could to it. So, I moved on by going from 
participating in dialogue groups to being a senior negotiator after Oslo. I 
thought that new people should be joining the unofficial process.  
 I think that the psychological approach can achieve very important 
things, but in 1994, I thought that we were way beyond solving problems at the 
level of a group of six Palestinians and six Israelis and that there was a much 
wider context in which the dynamic of the peace process had moved forward 
and needed to be developed in a much bigger way. I thought the approach was 
too intellectual and too micro focused, as I tend to be very practical and 
structured in my thinking.  
 
What possibilities did you see for some of the ideas developed in the workshops 
to be passed on to the official political process?   
 
 In so far as Professor Kelman was able to get a hold of senior people 
from both sides, people who had gone from being in the opposition to being in 
the government, for instance, yes those could have some influence. In most of 
the cases, people, who came to the group, had already made their decisions 
about their peaceful position; they already knew where they stood. I am not 
sure anyone changed his or her political view because of the discussions we 
had. If I think about the people who took part in the discussions on refugees 
and settlements, they all had already formed their positions and basically 
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argued their positions. All we really did was demonstrate that we had a good 
will to talk, as opposed to anything else. I do not think I learnt anything 
fundamentally new. Some of us – as individuals – had gone on further than the 
group as a whole in terms of making practical suggestions. Someone like 
Joseph Alpher, who in some respects one might disagree with fundamentally, 
came up with the Alpher Plan, in 1997, I think it was. It altered how we think 
about solving the settlement problems and whether one agrees with the 
underlying approach or not, it has become the basis for how everything is being 
resolved now. But he did not get that from the group, he brought that to the 
group. Educationally, it did not really advance me and that was partly why I 
felt it was time for me to move on, or for the group to move on. I felt that the 
group, at the time, could not advance, maybe because it was set out to produce 
a written product and therefore the discussions ended up being very general and 
we could not do better than the official team. Or if we were to do better, it 







Interview with Yossi Alpher, Tel Aviv, Israel, 11 November 2002 
 
Yossi Alpher is a writer and consultant on regional strategic issues, and 
director of the Political Security Domain (PSD), an independent NGO. He has 
served as director and acting head of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel 
Aviv University; as director of the American Jewish Committee's Israel/Middle 
East Office in Jerusalem; and as a senior official in the Mossad. While at the 
Jaffee Center, he coordinated and coedited the JCSS research project on 
options for a Palestinian settlement, and produced "The Alpher Plan" for an 
Israeli-Palestinian final settlement. Since 1992, he has coordinated several 
Track II dialogues between Israelis and Arabs. In July 2000 he served as 
special adviser to the prime minister of Israel, concentrating on the Israeli-
Palestinian peace process. In late 2001 he published (in Hebrew) And the Wolf 
Shall Dwell with the Wolf: the Settlers and the Palestinians. 
 
 
What were you doing in your professional life when you were participating in 
interactive problem-solving workshops?  
 
I joined the group, when I was about to leave the Jaffee Center for 
Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University. Then, I moved on to a non-academic 
position working as a representative of the American-Jewish Committee in 
Israel and the Middle East.  
 
How would you describe your personal experience of participating in problem-
solving workshops? Can you remember concrete moments during which 
deadlocks in the discussion occurred and how the group dealt with that?  
  
I cannot remember any dramatic moment, where on both sides people 
would say, ok, we drop our rejections to this and this. It was never like that. I 
think the best testimony to that was the [Joint Working Group] workshop, 




A very interesting confrontation took place during that workshop, when 
my Palestinian colleague and I presented what was more or less the final draft 
for the discussions of the following meeting. We had two Palestinian 
propositions and two Israeli propositions for a solution. Herb Kelman said that 
we had to merge all of them into one statement to which both sides could agree. 
My Palestinian colleague and I both said that we were unable to agree. We 
were both of the view that it was up to politicians and the negotiators to do that 
job. We saw it as being part of the horse-trading between refugee issues and 
Israeli settlements that was going on during the official negotiations. We felt 
that we could not go on any further because it would not have been 
intellectually honest of us.  
This was disappointing for the objective of the workshop group, which 
intended to engender a process that would lead to an agreed solution. The fact 
that we refused to come up with a unified solution was the reason that made it 
possible to get everybody's signature on the document on refugees. 
In retrospect, considering that the official negotiators could not solve the 
refugee problem proved that we were right, not to agree to the statements 
formulated by the Joint Working Group.  
 
To what extent were you able to introduce ideas that you had gained during the 
workshops into your professional activities? 
 
 My position in the American-Jewish Committee allowed me to continue 
to participate in the workshops because the Committee knew that it was 
important for me to keep my engagement in Israeli-Palestinian issues, to take 
part in these kinds of meetings, and to hear what the other side had to say. I 
dealt with the same issues on their behalf as well. In that sense my participation 




the other meetings were, which I continued to have with Palestinians on a 
Track Two level. I cannot put my finger on anything specific though.  
You founded the online Journal bitterlemons1 together with a Palestinian 
colleague. Could you explain what bitterlemons is and how its formation came 
about? 
 
 It came about the following way: In the Palestinian team of the [Joint 
Working Group] was Ghassan Khatib, who is now my partner in bitterlemons. I 
had met Ghassan previously in different Track Two meetings and I continued 
to meet with him in other consecutive Track Two meetings. But none of the 
other meetings were as intensive as the experience in the problem-solving 
workshops. Ghassan and I developed a healthy friendship at this time, not 
because we agreed on most issues. We actually often found ourselves involved 
in discussions, in which there was one Israeli dissenter: myself, and one 
Palestinian dissenter: Ghassan. We would dissent for different reasons, as we 
were on opposite sides of a given issue. We were, however, time and again 
winking at one another, as if we were collaborating in making sure that there 
were no agreements. So we established a good relationship even though we 
tended to disagree on quite a lot of things. We had a lot of respect for one 
another. When I began to develop the idea of bitterlemons about two years ago, 
I was talking to a number of Palestinian friends about finding a suitable partner 
for the project. Ghassan read my proposal and agreed with it, so from that 
moment onwards we became partners, and have consulted on absolutely 
everything ever since then.  
In its whole conception, bitterlemons, as I see it, is a kind of virtual 
Track Two. It is particularly well adapted to the current crisis: since the start of 
the Second Intifada it became harder for people to get together. You have to 
realize, two years ago, I was able to go to Ghassan's house in Ramallah, I could 
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drive to another Working Group colleague's office in Ramallah, and they could 
come to Jerusalem whenever they wanted to and we could get together and 
talk.  
Prior to the [Second] Intifada, you could do a Track Two project without 
the help of a neutral third party, which I consider to be an accomplishment. I 
actually organized such a meeting funded by the Ford Foundation between 
Israelis, Palestinians and Jordanians. We met in all three places or went abroad. 
We did not have any outside party providing us with a methodology; we did 
not need a facilitator. We traded jobs and rotated among those volunteering for 
them and so on.  
 
Would you say that generating more Track Two initiatives also meets an 
objective of Interactive Problem Solving?  
 
 Exactly, I also know of a number of other examples. There is an Israeli 
and a Palestinian, who set up an organization ten years ago. Today, however, it 
is much harder for us to do that. bitterlemons does not have a third party or 
facilitator and it is virtual, it is not land based. It is a kind of Track Two effort 
with limitations. The concept did not only grow out of the problem-solving 
workshops but out of all the Track Two projects that I had been involved in 
during the last ten years. A fact is that I would not have gotten to know 
Ghassan, if we had not been working together in the workshops. The method 
brought us all together in a specific atmosphere and that was crucial.  
 
To what extent was a process of change among the participants recognizable 





 We were all evolving and changing on both sides, without a doubt. The 
Working Group was, I think, a particularly good vehicle. I consider 
bitterlemons to be a kind of natural development stemming from that. It is 
unique in its form; there is nothing else like it. Part of the reason why it works, 
is a personal aspect, other people might have had a similar idea but could not 
get the right people together to put it into practice. The Working Group was 
important in this respect by bringing the right people together.  
 What you have to understand about ways it is a step forward, in some 
ways, however, it reflects the fact that we have moved backwards, because we 
do not even attempt to reach an agreement or consensus on any issue. We 
consider it an achievement today, if we are able to organize on a weekly basis a 
civilized exchange of views between Israelis and Palestinians, who do not 
agree with one another. That is the most we can aspire to, in that sense this is a 
step back from the atmosphere we had in the Working Group, where the idea 
was to see how far we could agree on certain issues. There are still people 
involved in similar efforts, who tend to be more on the left wing fringe. My 
sense is that they do not reflect any ability to have a widespread effect on 
people, or leaderships, or the larger public, which is something you were able 
to do in the late 1980s and the mid 1990s.  
 When we produced the paper on the refugees, we translated it from 
English into Hebrew and Arabic and distributed it very widely. When Ehud 
Barak, in one of his first speeches as Prime Minister in the Knesset, said with 
regard to the Palestinian refugee issue, that Israel had to show empathy for the 
Palestinian suffering and had to recognize that Israel forms part of the overall 
situation even though Israel might not bear responsibility for what happened to 
the Palestinians, he took the wording directly from us. So you could feel that, 




Would you qualify this as an example for the fact that achievements of the 
workshops were transported to the larger political process?  
 
Definitely. I never asked him or got a confirmation of that, but it 
nevertheless gave us a sense that we were having some influence, that we were 
ahead of the curve of the policy makers, which is where, as academics, we 
should be.  
With regard to the refugee paper, the wording of which we saw 
reappearing in Barak's speech, we had hoped that it would get a lot more 
publicity and attention than it did. At the time, before the commencement of 
final status negotiations, well before Camp David, the public was not interested 
in such issues. The public was not yet prepared to deal with these very 
existential narrative issues that are involved in the refugee question. There had 
been many more public discussions since Camp David, which had made 
evident how far we could go and what Arafat's ultimate position was. Camp 
David also told us that the spirit of the Palestinian side of the document was not 
the spirit of Arafat. I think we were much closer in representing what Barak 
ultimately offered than they on their part.   
 
How would you qualify Interactive Problem Solving as a methodology for 
conflict resolution?  
 
 I would compare the method to the efforts of some other facilitators and 
I must say that Interactive Problem Solving had a much more informed 
methodology. During the meetings we even had discussions about how to 
proceed on the basis of the methodology. Nevertheless, I did not feel that the 
methodology was particularly effective compared to what other people did 




acting completely intuitively as I do not have any training in that field. So I 
never felt that the methodology gave this project any dramatic advantage 
compared to other Track Two projects.  
 
Do you see possibilities for improving the workshop format? 
 
 No, because I think that ultimately the third party of the problem-solving 
workshops also did a lot of things intuitively. The method reached certain 
products, not all the products it aimed for but considerable ones. The important 
thing about the workshop format was not its methodology, I find, but the 
quality of the people, the intelligent third party members; as well as sufficient 
funding, time and motivation. The fact that we knew we would meet four times 
a year gave the effort a lot of weight. We knew that the papers we were 
working on were an ongoing project that could be continued in a following 






Interview with a Palestinian Civil Engineer, East Jerusalem, Israel,  
12 November 2002 
 
He served as secretary of the Palestinian National Steering Committee in the 
occupied territories and headed the Engineers Association in the West Bank. 
He contributed to the formation of a number of leading Palestinian civil society 
organizations such as the Higher Council of Education and the Arab Thought 
Forum. He worked on the launch of the Palestinian National Initiative and 
chaired the Board of Trustees of Bir Zeit University. 
 
 
How would you describe your personal experience of participating in 
interactive problem-solving workshops? 
 
The workshops were definitely educational in the sense that I gained 
more information about different situations; especially, because the Israeli 
participants were very knowledgeable and closely situated to the decision-
making-process in Israel. However, the highly analytical and fruitful 
discussions that provided me with new insights also reinforced previous 
convictions that I had. It was very difficult for the [Joint Working] Group to 
reach an agreement because there are levels that you cannot penetrate. The 
historic level of the average Israeli is one of them. Even the workshop 
participants seemed to me to be composed of two levels, a level on which you 
can conduct discussions and even come to conclusions sometimes, while the 
other level bears a realm that I cannot comprehend. For example, let me put it 
like this, when you speak about settlements in the Occupied Territories and you 
say that, as long as we have to live together, side by side, we need to find a 
way, by which to establish relations, some of the Israelis understand this while 
others do not because this would imply to get rid of the settlements in the West 
Bank and Gaza and this is something they cannot do. They cannot sell this idea 




In a conversation, where a compromise is sought and the intention is to 
come to a peace agreement, I cannot see a way by which it is possible to give a 
certain piece of land to the Israelis for the notion of security as being defined 
by the Israelis. I can understand their need and concern for security – I need 
security more than they do. On a certain level, Israelis are not able to negotiate 
a compromise when it comes to security issues. Under these conditions it is 
impossible to define an independent Palestinian state, if Israelis are not ready to 
give up control over a defined territory. If we cannot establish control over our 
boundaries, than we do not have a state.  
Some of the Israeli participants had something in the back of their 
minds, which they were unable to say or they felt they were betraying their 
cause by speaking about granting an autonomy status to the Palestinians. And I 
found that it was impossible to go beyond that level during the conversations in 
workshops.  
I think that what the Israelis are looking for is, and I am speaking about 
the left-wingers, that the Palestinians should have a flag, a passport and 
autonomy and that is all that they can have. Palestinians in the West Bank are 
not granted any rights but are tolerated by the Israelis to live there.  
 
How would you qualify interactive problem solving as a method?  
 The technique is good but it does not help us to go beyond the 
boundaries that I mentioned. At an advanced stage the method intends to 
produce papers on refugees on settlements and so on. But there are areas, very 
hot areas in the conflict, in which you find yourself to be in an awkward 
position when you have to accept the Israeli views and they most probably 
have the same feeling when they have to accept our views. For them what 
happened in 1967, was the continuation of the liberation of Israel, for us it was 
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occupation. How can you find a way by which to compromise between these 
two notions? They are totally contradictory!  
 
Does it help to hear how the other side perceives the situation? 
 
 Well, we have talked to the other side about how they see things. For 
example, with regard to the problem of the refugees: there were thoughts 
mentioned within the discussions, that we do not want all the Palestinians to 
come back and this is all right, we accept that; but Israelis have to accept their 
role in that situation, but they said no, it was a result of the war. The Israelis 
just said that every war produces refugees, and therefore they are not to blame 
for the Palestinian refugee problem. So they think that they are completely 
innocent. We asked them for an apology, to say that they were to some extent 
responsible for the refugee problem. The maximum compromise that we were 
able to reach was a statement saying that there was a joint responsibility 
between the Arab states, the Palestinians and the Israelis.   
 
To what extent do you think it is useful to hold discussions with regard to the 
limit you mentioned? 
 
Generally, it is useful. The method, as developed by Professor Kelman, 
may be successful in other areas for the resolution of other conflicts. The 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a very unique situation, where the primary 
conceptions of each side contradict each other. Some call it the conflict 
between two rights. In my opinion this is not the case. If we speak about the 
Israeli right to pray at the Wailing Wall, the saying is correct, but if we are 
speaking about national rights it is not. It is not a national right that is at stake 




I do not think that the technique of interactive problem solving can 
bridge this gap.  
 
Did you recognize changes that happened among participants between the first 
meeting and the last one? 
 
Yes, maybe not a change really, but what I found out through the 
workshops was how Israelis think with regard to certain issues. I knew most of 
the Israeli participants from before and knew that they are more right wing 
oriented than moderate. The discussions showed me that they also have liberal 
ideas. When it comes to the Jewish-Israeli problem vis-à-vis the land, however, 
their liberalism is left out of the equation. There is just a limit beyond which 
you cannot go. Liberalism means that I have the right to travel, to medical 
treatment and so on. When it comes to national rights, they have a very clear 
position. What has happened in1948 is seen as being normal and in accordance 
with the UN resolution; what happened in 1967, is seen as being almost 
normal. It is not seen as consisting of a real occupation, but as being something 
between occupation and liberation of their land. Changing that perception 
requires a long timeframe.  
I think that even under the present, very tough situations, there are 
changes taking place in everybody's mind that will be inherited by the new 
generation, changes that will finally help us to find a solution. If we could 
come to the understanding that no one needs to be an occupier or needs to be 
occupied, we could live normally as human beings, keeping our culture and 
understandings. We have to accept each other's different ways of thinking 
without trespassing the other's culture and way of life. The Israelis want to 
establish their way of life in the area. They want to establish a hegemony that is 
more related to secular perspectives, not religious ones.  
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The technique of interactive problem solving is wonderful from an 







Interview with Moshe Ma’oz, Jerusalem, Israel,  
12 November 2002. 
 
Moshe Ma’oz is Professor Emeritus of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at 
The Hebrew University, Jerusalem and previous director of the University’s 
Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace. He has 
been a visiting professor, scholar and fellow at many leading universities and 
institutions around the world. His scholarly works focus on Middle Eastern 
politics, with several published in Arabic as well as Hebrew and English. He 
has served Israel’s Knesset as an advisor on Arab Affairs, and was a member of 
official advisory committees that counselled Prime Ministers’ Shimon Peres 
and Yitzhak Rabin.  
 
 
What were you doing in your professional life when you participated in 
interactive problem-solving workshops? 
 
 I was a professor for Middle Eastern Studies and Director of the Harry 
S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace, here at the 
Hebrew University in Jerusalem. I organized a lot of conferences and 
workshops. The one with Professor Kelman was the most serious one, because 
it was ongoing over several years and there were serious people taking part in 
it.  
 
When did you participate in a problem-solving workshop for the first time? 
I think the first time I took part was in 1986, I was at Harvard 
[University] at the time for a sabbatical and we organized a little workshop 
with four Palestinians and four Israelis some of them were there for a 
sabbatical, some came from abroad and we engaged in a discussion about the 
relation between Palestinians and Israelis. This was the start. The discussion 




How would you describe your experience of participating in problem-solving 
workshops? 
 
It was very fruitful, very important in terms of getting to know one 
another and to find some ways to sort out things, and to find ideas for solutions. 
Especially the discussions we had on refugees, on settlements, and on the 
future Israeli-Palestinian relationship, were important as their results were 
published. The system of the workshops [of the Joint Working Group] 
consisted of plenary group discussions and of sessions in two subgroups, for 
which one Palestinian and one Israeli would prepare a draft paper beforehand 
and work on it in their subgroup. In the plenary the two papers were then 
discussed and amended to eventually form an agreed text out of it.  
 The only snag was, that none of the governments of the two sides were 
ready to accept those papers.  
 
How did your perception of the relationship between the two parties change? 
 
 It was a gradual change that we went through. As far as I am concerned, 
that process started a long time before my participation in the workshops. You 
see, you need people with a certain attitude to take part in such conferences. 
For example, a right wing Israeli would not accept to participate in such a 
group because he does not believe in it. Only liberal lefties or scholars are open 
to participate in these kinds of workshops. Of course, you need some cleavage 
between the participants to have discussions of some depth.  
 As far as I am concerned my personal process of change started before I 
first participated in a workshop. While sitting in the workshops, I think some 
things became clearer, I saw more deeply into the Palestinian cause and better 




influenced to a certain extent by the workshops although I had already formed 
my position. I felt that from all the group members, I was the one, who was 
closest to the Palestinian point of view. They almost took me for a Palestinian 
[laughs] because I was sensitive to their grievances.  This was due to my 
profession being a scholar of Islamic and Middle Eastern studies, so I knew the 
situation better than others. But not all of the participants on the Israeli side 
were what we call "Arabists".  
 
How would you qualify the impact of the workshops on the wider political 
process? 
  
On the general public, I am not sure whether there was a big influence, 
certainly not on decision-makers, nor the government in power. By and large 
from my experience, it had very little impact on the decision-makers.  
With regard to the general public, we published those papers, but again I 
believe that those publications were not able to convince many people. As 
those who do not believe it, just ignore it. We planned a number of press 
conferences but nothing came out of it. Our findings were not implemented at 
all. We intended to spread the word, and I did, I wrote about it and talked to 
colleagues and friends. I suppose that some of them learned something and I 
was able to clarify some points for them. Others who did not like the idea a 
priori just rejected what I said.  
 It is a very tricky question that you asked, I do not know whether there 
is an answer to that.  
Because it is difficult to trace back the origins of such influences? 
 




Can you remember a concrete situation during the workshops in which the 
group encountered difficulties or a blockage that could be overcome through a 
change in perception? 
 
 Yes, I think so, that is a good point. I think the positions of the two sides 
became closer during the workshops as people on both sides learnt more about 
the other, about their grievances and positions. This process of getting a better 
understanding of one another was certainly at work. For example, with regard 
to the issue of refugees the [Joint Working] Group encountered the problem 
that each side has a baggage of being educated towards adopting a certain 
position. The Israeli version of the origin of the refugee problem is, that the 
Arabs just fled; while the Arab version is, that the Israelis expelled them. The 
truth is both; depending on the circumstances and the area you are talking 
about. I think this had become clear to both sides during the workshop 
discussions. It became apparent when the Israeli participants, who had first 
been opposed to the idea of accepting to deal with the refugee problem, became 
ready to include the issue in settlement negotiations. Not everyone in the group 
was happy with that development, though, and our friends criticized us about it.  
 Another example of a blockage with regard to formulating a statement 
on the refugee issue was, when it became clear that many Israelis do not 
understand that Palestinians want Israelis to apologize for the event that created 
the refugee problem. The Israelis felt very strongly that they did not need to 
apologize, because they did not start the war, the Arabs did. What we, on the 
Israeli side, were ready to say was that we were sorry and that it is a tragedy. 
We are willing to help and provide compensation but we cannot apologize for 
this. The Palestinians were not very happy about that reaction. I suggested 




idea. These are changes that occurred among participants during the workshop 
discussions.  
 I saw that change occurring within myself. Initially, I thought: why 
should we apologize? Then I thought: they have a point because there were 
cases where we, the Israelis, expelled Palestinians, so we have some 
responsibility. But the group did not reach an agreement about accepting 
responsibility. Although, I think there were others, who were willing to accept 
it.  
 One of the Israeli participants was a member of the Knesset and he used 
this idea, this argument, in one of his Knesset debates. He was criticized for it 
but I still think it was positive for the Palestinians, because it was at least 
publicly stated.  
 To answer your question, yes there were some dynamics that changed 
the positions of the participants on both sides.  
 
How would you qualify the method in general? 
 
 I liked the informal character of it and the professional way in which it 
was organized. I think that the social-psychological basis of the method is very 
helpful. The weak points of the method, I found, lay in the fact that it is 
preaching to the converted, in the sense that only people who have a pro-peace 
attitude would be willing to engage in such a dialogue group; and that it is not 
very strong in reaching and influencing the decision-makers.  
 





That is very difficult. Governments, their agencies and the political 
parties all have their own agendas, but what we can do is try and give 
munitions to the parties, who stand for these ideas, usually left wing parties; 
give them something that they can use. On that level, the method can be 
improved or be used to reach the decision-making level. And this is what we 
[the members of the Joint Working Group] actually did, we sent the papers to 
the Knesset members, whether they used it or not, that is very hard to say. We 
also aimed at reaching people on a grass-root level, which we did by visiting 
schools and universities, and by working on projects that would bring people to 
meet one another, which is a very tall job. To enhance the method's influence 
we would need more organizations doing that kind of work. The workshop 
group does not have the capacity to reach a sufficient amount of people that 
would be necessary to achieve change.  
One of my daughters, who also works in conflict resolution, recently 
conducted a study and found out that only three percent of the Israelis met with 
Palestinians in such a framework. 
Another way of reaching people consists of publishing articles, then 
again probably only those with an open mind would read material on those 
subjects, and it is doubtful whether publications can reach those who should be 
convinced.  
So the question remains, even with all those efforts in place, whether 
one is able to change the mind of the undecided, or at least cast a doubt on 
those people's beliefs. There are examples of cases, in which it was possible to 
achieve such changes, look at what happened in the case of the Israeli relations 
to Egypt when 80% of Israelis were against reaching a solution with Egypt and 
changed their minds because of Sadat's visit to Israel. Although that was only 
possible due to a gesture of a strong leader in whom people trusted. The 




worked in the case of the secret Norway Channel, which used similar 





Interview with Gabriel Ben-Dor, Haifa, Israel,  
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Haifa and has lectured as Visiting Professor at Universities in Canada. 
He has published many books and over one hundred articles on Middle East 
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How would you describe your personal experience of participating in 
interactive problem-solving workshops? 
 
 I joined the [Joint Working] Group in 1994 and stayed with it for about 
five years. We used to meet about four times a year, mostly in Europe and 
sometimes in the Middle East. We formed sub-committees in order to work on 
some specific problems of the conflict.  
 The first meeting in 1994 lasted for eight days. We set up a core group, 
which was supposed to look at the big issues and the nature of the relationship, 
and then we would break into sub-groups specializing on specific issues. I 
though that this was a good procedure, because, first, there was time and 
patience and second, we were talking about the big things, about the nature of 
our relationship and where we were going and not about little details of 
wordings. We worked out a set of principles. Later on, we lost that patience 
and had shorter meetings, taking just a weekend off from our other 
engagements.  
 All the sub-groups were structured in the same way consisting of one 
Israeli, one Palestinian and one third-party member. We took great care of 




would otherwise go astray. We worked very slowly. The group argued about 
every word in the formulations. By the time we were ready to produce 
something, it was too late because other people, politicians had worked quicker 
than we did.  
I was unhappy with the fact that in most sessions during the final two 
years 80 to 90% of the time was spent on arguing about words and 
formulations, which is more for diplomats concluding a deal than for a group 
like this with the objective to try and understand the other side.  
I am a theoretician myself, so I have some reservations towards the 
method. I found that the group did not always stick to the original format and 
its theoretical source stemming from Burton's interactive problem-solving 
approach. I think that the structure was not very tight. Most of the participants 
did not know the method and were not interested in its theoretical background; 
they were interested in making progress on the substance of negotiations. 
Therefore, the meetings focused less on the methodology and more on 
establishing continuity and building trust through open and frank discussions.  
I was unhappy with the theoretical and methodological part of the 
workshops, I think it was very loosely structured and far away from the original 
theoretical assumptions of the people who had formed the method. It became 
more intuitive. We eventually found that this kind of intuitive approach could 
not overcome the realities of the situation on the ground, which was becoming 
very serious.  
We made progress on some issues and managed to produce a couple of 
joint papers. They did not have a major impact, though. We were arguing many 
times about how to present those papers to make a big splash at the UN. The 
fact that we did not manage to achieve more impact, or to produce a major 




Can you remember concrete moments during which deadlocks in the discussion 
occurred and how the group dealt with that? 
 
 I can give you one example, which is of theoretical importance to me; it 
was a point that I pushed for very strongly. I pushed for what we call in 
theoretical terms: linkage. The group worked on five different issues, on 
refugees, etc. I said that there was no way to make progress that way. In order 
to achieve progress, each group would have to choose the issue that is most 
vital to them and gain concessions from the other party on that issue by 
granting them the same in return. Then each side would be able to compromise. 
We never really got to that point of integrative bargaining, which you find in 
negotiations like the ones held in Camp David. Instead, we were bargaining on 
specifics. We did make some progress that way though. The sessions we had 
on settlements were quite successful. I found that the Palestinian participant 
who was working with me was quite forthcoming. Then I found that what he 
said was not congruent with the view of the other Palestinian participants. 
When we went back to the plenary session and presented our paper, the other 
Palestinians did not accept the ideas. The Palestinian participant I had worked 
with was from England and was far away from his own people. He was 
thinking in more universal terms, which he found easier to live with. When we 
took these ideas to the real life situation, they were rejected.  
 Also, the Israeli participants were not representative of the mainstream, 
they were far left of centre and we had some arguments within our team. Some 
of them were really far removed from the Israeli mainstream. What they said 
was nice and allowed for making compromises and concessions to Palestinians. 
However, they represented only about two percent of the Israeli public opinion.  
 What we really needed to do was to compromise, not between the more 




represented. The difficulty that the third party faced was, whether they should 
choose more participants representing the mainstream of their respective 
societies and put up with greater difficulties within the discussions; or choose 
participants, who were more open minded and thought along similar lines and, 
thus, would be able to agree on some things.  
 
Did your understanding of the other side change during the workshops? 
  
Yes, I think that I learnt to better appreciate the Palestinian point of 
view, I learnt a lot about the details of their perception. And I think I learnt 
more about Israel.  
I did not experience a revolutionary change. The sessions actually made me 
more pessimistic. Knowing the Palestinian attitude better, made me more 
pessimistic because I understood how far they were from us and how far we 
were from them and how difficult it would be to overcome this gap.  
 We did manage to overcome some gaps with regard to certain issues, 
though.  
 
How did your understanding of your own party change during the workshops? 
 
 Not very much, I tried to look at myself again, when I returned from the 
meetings and tried to reflect on how Palestinians saw me, whether I did a good 
job or whether I should have been more forthcoming, more willing to 
compromise and so on. But I felt that progress along these lines had been 
hindered because of the loose structure.  
 




 Sure, I suggest two things. One concerns the structure and the second 
concerns the choosing of participants. I suggest choosing people representing 
the mainstream of their society; if that means that the distance between the two 
groups is large, than this should be accepted as a reality factor. Instead of 
preaching to the converted, the method should get a real sense of what life out 
there is like, as a starting point. We failed to do that. I think if we had started 
with more representative participants and stuck to the structure more strictly, if 
we had refrained from diplomatic haggling over words and had stuck more to 
the interactive problem-solving method, we would have made more progress. 
Or else we would have learned more about why it was not possible to make 











Interview with Yuli Tamir, Jerusalem, Israel, 14 June 2004. 
 
Professor Yuli Tamir received a BA in Biology and an MA in Political Science 
from the Hebrew university of Jerusalem and a PhD in Political Philosophy 
from Oxford University. She was one of the founders of Peace Now in 1978. 
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and was a member of the Knesset from 2003 until 2010, as Minister of 
Absorption, Minister of Education and Minister of Science, Culture and Sport. 
Today she is the President of the Management Board of the Shenkar College in 
Ramat Gan.  
 
 
Why did you decide to participate in an interactive problem-solving workshop? 
 
Because no other channel of communication existed between Israelis 
and Palestinians, at the time we started working. So, I thought it was a good 
idea to develop a permanent dialogue.  
What I liked about the meetings is their continuity both in terms of 
participants and in terms of time that they would continue over several years. 
What I also favored about them was that they were focused on very important 
aspects of the conflict.  
They allowed us to discuss those things and evaluate changes as we 
were meeting each other time and again, so we were able to evaluate what was 
happening on the other side.  
 
How often did you participate in a workshop? 
 




What were you doing in your professional life when you were participating in 
the workshops? 
 
I was active in the civil rights association and was politically active in 
general.  
 
How did the workshop experience influence your professional activity? 
 
I think, throughout all these years, I gained a lot of insight into what was 
happening on the Palestinian side and learnt how to evaluate what Israel can 
offer.  
 
How would you describe your personal experience as a workshop participant? 
 
It allowed me to experience a much closer relationship with some 
Palestinians knowing them, knowing the way they think, and having a very 
effective channel of communication. Even now I speak to many of them and I 
am in very close contact with some of the former Palestinian group members.  
 
How did your conflict perception change? 
 
What changed for me was not so much the perception of the conflict but 
of a future agreement of what could be achieved, what kind of agreement is 
achievable and who the partners are within the Palestinian camp to talk to.  
Did your perception of the other side change? 
 
Yes, the more I understood about their situation, the more it changed.  




I think, I became more sensitive towards the dynamics and the way we 
raise some issues in contrast to the way the Palestinians illuminated some of 
the aspects of the dialogue.  
 
Can you remember a concrete moment during the workshop discussions when 
such change occurred? 
For me, the most significant moment during the workshops was, when 
we had a very fierce debate about the right of return and it looked as if we 
reached a complete standstill, and than after a long period of tension, one of my 
Israeli colleagues stood up and said to the Palestinians, that this had been a 
very difficult moment for all of us and that the Israelis were aware of what the 
Palestinians had been going through. The Israeli participant addressed 
especially one of the Palestinian participants, who had been imprisoned for 
many years, and said that the group appreciated that this Palestinian participant 
took part in the dialogues and that the dedication of this participation was very 
moving for all members of the group.  
By saying that, my Israeli colleague opened up a new kind of dialogue, 
but it also taught me a lesson about the inequality of the point of departure for 
these dialogues of each side. We both come and we negotiate and we go back 
home. They go back home but they go back to a situation of occupation where 
they have to face very difficult conditions. It was a very important lesson for 
me, to understand that their background is so different from ours.  
 






To what extent were you able to use some of the ideas that were developed 
during the workshops in your professional activities? 
 
I think we were in Austria together the day we heard about the Oslo 
Agreement. It was very interesting for all of us to learn this fact while sitting 
together and discuss it. It was a very interesting moment to see how the group 
reacted to the fact that there is an agreement and that it was in a way very 
similar to what we had in mind.  
 
Did you feel you were somehow part of this process that led to the Oslo 




Do you have any final comments about the nature of the method? 
 
I think the important thing, as I said, is its continuity. Because we met so 
many times we got to know each other and became friends; that was the most 
important part. Also, the composition of the group was a good one because it 
contained intellectuals situated on the left; at that time not many people from 
the right were ready to meet Palestinians.  







Interview with Ze'ev Shiff, Tel Aviv, Israel, 15 June 2004.  
 
Ze’ev Shiff, the late Israeli defence analyst, wrote numerous books, including 
Israel's Lebanon War and Intifada. He also served as a military correspondent 
in Vietnam, the Soviet Union, Cyprus and Ethiopia. He joined the Haaretz in 
1955 and became senior associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace in 1984. He was the chairman of the Military Writers Association, a 
fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and an Isaac and 
Mildred Brochstein Fellow in Peace and Security at the James A. Baker III 
Institute for Public Policy at Rice University. Schiff won several prizes, 
including the Sokolov Journalism Prize, the Amos Lev Prize, and the Sarah 
Reichenstein Prize. He died in 2007 at the age of 74.  
 
 
What were you doing in your professional life when you participated in 
interactive problem-solving workshops? 
 
 I worked as a journalist. 
 
Why did you decide to participate in a problem-solving workshop? 
 
Yesterday evening, when we were listening to a number of lecturers [at 
the Track Two Diplomacy Conference at Tel Aviv University] I took notes for 
myself to find out in how many of such dialogue groups I have participated 
during my career. Herb Kelman's group is unique in many aspects. It is not the 
only one that is good but I would say that there were only about two or three 
kinds of dialogue groups, which I found good.  
Something that was not mentioned at all by the speakers yesterday 
concerning the role of Track Two, and something that was not included in the 
list of all the things that can be achieved through Track Two efforts, is 
something that Herb Kelman managed to do, maybe not intentionally, but it 
was contained in the outcome of the workshops. The IPS workshop meetings 
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became sort of a school, an unbelievable school, for negotiators. This became 
apparent when many workshop participants became engaged in the official 
negotiations in the 1990s. This was particularly the case for a number of 
Palestinians, who became actual negotiators in the official talks, and also for 
some Israelis, who acted as advisors and members of the official delegations. 
This was an unbelievable development.  
Later on this created a problem, because some of them said: "listen I am 
really sorry, things which I have said yesterday, I cannot do anymore, because I 
became sort of an official". So some of them left the group, although nothing 
that was discussed in the group would leak to the outside. It was an excellent 
unbelievable group, consisting of people, some of whom had not wanted to 
engage in talks let alone in negotiations, who - all of a sudden - started listening 
to each other. Palestinian group members began to understand what the red line 
was for us Israelis and the same was true for us towards the other side. This is 
something that was unique about the problem-solving workshops.  
Herb Kelman was a pioneer in organizing a Track Two initiative and 
thereby created a sort of school for negotiators or for developing diplomatic 
skills and that is something that was not mentioned by any of the lecturers 
yesterday.  
Secondly, what stood out about herb Kelman's workshops was their 
seriousness. Professor Kelman did not always intervene, when there were 
problems in the workshop group. Other groups I participated in were faster in 
producing things and publishing them. Herb Kelman, on the other hand, was 
slow; he was digging in deeper and deeper. The written results came later, just 
very slowly. If you look at the documents, which were produced, the 
seriousness and the thoroughness of the endeavor becomes apparent. Herb 
Kelman's dialogue groups therefore were the most serious ones for me, as he 




although we encountered real problems and we wanted to stop because we had 
reached a dead end, especially with regard to questions about the refugee 
problem. But if you read the paper we produced on the refugee problem, I think 
it's content is unique, particularly with regard to one aspect. It was not 
welcomed, by the way, by some of my colleagues here in Israel. But the paper 
was the only occasion when we found a formula of how to deal with the 
sensitive narratives of both sides. If you read the paragraph on the refugee issue 
you will see that both sides understood – although we did not go into any 
numbers – but we dealt with the narratives, which is tremendously important.  
We reached a sort of a formula in which we did not blame each other we 
just spoke of the results of this war. It was not a question of blaming the 
Israelis who expelled the Palestinians, or blaming the Arabs that they aimed in 
any case to destroy the Jewish state. We spoke about the flight of Palestinian 
refugees and it was clear to us that all of us were responsible not just one; we 
did not blame each other. Professor Kelman was enormously helpful in 
bringing that result about. 
Professor Kelman was not scared to touch on such sensitive issues. He 
understood the importance about each side's narratives concerning the refugee 
issue. It was clear to him, that neither the Palestinians, nor the Israelis, no 
Palestinian leader and no Israeli leader, could accept the other side's claim; nor 
could they deny or give up the right of return. It was something that neither 
side was able to do at that stage. I personally changed my views as well.  
 
Because of your participation in the workshops? 
 
No, no, do not misunderstand me. Because of the workshops I became 
much more open to their [Palestinian] identity. I had no problem to 
acknowledge the fact that they are here and what the war had brought about. I 
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understood how important their ties [to the land] were, just as important as 
ours. I understood their identity; I understood their deep connection to this 
place. Although, when I thought about the concrete numbers of refugees, I 
came to the conclusion that every Palestinian no matter what, no matter where, 
no matter whether he is a millionaire in Detroit, he continues to see himself as a 
refugee. Every Palestinian considers himself as a refugee and they will never 
give that up. This leads to a scary number. The change that I underwent was, 
that I learnt to understand the meaning of what they were saying.  
What I was referring to is a change that is not related to the workshop 
experience. This change came about because of the last uprising, the Second 
Intifada and the bloodshed. I decided that no matter what, I did not want to 
absorb any more Palestinian refugees. For the Israeli Arabs, who are here I am 
ready to do everything that they gain access to all the rights. But I am not going 
to give the key to others, no matter what.  
 
What other changes about how you perceive the Palestinians or you own side 
did you experience during the workshops? 
 
I better understood that there was a perceived threat [on the Palestinian 
side], and I better understood how to explain our perception of threat to the 
Palestinian side, and I better understood the meaning of occupation, the Israeli 
occupation.  
 
How the Palestinians perceive the situation? 
 
Yes. My understanding changed not only through my participation in 
problem-solving workshops but also through experiences gained in other 




roadblocks with regard to security. I suggested that we should create a 
committee, which would deal with the essentials. For example, a committee of 
doctors in order to help sick and elderly people and create a situation, in which 
we would become able to deal with real problems. I said that I could organize a 
discussion with doctors, willing to form such a committee, to work out the 
necessary details. I was shocked by a very interesting reaction, the Palestinians 
living in the territories supported me immediately, Palestinians living in Jordan 
or abroad, however, said no to the idea, finding it not important. No solution 





Interview with Harold Saunders, Tel Aviv, Israel,  
16 June 2004. 
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You were a member of the third party for the Continuing Workshop. Why did 
you decide to participate in the workshops? 
 
The motivation to participate in the meetings held in Cambridge, USA, 
was that, in the early 1980s, there was a strong feeling that it was important for 
each side to recognize, what the deepest fears of the other side were, and then 
to think about what they could do to reduce the fear concerning one particular 
point. There was a general objective that if each side would write something, 
stating the new position they were able to take with regard to a particular point, 
it would most effectively reduce the fear of the other side.  
I think each party tried to write a paragraph or two, which was then 
presented to the other side so that they could respond to it. The objective was to 
find participants on each side, who could publish those statements in a media 
that would reach their respective constituency, like in a newspaper editorial, for 
example. The idea was to start a series of such articles, stating the position of 




reached within a workshop meeting would have had the potential of producing 
actions outside of the meeting.  
 
According to you, what is the aim of problem-solving workshops? 
 
To find out how participants change within a workshop and how that 
change demonstrates what is required to change the relationship of the conflict 
parties or at least the relationship of the representatives of the conflict parties, 
who participate in a problem-solving workshop. The purpose of the workshops 
is to find out, what causes people to change their perception.  
I often say, that the purpose of my dialogue groups is first, to change the 
relationships of the participants and to enable them to learn what it would cost 
them to change the relationship with the other, what they would have to give up 
in terms of their convictions about the other, to say I was wrong, my perception 
was wrong, and which familiar perception do I have to give up. The second 
purpose is to change the larger party politic of which the participants are a part.  
When I chaired a meeting between representatives from Armenia-
Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh, I remember starting a meeting by saying to 
one side: what do you need from the other side in order to do what you need to 
do, what do you need to persuade your fellow Armenians? In response I got a 
lecture on the history of the Armenian-Turkish genocide; I got a lecture on the 
history of the Armenian people and so on. At three o'clock in the afternoon, 
one of my American colleagues said: look, at 9 o'clock Harold Saunders asked 
you a question that you managed to avoid for six hours, why can't you answer 
that question?   
They were not able to answer that question because it was too painful.  
 
Because that question referred to their deepest fears? 
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Yes, and because they would have to acknowledge that fear, admit to it 
and describe their weaknesses.  
If people can learn in a workshop what they have to give up, that is a 
learning that they can take out of the room and transfer to their constituency. If 
they learn in the workshop what it requires to introduce such change out there, 
that new insight can be transferred. This is conceivable to do if you are an 
editor of a newspaper writing an editorial that addresses that change; if you are 
a politician it is more difficult.  
Problem-solving workshops offer a realm in which one can discover the 
deepest roots of conflict and how these can be addressed. I always thought of 
Herb as a social scientist, as a scholar, with the primary interest of bringing 
people together for the purpose of revealing, to the groups sitting across the 
table from each other, the deeper roots of conflict.  
 
How can you demonstrate that the workshops set a process in motion that 
reveals underlying conflict causes and that helps to transfer this new insight to 
the constituencies of the participants? 
 
If it is possible in the course of a workshop to say that people change 
their assumptions about what is really at issue in a given conflict, there is a bit 
of knowledge produced that demonstrates what the assumptions about the 
nature of a conflict really are. That in itself has a potential to impact on the 
wider public and body politic.  
You do not have to demonstrate that the pro-peace participants taught 
the Israeli and Palestinian bodies politic that this or that is the cause of the 
conflict, you do not have to demonstrate that connection.  
 




Yes. But you do have to do something to make ideas travel. For example, 
Shimon Shamir's invitation to the Track Two Conference said that his 
motivation for organizing the conference was to insert the idea of Track Two 
into the Israeli discourse of the conflict. In other words, reach wider acceptance 
of Track Two work as a legitimate way of addressing conflict issues. After the 
conference he said to me that he got a lot of positive feed-back and felt that the 
conference contributed to broadening the acceptance of Track Two and to 
making it a part of Israeli thinking about the conflict, which it was not two 
years ago. This actually surprises me, because Track Two efforts have been 
going on for 33 years and after the Oslo Accords, you would have thought that 





Interview with an Israeli MD, Tel Aviv, Israel,  
18 June 2004.  
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New York Times. He is currently the Chairman of S. Daniel Abraham Center 
for Strategic Dialogue in Netanya Academic College. 
 
 
Why did you decide to participate in an interactive problem-solving workshop? 
 
I have to refer to my professional background. I was assigned Governor 
of the West Bank in January 1988, serving my last post as a military official. I 
was considered as one of those Israelis who understand the Palestinian 
situation. I have to say that my service as the Governor of the West Bank 
convinced me that Israeli-Palestinian peace is necessary – not unavoidable – 
necessary. Then, I joined the Labor Party where I was again considered as 
someone who knows the matter quite well. In 1988, Rabin and Perez sent me to 
negotiate with the Palestinians. When I had an opportunity under the auspices 
of Professor Kelman to become engaged in a dialogue with Palestinians, who 
are also in favor of dialogue and peace, I was very glad to accept it. You 
remember at the beginning of the Intifada people were quite desperate and 
scared about what was going on.  
 





For me, and I think for other participants as well, the participation in the 
workshop was important because it was a very good way to learn what the 
other side feels in a very direct and intimate way.  
You know the discussions were quite lengthy, it took time and we were 
not under pressure of time. We were sitting together and talked for hours and I 
think this helped everybody on both sides. This was the main value of the 
workshop to generate understanding of the other side, for them and for us.  
 
How did your perception of the other side change? 
 
I did not lack knowledge at that time of what was going on, but I had 
some decisive conversations that generated a better understanding of what was 
going on inside the Palestinian community.  
 
You mean you gained better understanding of what influenced the Palestinian 
perspective? 
 
Exactly, about the inner side of their politics.  
 
Was that also the case in terms of your own community, did your 
understanding of the Israeli view also change?  
 
Yes, it was important for both sides in the same way.  
 
To what extent were you able to gain new ideas from the workshop discussions 
that influenced your social-political activities? 
Maybe not concrete new ideas, but it was important to have this 
experience, to have a permanent dialogue.  
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Did your increased understanding of the other influence how you approached 
matters after your participation in the workshops?  
 
Yes exactly.  
 
To what extent did you experience concrete changes of perception during the 
workshop discussions? 
 
I do not remember historical turning points in the workshop.  
There were no decision-makers among the Palestinians. At that time, 
they were not yet at that point. Many of them would just repeat the general 
Palestinian rhetoric. But since they were very eloquent and very candid, it gave 
us confidence. Later on, however, many of the participants on the Palestinian 
side became prominent members of the Palestinian establishment. 
 
How would you qualify the method in general? 
 
It is always important to talk.  
At the time when we had the official dialogues with the Palestinians, the so-
called "momentum" type of dialogue [that is achieved in workshops] was not 
so needed.  The time when that kind of dialogue is needed is in times when 
there is no dialogue between the two sides, like now.  
I just recently participated half a day in a workshop Professor Kelman 





Interview with a Palestinian Architect and Author, 
Frankfurt, Germany, 10 October 2004.   
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2006, she was appointed as a vice-chairperson of the Board of Trustees of 
Birzeit University. Her publications include, “Sharon and My Mother-in-Law: 
Ramallah Diaries“, which was awarded in 2004 the prestigious Viareggio Prize 




What were you doing in your professional life at the beginning of the 1990s? 
 
In 1990 I was teaching at Birzeit University most of my time. But let me 
go back two more years, as my activities at that time are relevant to our topic. 
In 1988, I participated in a woman’s conference where Israeli and Palestinian 
women came together and a real network resulted from that encounter. We 
would continue to meet and discuss conflict issues. That was a very important 
experience for me, because, as a Palestinian, you know that the Israelis are the 
ones who are of a stronger mentally, they are the ones who are the occupier, 
they are the ones with the big arms and with the airplanes. So you always have 
this image of the Israelis as being very strong. While on the Palestinian side 
you do not have weapons etc. Through these meetings with Israeli women, I 
realized that Israelis perceive the situation in an opposite way on the 
psychological level and this was for me very important. I realized that there is a 
lot of insecurity among the Israelis and also a lot of fear, real fear. From a 
Palestinian viewpoint this fear may seem to be ridiculous because they have the 
strongest military power. So for me it was essential to realize that having a 
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strong army does not give you security, internal security [psychological 
security]. I think that Palestinians have a lot of security inside. It was so 
interesting for me to see that the psychological equation is just the opposite of 
the military equation. It also told me that I have to take the fear or concerns of 
Israelis seriously. At the very beginning it looked so ridiculous to me that 
Israelis would ask Palestinians to give them security. How could we give them 
security, at a time, when we only had stones and knifes? Israelis telling us that 
they wanted to collect our knifes, sounded absurd to me.  
In the 1990s the situation was still the same. When the meetings with 
Herb Kelman started, it was a continuation for me of what I had been doing in 
the framework of the women’s meetings. In the 1990s I also started RIWAQ2 
and, in 1991 I was very interested in the protection of cultural heritage.  
Then Madrid happened. I did not go to the first meeting there. I only 
participated in the second round of the talks in Washington. I received a 
telephone call from a PLO member in Tunis telling me that I should participate 
as a delegate of the Palestinian team taking part in the official negotiations. At 
fist I thought why me? And it took me a while to come to a decision. I was very 
scared and very much taken by surprise because the negotiation team had been 
formed some months before, and I never expected to become part of it. Also, 
the negotiation team was based on political activists. I have always been active 
and I have always been close to the democratic front but I have never been a 
member of the PLO. In all my life, however, my political activism never took 
priority over my professional life. I was always more concerned about my 
profession as an architect or as a teacher, then about any kind of political 
activities. All the other participants did just the opposite; they had all 
abandoned their profession for a political career.   
Only after a good friend of mine told me that this was a once-in-a-




participant. I accepted, also, because I was the only woman of the negotiation 
team. There were other women involved but because they were from East 
Jerusalem the Israelis did not allow them to enter official negotiations in the 
state department. So I was the only woman participating in the negotiations, on 
both sides by the way, the Israelis did not have a woman negotiator either. Only 
at a latter stage, I think the Israelis once brought in a woman consultant. Also 
on the Palestinian side a female workshop participant was brought in later on.  
When Oslo happened, I was sure that I wanted to go back to University 
and teach and continue my work on RIWAQ, but then, I conceded to work for 
the ministry of culture, without being a deputy. I worked there for 18 months. 
At the beginning it was great fun to find a building that we could rent, buying 
furniture and lamps, setting up the structure of the departments and hiring 
people. Then all of a sudden I was overwhelmed with all the new appointees. 
Looking back now, I find myself very naïve and immature. Most of the 
appointments were political; people who had been activists of the PLO and 
who had to be absorbed one way or another. At that time this caused me a lot of 
frustration because I did not know whom to trust. So after 18 months I resigned 
and went back to RIWAQ.  
 
Why exactly did you decide to participate in problem-solving workshops in 
addition to the fact that it was a logical consequence after your participation in 
the women’s meetings?  
 
I have always believed in that kind of work and that it is extremely 
important to talk to Israelis. Also, I believe that the Israelis have big problems 
within their own society.  
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In the case of Herb Kelman’s workshops, you have to recall that what I 
tell you is what I think now, not what I thought then; it is very difficult for me 
to recall what I thought at that particular moment.  
There are two main reasons why I participated in Herb Kelman’s 
workshops. First, because it seemed to me that this effort could eventually lead 
to the recognition of the PLO. At the time there were many meetings between 
Israelis and Palestinians who were active in the PLO, without the PLO being a 
recognized political organization.  The workshops were something that the 
PLO knew about, although there was no direct contact with the PLO. In 
addition, the Israelis [influential Israelis who participated in the workshop] 
were ok with that. It was most important to me that people from the Israeli side 
were willing to meet with PLO representatives.  
Second, it was important to me that some of my friends participated as 
well, which meant that I was familiar with the people going there.  
 
How did you feel when you first participated in the workshops? 
 
I was not scared, I hardly find myself in situations that scare me 
[laughs]. But I was and am still very frustrated with many of the arguments 
because I expected different things from people who are willing to come and 
meet Palestinians even Palestinians associated with the PLO. There are only 
very few Israelis I am not frustrated with. I assumed a lot about them [the 
Israeli participants] and I felt that every Israeli held a conflict perception that 
was so persistent and strong. I think they all went to the same school, you know 
what I mean? 
So for me it was frustrating to see people from the Israeli side, who I 
thought were ready for a two state solution but were of course all Zionists. In a 




solution. But for me it was always very hard to find that the Israelis were not 
willing to face one reality, of what happened to the Palestinians.  
 
Which reality are you referring to? 
 
Israelis keep on saying that the creation of the Jewish state in Palestine 
had not affected the Arab inhabitants; but how could you create a Jewish state 
in a place that is Arab and not affect them? How can I go to India and say I 
want to have an Arab state but the Indians will not be affected. For me this is a 
psychological issue that does not necessarily have to have implications on the 
type of solution. It is like the right of return. I cannot see how Israel could insist 
on having no responsibility on that. It is ok for Jordan to absorb Palestinians, as 
it is for Syria, Lebanon, Sweden and the rest of the world, it is ok for them to 
assume responsibility but not for the Israelis.  
 
How would you describe the experience of your participation in the 
workshops? 
 
During the workshops I felt that the Israeli mentality of being powerful 
dictated the kind of solution we were approaching and the solution dictated the 
arguments. Maybe the participants on the Israeli side were more politically and 
more military oriented. While on the Palestinian side the participants were 
more intellectual and grass-root oriented, people to whom values like justice 
mean a lot.  
So for me it was educational but I was always frustrated with the kind of 
answers I got. And I remember one time when we were discussing the right of 
return, which is such an intense issue for me, the situation became so difficult 
that I had to leave the room, I could not take it, you know.  
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I remember one of the Israelis telling me: "you know Suad, I never, 
never understood how difficult this issue is for Palestinians until you cried." 
I felt that the whole issue of the right of return was something they were 
so insensitive about. [Starts crying] saying: that happens to me all the time. 
When I give a speech and I talk about an olive tree, I might start crying. And 
people ask me: "are you crying?" I say: "yes". They go on: "are you crying over 
the olive tree?" I say: "yes". [We both laugh]  
 
I guess that you are moved by what you associate with the olive tree? 
Yes. That is exactly what happened during one of the workshops. I think 
that of all the discussions we had, the most difficult one was the one about the 
right of return. There were a lot of emotions involved in that discussion. So 
what else did you want to ask me? 
 
How did your perception of the Israelis change during the workshops? 
 
It changed a lot. I think that both of us influenced one another. Even if 
you sit there and argue against something, at the end of the day you go on and 
you reflect on it. To me it was very important that there were moments, when I 
thought that they got affected by what we said and vice versa.  
Most importantly, all of us have our own narrative and we strongly 
believe in our narrative. Then we listened to the others’ narrative and some of 
it, we accepted as a fact. We did not have to approve of it nor adopt it but we 
learnt how to understand it. I think for me the most important thing was, that 
most of the people who were there, I think were Ashkenazi, were Europeans. 
An Arab can never understand the Holocaust. It is not part of our history of our 




In Israel the Holocaust is so present and I always said: I have nothing to 
do with the Holocaust. Why should I be bothered with this? But all of a sudden 
I realized that I was dealing with Europeans who were victims of that historic 
moment and you just cannot escape that. If I say I have nothing to do with that, 
it does not for that matter become the end of the story.  
Also there are a number of issues that I always had difficulties with and 
that remain difficult for me, which are mostly lines of thinking. For example, 
the Jews being a nation not a religion, these are basic differences. For me 
Islam, Christianity and Judaism are religions and people who belong to these 
religions are from different cultures. So what do you do if a religious 
community decides that they are a culture? I am not convinced about that, I 
think that the Moslem fundamentalists do the same thing; they say that they are 
a Muslim nation and I do not agree with the Muslims saying that. But when 
you are faced with someone who strongly claims that this is what they believe, 
you have to take it as a given and deal with it as a given. So when you are 
speaking with Israelis about some of these issues at the end of the day I tell 
myself that this is what they feel and you have to respect that feeling and go 
with it, without having to be convinced about it.  
When the Israelis talk about something that happened 2000 years ago, I 
cannot take it seriously because when the refugees are concerned they cannot 
remember anything. What will happen if Arabs start remembering things that 
happened 2000 years ago? I really have an unbelievable amount of difficulty 
with trying to conceive what Zionism is all about. But I take it as a given, one 
two three four, this is how they see it and I have to take it from there and go on. 
I think that is what I learnt from the workshops because every one participating 
in it felt so strongly about this. I decided that, while I will never be a Zionist by 
understanding, it is very simple for me to understand the Jewish feeling of 
insecurity, of what happened in Europe during the Second World War. This is 
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all very easy for me to understand on a psychological level and to be very 
sympathetic to it. But it is not easy for me to go with the ideology of what came 
after that. It is of two completely different sets of issues to me. I accept that 
these two are connected and that this is how they see the world and if you want 
to come to a solution in the end, you go along with that story.  
With regard to the narrative of what the Israelis did to the Palestinians, I 
once said during a workshop session: listen, recognition is very important for 
the Palestinians. If I was an Israeli or a Zionist and I would want to make peace 
with Palestinians I would stand up and say: I am sorry for everything we did to 
you, we kicked you out of this land, we destroyed your villages, but now we 
want to make peace with you, please forgive us! 
I would do this if I were an Israeli and it would not change anything 
with regard to the solution: it would not mean that the Israelis would have to 
give us more land, or more of Jerusalem, or that we would be given the right to 
absorb more Palestinian refugees.  
Basically what I was trying to say then [during the workshops] was, that 
you Israelis never want to face what you did to us in 1948. To tell me we lost a 
war, so what? 
Then one of them said: "Suad what do you want? You want us to say 
that Israel was born in sin"? I answered: "exactly, exactly". But being born in 
sin does not mean you do not have the right to live, or to education, to a good 
marriage and nice children, to a good life. But you were born in sin as far as the 
Palestinians are concerned.  
The beautiful thing of this situation was that it was my Israeli 
counterpart who formulated that for me. He went on saying that it was very 
difficult for them as well. I think that there are certain limits for the Israelis, if 




So the psychological, or should I say the existentialist, dimension of the 
workshops was very important for me. Of course you discuss the borders, 
Jerusalem and security but accepting one another was the most difficult part in 
all of these dialogues. The underlying tension, anxiety or frustration was 
mostly based on what both of us thought had happened to us in 1948 and what 
we were ready to acknowledge or not acknowledge or give excuses for. Of 
course the Israeli version always blames it on bad political leaders who did not 
advise them properly and part of this is true. I think the Arabs refusing to 
accept the 1948 partition was a terrible mistake looking at it from my 
perspective today. But these were not the reasons that made us refugees. It was 
a bigger theme of what happened in this land. Once you say you want to have a 
Jewish state, it causes a lot of consequences.  
For me accepting the other narrative means to say: yes, I did that to you. 
And this has nothing to do with [achieving] a political solution. The Israelis, on 
the other hand, always feel that if they acknowledge something like that, it 
evokes paying a price. I think because there were more politicians and more 
influential people on the Israeli side, it was more difficult for them to admit 
something like that. A politician cannot say yes to something without also 
saying yes to the absorbing of refugees. On the Palestinian side we were more 
intellectuals while on the Israeli side there were more functionalists.  
 
How did your perception of your own community change during the 
workshops? 
 
I do not think that it changed, because you know, you have Palestinians 
living in Diaspora and Palestinians living in the West Bank. As a refugee 
person from Jaffa and a Diaspora person who participated as a representative of 
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the Palestinian public from the inside [Occupied Territories], no I do not think 
that my perception of the Palestinian community changed.  
Maybe you could elaborate a bit on what you are getting at with that 
question? 
 
The question is directed at finding out how the workshop participation 
influenced your own identity perception in terms of accepting the other party 
without feeling threatened.  
 
 No, I do not think so, but I can tell you one thing: I mentioned before 
that I found out that we Palestinians have a sort of an inner strength and an 
inner peace when it comes to know who we are and what we are. I think that 
the Israelis went trough a process of identity [formation], which is much more 
complicated than ours. After all they have been through, they decided to 
become a nation they are, thus, a nation in formation. They are in a more 
difficult situation when it comes to answer the question about who they are and 
what they want to be.  
 
How did your perception of the conflict change?  
 
 One change that occurred was that I realized, that you cannot impose a 
solution, you have to reach an agreement on things. The most important thing 
for me was to understand that you have to work things out with one another. 
We cannot force anything on them, they cannot force something on us, because 
that will not be a lasting resolution of the conflict. I think that the Israelis have 
not quite come to terms with that. If they want a real solution, it has to be fair, 
they have to be generous. They would have to give the Palestinians what they 




work it out with the Israelis by talking, by making them understand who you 
are and by understanding each other's narrative, you may fall short because 
they always ask for a little bit more in return for what they are ready to give. 
Even though we went a long way in the workshops, the equation remained that 
we had to accept what they were ready to give us instead of being able to 
obtain from them what we asked for.  
On the one hand I felt that the discussions initiated a process that 
changed both sides. It made the Palestinians more realistic. When I talk to other 
Palestinians, I feel that there are two levels, the mental level of wanting a 
solution, of wanting peace, of wanting to divide the land; and the existentialist 
level on which Palestinians feel that they belong to Jaffa and that the Israelis 
have to apologize for taking that away from them, there is a lot of psychology 
involved in bridging that gap.  
On the other hand, I felt that during the workshops we were not able to 
close that gap.  
 
To what extent did you develop trust in being able to bridge this gap 
eventually?  
 
The trust was building slowly but I would say certainly. A lot of fears 
and misunderstandings were dissipated by hearing the other's narrative. 
Understanding one another diminishes misconceptions, and that in it self 
generates a feeling of confidence. A lot of fears and exaggerated images like 
Arabs wanting to throw Israelis in the sea or the Israelis wanting to kick us out 
of the West Bank become silly when you are ready to sit down and talk 
together. Because you realize that deep down both peoples want to find a 
solution. When you realize that the person in front of you wants to find a 
solution, then a lot of the misconceptions go away. Even if it is not outspoken, 
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such a process builds confidence to tackle important issues. All members of the 
group were ready to discuss difficult issues.  
I remember a discussion about the right of return when an Israeli asked 
me: how can I trust you that you do not claim back your house in Jaffa? I 
answered that on an emotional level I want to go back to my father's house, but 
what I feel is one thing, on a rational level, I realize that I have to give up on 
that idea. What is important for me, is for you to acknowledge, that I am able to 
give up on that claim, and thank me for that. You have to acknowledge that I 
paid a heavy prize and that I went a long way in order to get to this point, 
where I am ready to give up on such a claim.  
When you negotiate in such a way, that you touch on all the wounds and 
hear how everybody has been hurt and then look at how you can cure it, it 
builds confidence and trust in a very strong way.  
  
To what extent were you able to use ideas developed during the workshops in 
your social-political life? 
 
When you go through this kind of process [referring to the process set in 
motion by workshops] it helps you also on a personal level not just in the 
political context, concerning Palestine and Israel I think it teaches you how to 
listen to the other person. It helps if you get into a fight with your husband or 
experience a disagreement in the office and I think it gives you the patience to 
just sit back and listen to the other person and to what it is that they have to 
say; and take their feelings, their fears, or their crying seriously even if, again, 
you do not think it is worth while, but you cannot refuse to listen to the other 
who is in fact trying.  
I think the workshop teaches you how to sit down and listen to things 




formulate your ideas and just try to deal with it. It teaches you how to negotiate 
at the end of the day.  
I think what I learnt during the workshops was helpful for dealing with 
conflicts in general, for example at RIWAQ, and not to freak out about 
conflicts I encountered, but to realize that it is not the end of the world when 
you find yourself involved in a conflict; you just need to sit down and listen 
and you work it out. I think it thought me something very important: that 
problems have to be worked out. You have to talk without being afraid of 
talking; and doing that does not mean that you have to fight.  
I think at the beginning of the negotiations there was a lot of 
disagreement and anger. I am sure that in a situation like that, if somebody says 
something that you do not like, you do not even answer, you know what I 
mean? 
So I do not want to use the word tolerance but I think it does teach you 
how to deal with the other whoever that other is. It teaches you to handle 
situations in a calmer way. You learn how to put things in perspective. I do not 
need to sort everything out right now, or need to convince every person now, if 
I make one point it is enough.  
I think that the complexity of the situation during the workshops makes 
you feel that it is like a big wall of blocks it is very complicated. You have to 
be very patient and take it one at a time. Sometimes leave a difficult situation 
as it is and come back to it later. It is a process where you just feel that you 
need patience.  
 






Also with regard to the conflict? 
 
Right, to unwrap it, yes. 
 
So, what you are saying is, that you experienced that it is effective to work on 
the conflict over a long period of time and let discussions about a certain issue 
rest for a while, especially when there seems to be a deadlock, and then come 




Would you say that the confidence was there from both sides that this was 
doable? 
 
Right. You also have to realize it is a very energy taking process and 
there were times when I just felt that I could not go on, that did no that happen 
when I was taking part in the workshops, but during the last three or four years.  
One is just not always in the mood of discussing one’s existence, 
explaining who you are, what you are. Also with Israelis, there is always a lot 
of explaining involved about who you are, and what your intentions are and 
eventually you just say: Halas, I am fed up. Workshops are a very taxing 






Interview with Shimon Shamir, Tel Aviv, Israel, 9 April 2006 
 
Shimon Shamir is Professor Emeritus at Tel Aviv University. He served as 
Israel’s ambassador to Egypt (1988-1990) and as first ambassador to Jordan 
(1995-1997). He was appointed to the Orr Commission of Inquiry (2001-2003), 
which investigated clashes between the police and Palestinian Israeli citizens. 
He has published widely on the subject of Jewish-Arab relations. Among his 
publications are, “Self Views in Historical Perspective in Egypt and Israel”, 
“The Jews of Egypt”, and “Camp David Summit – what went wrong?”.  
 
 
What were you doing in your professional life when you were participating in 
interactive problem-solving workshops? 
 
I was a professor at the University of Tel Aviv.  
 
What socio-political activities were you engaged in at that time?  
 
None in the periods in which I functioned as ambassador in Cairo and in 
Amman. During the years in which I served as a diplomat I did not participate 
in political workshops.  
 
Why did you decide to participate in problem solving workshops? 
 
Because I believe in the method of citizen diplomacy. I think conflict 
resolution should not be left exclusively to diplomats and certainly not to 
generals. I thought that with more and more citizens becoming involved in the 
dialogue between Israelis and Palestinians, this might create an atmosphere that 
would be conducive toward peace making.  
You may remember that at the time of the first workshops it was a taboo 
for Israelis to meet with Palestinians. One of the initial purposes of initiating 
workshops was to break this taboo and enable both sides to talk to each other. 
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Over time this stopped to be an issue. Nowadays talking to Palestinians is no 
longer a problem for Israelis. Groups of citizens conducting talks with 
Palestinians have proliferated.  
Interactive problem solving workshops, which were once a pioneer 
initiative, are now just "one drop in the sea" of informal dialogue forums taking 
place between Israelis and Palestinians. Although IPS has particular 
methodological aspects it lost its uniqueness in the field of citizen diplomacy.  
 
What kind of new ideas or insights did you gain from the workshop meetings? 
 
In general I gained a better understanding of the positions and the 
priorities of the other side and its constraints and difficulties. I would say that I 
gained better insight with regard to fundamental issues, such as the refugee 
problem. Our "exercises" trying to identify specific points of agreement helped 
to clarify where the red lines of the other side were drawn and on which issues 
it felt it was impossible to compromise.  
Such exercises were very instructive. As much as one might have learnt 
from the literature about the Palestinians, it was still difficult to see what their 
core values and core beliefs were. In the workshops those underlying factors 
came to the surface.  
 
How did your own position change?  
 
Not in a drastic way, as I already came to the meetings with quite a 
moderate position. I did not feel that I had to temper my views much further as 
a result of my participation in the workshops. Actually, sometimes when I was 
confronted by the other side with a very rigid position, it worked toward the 




Israeli group-members, those who had not been as familiar with the Palestinian 
side, were considerably influenced.  
 
How did the change of perception come about? Can you remember a concrete 
example when you realized that something in your conflict perception changed 
or where you saw that other participants' perception changed? 
 
I can remember moments when I was disappointed by the Palestinian 
point of view and felt it was unnecessarily rigid. For example, when we were 
working on a possible solution to the refugee problem there was one 
Palestinian group-member, who even though he participated on all other issues 
very productively, when it came to this issue he blocked any attempt at 
reaching a realistic compromise. Also, when we discussed the question of 
Jerusalem, I thought it would be easier for the Palestinians to accept a 
compromise with regard to the holy places in Jerusalem. Whereas we were 
ready to recognize their full control of the Al Aqsa Mosque and the Haram, 
they would not recognize any historical link of the Jewish people to the Temple 
Mount. They insisted on full sovereignty, not even mentioning the existence of 
Jewish connections to those places.  
On the other hand there were times when I was encouraged by the fact 
that the Palestinian side presented positions that were more moderate than 
those of the PLO. If you look at the agreements that we managed to reach in 
our discussions in the workshops you will see this gap. That gave us some 
hope. It was also encouraging to realize that none of the Palestinian workshop 
participants supported terrorism or violence in any form.  
 




It was gratifying to realize that some of our understandings reached a 
wider public. This after all was one of our assignments. We did not participate 
in the workshops just to revolutionize ourselves. The idea of this method was to 
develop an instrument that would eventually influence a wider public. Indeed, 
following the workshop discussions, I and other Israeli colleagues would write 
articles in the press or give media interviews. We also spoke with officials. 
When we reported about the existence of moderate Palestinian positions we 
were on solid ground because we heard them firsthand. So, insights gained in 
the workshops served to impact the public. We tried to convince members of 
the Israeli political elite, we were in touch with such people and reported to 
them about the content of our meetings. I think that this had some influence.  
There is no question that in time such meetings were instrumental in 
bringing about a change in public opinion in Israel. The Israeli public opinion 
started from a position of complete denial of the existence of a Palestinian 
people but it was gradually transformed towards understanding that a particular 
Palestinian identity did exist and that the Israelis need to relate to this reality. 
Gradually the majority of the Israeli public accepted the idea that it was 
necessary to talk to the PLO, which had previously been a taboo and even 
illegal. The workshop meetings constituted one factor that brought about an 
understanding that Israel had to talk to the PLO. Also the idea of the two-state 
solution, which had been rejected for a long time, gained gradually the support 
of a majority of the Israelis. This revolutionary change in the Israeli attitude 
was advanced by people, who participated in track-two meetings of this type.  
 
How would you comment on Interactive Problem Solving as a method? 
 
I think one of its methodological weaknesses concerned the selection of 




finding suitable participants is complex and time-consuming. I do not think that 
there was a method available for doing it efficiently. The workshops 
themselves were conducted in a very faire mode. The agenda was carefully set 
and yet professor Kelman was not too rigid about it. When the group wanted to 
concentrate on some other issue, he would make the necessary changes. He 
functioned as facilitator and worked in a systematic way. He took detailed 
notes and prepared comprehensive summaries of the discussions. He carefully 
chose a co-chair who would create a balance in the third party between Jewish 
and Arab affiliations; this I found very helpful. Professor Kelman showed great 
empathy to both sides, as it is indeed required from a third party handling a 








Interview with Shlomo Gazit, Tel Aviv, Israel, 9 April 2006 
 
Shlomo Gazit is a retired Major General in the Israel Defense Forces and was 
in the past head of the intelligence service of the Israeli army 1974–1979. Upon 
his retirement from the IDF, he served as President of the Ben Gurion 
University in Beersheba for a one four-year term. Since 1988 he has been a 
member of the staff of Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at the Tel Aviv 
University. Among his publications are: “The Carrot and the Stick: Israel's 
Policy in Judaea and Samaria, 1967-68, “ The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and 
Peace in the Middle East” and “Trapped Fools”.  
 
 
What were you doing in your professional life when you were participating in 
interactive problem-solving workshops?  
 
I am a retired Israeli military and I met Professor Kelman for the first 
time, when I spent a year at the Center for International Affairs at Harvard 
University. I was working there on my book "The Carrot and the Stick". He 
organized a summer seminar on the Palestinian perception of the Israeli-Arab 
conflict. I joined that seminar and Professor Kelman arranged a number of 
confidential meetings between a Palestinian-Lebanese Professor and myself. At 
that time Israelis were not allowed to have any open dialogue with members of 
the PLO but under the cover of academic premises these meetings became 
possible.  
After this stay at Harvard University, I retired from services and spent a 
number of years as president of the Ben Gurion University in Israel. If I am not 
mistaken, Professor Kelman initiated the interactive problem-solving 
workshops several years later. He spent a year, I think, at the US Institute of 
Peace in Washington, while I was at the Woodrow Wilson Center and we got 




workshop groups and asked me whether I would like to join, and I said that I 
would be glad to do so. That was how it all started.  
 
Why did you decide to participate in problem-solving workshops? 
 
I have difficulties remembering that, as I was participating in many 
different Track Two initiatives at that time, sometimes even with the same 
people. I am saying this because I am a very strong believer in the importance 
of Track Two meetings and the importance of having a dialogue and of getting 
together and understanding each other. Because of my close connection with 
the Israeli decision-making leadership, I always made it a point to report after 
each meeting, what had been discussed, what the special points were and what 
new ideas had been brought up. I tried to influence the Minister of Defense or 
even the Prime Minister with those new insights.  
So I saw the problem solving workshop meetings as one of those many 
different Track Two dialogues in which I had been involved.  
 
What kind of new ideas did you gain during the problem solving workshops? 
 
I remember some of those meetings as quite frustrating because 
Professor Kelman was sometimes too theoretical and trying too much to put the 
conflict issues into the framework of his academic theory. I found that this 
attempt did not work. I remember that the workshop group had some serious 
disputes on that subject.  
My personal benefit from the workshop meetings consisted more of 
contacts with some of the participants, with Palestinian friends with whom we 
developed a dialogue, than of advancements on conflict issues.  
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One of the concrete outputs of the workshop dialogue was Bitter 
Lemons, which two former participants initiated during the meetings, which is 
an extremely important development.  
 
How did your conflict perception change during the workshop meetings? 
 
My perception of the conflict had always been on the optimistic side. I 
believe my first dialogue after taking off the uniform was with the American 
Psychiatrist Association, which had organized meetings with Israelis and 
Egyptians in the 1980s. Those meetings also moved in the same direction [as 
problem-solving workshops]. When I brought my wife to one of those meetings 
for the first time, she reacted with astonishment that those counterparts were 
“normal” human beings, just like us.  
 
How would you comment on interactive problem solving as a method? 
 
I would divide the effort into two parts. One was extremely positive as 
the method and the personal contribution of Professor Kelman were totally 
dedicated to the attempt of bringing two parties to sit down together, to discuss, 
to analyze their positions as they were and to try and find breakthroughs 
towards a new step. This part was very successful; we made a lot of progress. 
The other one was the effort's theoretical pattern of what a dialogue between 
the two political camps should look like. I found that the effort was trying to 







Interview with a Palestinian Political Scientist, Ramallah, West 
Bank, 11 April 2006.  
 
A PhD in Middle East politics from the University of Durham and co-founder 
and co-editor of bitterlemons.org. As a member of the Palestinian delegation 
for the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference he participated in the 
Washington negotiations from 1991 to 1993. He was appointed as Palestinian 
National Authority Minister of Labor in 2002, and as Planning Minister in 
2005. He is Director of the Government Media Centre and lectures at Bir Zeit 
University.   
 
 
What were you doing in your professional life when you were participating in 
interactive problem solving-workshops in the 1990s?  
 
I used to be a lecturer for cultural studies at Birzeit University at that 
time and I was also the director of a non-governmental organization and the 
director of the Jerusalem Media Center, which used to do media and research.  
 
What kind of social political activities were you involved in? 
I was involved, for example, in activities of the Peace Camp in Israel3 
focusing on furthering Israeli-Palestinian interactions.  
 
Why did you decide to participate in a problem-solving workshop? 
 
Because I was invited [laughs]; I have always been a believer in the 
importance of interactions between Israelis and Palestinians. I always thought 
that one of the problems was that they did not listen to us nor did we listen to 
them, although we have so much to tell each other about our lives, about how 




That is why I never wasted an opportunity of interacting with Israelis. I 
used to do that through grass-root activities. During the First Intifada, which 
was a non-violent Intifada I used to be active in the fighting with grass-root 
Israeli activists.   
So I followed the invitation of Herb Kelman to participate in problem-
solving workshops, because they were consistent with what I believe to be 
useful in terms of activities contributing to mutual understanding and hopefully 
to preparing the ground for a peaceful process, rather than an ongoing violence.  
 
How did your perception of the conflict change during your participation in the 
workshops? 
I would not say that it changed a lot because it was not the first 
encounter that I had with the other side. I knew the two faces of Israel very 
well, before I first participated in a problem-solving workshop. I had been 
introduced to the ugly face of Israel, when I was arrested and spent several 
years of my life in prison and I experienced the Israeli police and the torturing, 
etc. At the same time I had very positive experiences with Israelis in the Peace 
Camp.  
The workshops gave me an improved perception of the Israeli situation 
because we used to have systematic discussions with Israelis, who were 
specialized and experienced on certain aspects of the conflict, like on refugees 
or historical issues.  
First, the workshops broadened and refined my knowledge and 
experience about different views of the Israeli side.  
Second, the systematic discussions that we used to have, helped me to 
differentiate with regard to my own views of the conflict. I think that a lot of 
the Israeli participants probably also experienced that. It helped me also to see 




What particular new insights did you gain from the workshop discussions?  
 
It is difficult to think of something specific, I learnt a lot of additional 
things in spite of my previous experience and background on the issue. The 
discussions were useful in terms of getting into the details of conflict issues and 
also in terms of the trade off possibilities for the different components of the 
conflict. It enabled me to learn about the limits of the potential Israeli 
negotiating positions, which correspond to the limits of the different Israeli 
parties, because there are differences between them on those issues. It helped 
me also to understand the differences and the different extents of flexibility 
between the different Palestinian positions in response to the Palestinian 
demands and requirements. The meetings also helped creating some confidence 
between us especially as some of us became involved in the official 
negotiations later on. The same was true for the Israeli side. So, that was 
another achievement, which resulted from the previously gained familiarity on 
the positions and the people, in addition to some confidence that had resulted 
from this familiarity.  
 
How did your perception of the Israeli side change through your workshop 
participation? 
 
I did not see them [the Israelis] as being different compared to my 
previous perception, but I got to know Israelis, their different positions and 
their way of thinking in more details and in a much deeper way than before. It 
is one thing to get an impression through personal meetings, and another to 
gain information through reading or listening to the media. Having these 
lengthy detailed systematic workshops, with discussions that went into the 
details of the details and enabled both sides to learn more and increase their 
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understanding on a much deeper level, showed the variety of possible views 
and positions of the other side.  
 
How did the view that you had of your own community change?  
 
I am not sure that there are relations between the workshop experience 
and the perception of my own community. These encounters were directed at 
understanding the other side and to be understood by the other side but not 
about understanding our own community.  
 
What I mean is that, sometimes when you look at yourself through someone 
else's eyes you see yourself differently.  
 
Yes that is possible, but I do not think that this was the case for me.  
 
Were you able to use some new ideas that you gained from the workshops in 
your professional or social political activities?  
 
In an informal way, yes. I have used information and expertise, which I 
gained from various activities either internally in my writing or teaching, or 
when I exchanged views with people from my side engaged in governmental or 
non-governmental activities. I also used such information in relation to 
activities with international people or with Israelis when I started to interact 
with them on an official level, at a later stage.  
 





There were two approaches in general that were used one was intended 
to produce written statements, the other focused mainly on discussions.  
In the first stage of the workshop we used to have systematic discussions 
without writing. At the later stages we started to try to write. The approach 
focusing on discussions was, in my view, more productive and useful than the 
one focusing on producing written statements. The phase was not mature 
enough to produce writings that would include significant progress in degrees 
of certainty. So if you looked at the writings we produced, you would see that 
the areas of agreement we were able to identify were not new, those were areas 
on which it was possible to reach Israeli-Palestinian agreements and the areas, 
which we did not agree on, were areas that were known to be difficult. The 
contribution was little in terms of bridging the gap, when we attempted to 
produce written statements.  
While the previous phase, which was about discussions without the 
objective of agreeing, be it within the dialogue or in writing, was more useful 
because it was freer and people were more forthcoming. We used to achieve 
more because nobody would worry that what he or she was saying needed to be 
reported. I found the style, which had less of an official negotiation character, 
more useful.  






Interview with Herbert C. Kelman, Cambridge, USA,  
3 September 2008.  
 
Herbert C. Kelman is the Richard Clarke Cabot Professor of Social Ethics, 
Emeritus, at Harvard University and was (from 1993 to 2003) Director of the 
Program on International Conflict Analysis and Resolution at Harvard's 
Weatherhead Center for International Affairs. He has developed Interactive 
Problem Solving and applied it to the Arab-Israeli conflict, with special 
emphasis on its Israeli-Palestinian component. He regularly publishes on issues 
of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and on aspects of theory and practice of 
conflict resolution. . He is recipient of many awards, including the Grawemeyer 
Award for Ideas Improving World Order (1997), and the Austrian Medal of 
Honor for Science and Art First Class (1998) and the Socrates Prize (2009) 
granted by the German institution Zentrale für Mediation in Berlin to honour 
outstanding work to the enhancements of mediation science and practice.  
 
 
Which important changes in the perception, or in the behavior of workshop 
participants, did you experience during the period of the Oslo Process? 
 
 Let me just mention a couple of things that are on the top of my mind. 
These things go back to the earlier years. One thing that I noticed in some of 
the early workshops was, that some of the Israeli participants, and you have to 
understand that I am generalizing here, had a tendency to dominate the 
discussions. This reflected in a way the dynamics of the real world in terms of 
power differentials. There were occasions when Israelis told Palestinians: If 
you want Israelis to be open to negotiations and policy changes you need to do 
x, y and z. The Palestinians of course resented that the Israelis told them what 
they had to do.  
 This was one of the cases where the third party would intervene  
Although, there are power differences between the two sides, I always 
argue that the power differentials are not only one sided, in military, political 




international reputation, human rights support and moral dimensions the 
Palestinians have more power.  
 Where there is a power differential, it is part of the job of the third party 
to help to empower the weaker party by turning to them and say: let's see what 
the other side has to say. I have felt, in my groups at least, and this might even 
be true in the more general terms of the outside world, less of that and more of 
the readiness to also listen to the other side. I remember one person in 
particular, who was very marked for doing that and knew exactly what he 
wanted and was very precise in terms of formulating what the other side had to 
do. I remember that same person at a later stage volunteered at one occasion 
and said: "we need to hear what the Palestinians have to say on that subject, 
first." So there, I think the [workshop] experience sensitized them to that 
tendency to compensate for and to be aware of the power differences. That is 
one example of a change that occurred. It is a very natural one that comes from 
what the workshops involve. You cannot spend so much time talking to the 
other side without realizing that they have their own thoughts, their own needs, 
and that they have their own rights. I think that the atmosphere of the 
workshops, the way they are structured, and the occasional third-party 
interventions contribute to that.  
On the Palestinian side, I noticed – also in the earlier years but I saw it 
resurfacing recently – a tendency to trivialize Israeli security concerns, in the 
backdrop of Israel being a nuclear power. Sometimes this led to a process of 
making the psychology behind Israeli security concerns transparent by relating 
them to what the Jews had experienced in Europe. But I think that, what I felt 
over the years was, the greater part of Palestinian participants recognized that 
the Israelis do have security concerns. Because the concern they have of 
sending their children on a bus to school is not minimized by the fact that 
somewhere there are nuclear weapons. In more general terms, Palestinians 
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realized that the strategic situation of Israel in the Middle East creates 
understandable security concerns, which may be magnified by historical 
experiences but are related to hard realities; and the Palestinians were willing to 
– in a sense you might say – accept Israeli's equality with regard to that 
example [of security concerns].  
So these are a couple of examples of observed changes that come to 
mind. Each example in its own way, involves recognition of equality about the 
other side in important respects, which is of course one of the principles [of 
IPS]. One of the ground-rules of the workshop is equality in the setting, even 
though there are inequalities, and you have to be aware of these inequalities, in 
the real world.  
Within the groups, particularly when you are dealing with people who 
have known each other, or who have participated not just in our activities but in 
a range of Track Two activities, there are people with experience in this sort of 
thing. There is a kind of "ingroupness", which does not transcend the conflict 
by any means they all know what their problems are, but at least in terms of 
entering a discussion it seems to transcend it. In the sense that participants can 
talk with each other as people, who are – I would almost say – like 
professionals, like people with the same line of work, who can talk to each 
other although they may have a lot of differences in terms of social origins and 
all of that.  
There is almost a degree of professionalism in talking about these issues 
that has developed within a certain cadre. As some of the people say in your 
interviews, there is a certain cadre of people, who are involved in all of these 
activities, which by no means transcends the conflict but influences their 
relations in terms that they can relate to each other.  
By the way, in the interviews, I saw that both Yossi Alpher and Ghassan 




the relationship that he and Ghassan have developed. This is an example of the 
kind of thing that I have in mind. And I agree with what Yossi says, that this 
does not mean that they agree with each other. They actually disagree. And 
they disagreed perhaps more than others. For example, Ghassan Khatib, and 
Moshe Ma’oz agree much more than Ghassan and Yossi Alpher do. There is 
this shared element, which does not solve the conflict, but which is not an 
insignificant development in terms of the notion of creating cadres [of people] 
who are used to communicate with each other and who see value in it, even 
though they do not see it as solving all the problems. Both Yossi and Ghassan, 
each in their own way, are very realistic about the limitations of personal 
relations, but they were supportive for them in a constructive way.  
I am sort of very pleased about that. They may have gotten to know each 
other independently of our groups but that is where they worked together for a 
while.  
 
And during the workshops they realized that it was possible to work together 
on a joint project. 
 
 Yes, and they saw the need for that and the value of it and most 
importantly the possibility for it.  
  
What would you say is the nature of these changes that you described? 
 
 It consists of sort of a comfortable acceptance of the other, of what you 
have in common with the other, which really is almost independent of political 
positions. I suppose it would be very difficult for this to happen if you had 
extremists on the two sides, which we do not, we have moderates with varying 
degrees of moderation [smiles]. Within that group there was kind of an 
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acceptance of the other, an acceptance of the other's equality as a person, as 
somebody with rights and with values and abilities and talents.  
 It is a comfortable way of dealing with each other like between 
professionals. I use the word professional to refer to the relationship between 
workshop participants, but do not want to imply that it is professional in the 
strict sense of the term, but it has that qualities, that you can work together on a 
common set of assumptions, a common methodology. And a common purpose, 
although with variations of that purpose, what the one ultimately hopes for is 
not the same as what the other ultimately hopes for, but it offers the 
opportunity for accommodating each other, it is that sort of thing that 
happened. It involves a kind of respect for the other, which you do not have in 
societies in conflict. I think a lot of it comes from meeting each other in a 
setting, in which people do function as equals.  
 It is often trivialized that people get to like each other. If you participate 
in this experience you meet other people in ways that go beyond the conflict, 
that even go beyond the resolution of the conflict, you meet them as people. 
But I think the liking is a small part of it and I do not think that it is the most 
important part of it. It is more respect than liking that is important. It is the fact 
that you can establish a working relationship with people from the other side.  
 I would imagine that similar kind of thing happen also in official 
diplomacy.  
 So it is respect that I would stress here, which is separate from liking 
and definitely separate from agreement.  
Can this qualify as a change of identity that occurs within a personal identity 
layer? In the sense that conflict is experienced at a personal and on a political 





 But it has political implications as well. The change in identity, I would 
say, is that you see yourself as someone who can work with the people from the 
other side. In a bitter conflict there is a total separation of self from the other. 
The other is evil and dangerous and stupid. And now that other becomes a 
potential partner. It is a partnership that emerges. Partnership has many 
meanings; it is a working partnership, a working relationship that happens.  
 By the way, I have written about something, although I was not there, 
and it is based on very indirect information, I felt that this kind of a working 
relationship or partnership developed between Rabin and Arafat. And this kind 
of relationship has limitations. As long as Rabin was alive, I think it had an 
important role.  
I ventured to say something that nobody can disprove nor can I prove it, 
that if Rabin had lived on, that partnership might have made a big difference; 
that was a big loss to the process. They were the strangest partners, it was not 
predictable but there was something in the dynamics that allowed for that to 
happen. But this is a different situation of ours obviously, but it made me think 
of that change you mentioned.  
 
That the change that was going on was a change in terms of how I see myself in 
reference to the conflict and in reference to the other side. 
 
 Yes, and that it is not a total … 
 
Monolithic enemy image? 
 
Exactly, monolithic view of the other side, as it was before. And for our 
purposes, the important thing is to see that there are people on the other side 
with whom you can work. That is what it is, and that is a lot [laughs]. So, it 
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helps at times to like people, but it is not the key element; that is what I would 
argue.  
 
These changes, maybe also changes on a more political level, are they still in 
place, or have they been reversed? 
 
Let me put it this way, on the base of my own experience, you know, I 
am working with a very select group of people, but I have been able to witness 
this group of people in professional meetings. Of course, there were moments 
of impatience and annoyance and anger, that happened every once in a while, 
but it is amazing how rarely it happened, and if it did, it would not matter 
because people were there to work together.  
With regard to the current conflict situation, I have been thinking about 
going back to the old format of the workshop and just hold discussions without 
focusing on producing a written product. Reading your interviews with former 
participants has helped me come closer to a decision with regard to that.  
 
You said that Israelis have continued to argue before and after the Oslo 
Process that there is no negotiation partner on the side of the Palestinians, but 
that they now argue on a different basis. Pre Oslo the existence of the 
Palestinians as a people was not recognized and they therefore could not have 
had legitimate political representation. Post Oslo, the existence of the 
Palestinians as a people remains unquestioned. The reason why there is no 
negotiation partner now, is because Israel criticizes that Abbas cannot 
implement an eventual negotiated agreement as his power is curtailed by the 
influence of the Hamas. So, the acceptance of the Palestinians as a people is a 





 It began happening during the Intifada. The Intifada persuaded a lot of 
Israelis who were not thinking of this before, that the Palestinians are here to 
stay, that they are a people and have the aspirations of a people.  
I was in Gaza at the time the Oslo Agreement was signed and before and 
after that time I was in Israel. There was an editorial in one of the conservative 
Israeli papers saying that the reactions of the Palestinians to the Oslo 
Agreement, the joy that it ignited, reminded them of what happened in the 
Jewish community in Palestine in November 1947, when the UN partition 
resolution was passed, which basically called for the establishment of a Jewish 
state. It reminded them of their reaction, of their dancing in the streets. That 
was an important thing to me, because it was – although covertly – a 
recognition that there was a people aiming for a state, and the empathy that this 
implied: they remind us of ourselves, when we first realized that there was a 
possibility for a state. That was a major fact for many Israelis, and I think this 
is an irreversible change, if anything is irreversible, but I think with all of the 
ups and downs, this is a change in perception that I think represents a real 
change.  
 
In the sense, that this change was really integrated into the identity structure of 
the two peoples' identities? 
 
 I think so, at least to some extend. Of course there are still people who 
cannot fathom this idea. The point about my current formulation of the two-
states-one-country solution, I would like to say that the land belongs to both 
peoples. I would argue that this is not at the core of the identity. At the core of 
the identity is: the land belongs to me. It is overlaid by the exclusiveness of that 




I agree [we both laugh]. Maybe it would be possible to achieve this change of 
perception through the introduction of a conceptual model of state and country 
that participants could work with and then apply to their realistic situation? 
 
 This basic idea is not new and it is not even mine. It emerged during a 
workshop in 1982. I do not remember whether somebody else or myself started 
to develop the concept of a united country with divided sovereignty and that 
comes from an old concept, you know people have been talking about the 
solution to the problem of Jerusalem, which still holds today, the solution is a 
united city with divided sovereignty, and that sovereignty is not all there is, you 
can be united and still have divided sovereignties. I suppose in some sense 
Switzerland represents that kind of a model, although it is a complicated one, 
and you cannot quite reproduce a Swiss situation. But that was at the heart of 
the idea.  
 
So you think some of the changes that happened during the Oslo Process are 
still in place? 
 
Yes. I mean, someone was saying that most Israelis have never met a 
Palestinian; they would meet Palestinians who live in Israel, but not 
Palestinians from the West Bank or Gaza. So we are talking about a very small 
group of people, who underwent that change, and I do not know how large a 
generalization you can draw from that, but I think a lot of social change 
happens in small circles and than you have, what is called the diffusion of 
innovations, change diffuses in its own ways.  
I read somewhere, maybe even in one of your interviews, that only 3 
percent of the population is involved in Israeli-Palestinian interactions, and so 




experimenting with a new relationship, which may then expand, it will never 
expand to the entire population, but it does not necessarily need to, for the 
purpose of establishing peaceful and productive relations. That is really, in a 
way, what I think was happening in these small enclaves [of workshop 
participants and other people taking part in Israel-Palestinian interactions], and 
it is still there, these enclaves exist. And I would like to believe that it is a 
contribution to change, which will expand, even tough these people are 
experiencing very hard times now.  
 
 
                                                
Notes:  
 
1 bitterlemons is an internet platform (www.bitterlemons.com) on which Israelis and 
Palestinians publish articles on prominent issues of concern regarding conflict 
issues and Israeli-Palestinian relations. It is produced and edited by Ghassan Khatib 
and Yossi Alpher, who also contribute articles. Its goal is to contribute to increase 
mutual understanding through the open exchange of ideas. bitterlemons aspires to 
impact on the way Palestinians and Israelis, but also the international public think 
about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. 
 
2 RIWAQ is a Ramallah based non-profit organization for the protection and 
development of architectural heritage in Palestine. 
Riwaq's activities include the National Registry of Historic Buildings, the 
implementation of some fifty conservation projects in major towns and villages, a 
number of Protection Plans for Historic Centers, the publication of ten books on 
cultural heritage, and a Photo Archive.  
In 2006, RIWAQ won the Dubai International Award for its successful Job Creation 
through Conservation project. The objective of the project was to tackle the problem 
of high unemployment in Palestine and to contribute to the organization's main aim 
of protecting cultural heritage in Palestine. 
 
3 The Israeli Peace Camp is a self-described collection of movements which claim to 
strive for peace with the Arab neighbours of Israel, including the Palestinians, 
Syrians and Lebanese, and encourage co-existence with the Arab citizens of Israel. 
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2001 – 2004 Ausbildung zur diplomierten Mediatorin  
 DEZA / Inmedio / Bern 
● Systemische Fragetechnik ● Metaphorische 
 Konfliktbearbeitung (Dr. Friedrich Glasl)  
● Faszilitation von Dialogprozessen (Dr. Günther Baechler) 
 
 
Berufserfahrung    
2009 – heute Kollars Kommunikation GmbH / Baden  
 Management Trainerin und HR Consultant  
● Konfliktmanagement ● Mediation ● Kommunikationsberatung 
●Teamentwicklung ● Führungsentwicklung 
● Strategische Personalplanung ● Kompetenzmodelle    
 
2007 – 2009 Schmidt Management Consulting AG / Zürich  
 Consultant 
● Knowledge Management ● Verfassen von Studien 
● Projektmitarbeit: Training von Vertriebsmitarbeitenden 
   
2003 – 2007 EKR AG IT-Banking Consulting / Zürich 
 Consultant 
● Personalmanagement ● Knowledge Management  
● Projektmitarbeit: Kommunikationsmodelle und Kundenberatung 
 
2002 – 2003 Harvard University / Cambridge (USA) 
Weatherhead Center for International Affairs 
Professor Herbert C. Kelman  
 Research Associate 
● Forschungsaufenthalt  
● Mitgestaltung von Konfliktlösungssimulationen 
 
2001 – 2002   Forschungsstelle für Sicherheitspolitik und  
   Konfliktanalyse / ETH Zürich 
 Research Associate 
   ● Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeit  
   ● Publikationsarbeit 
 
